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The sale in execution of the primary residence of a consumer has numerous implications. 
This is especially in light of section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (‘Constitution’) which gives people the right to adequate housing and to not be 
arbitrarily evicted from their homes. The enactment of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
(‘NCA’) which aims to balance the rights of creditors and consumers also impacted the 
procedure to sell homes in execution. In particular, section 129 of the NCA has pre-
enforcement procedures whilst section 130 allows credit agreements to be reinstated if 
consumers can pay the overdue amounts and other costs in full. In addition, amendments 
were made to the Magistrates’ Court Rules and the Uniform Rules of Court regarding the sale 
of consumers’ homes. The new requirements introduced by the NCA and procedures 
introduced by the court rules resulted in a great deal of confusion with different courts and 
judges adopting different approaches.   
Eventually, several matters which sought to sell consumers’ homes in execution were 
heard in Absa Bank v Mokebe and Related Matters 2018 (6) SA 492 (GJ) (‘Mokebe case’). 
Van der Linde J of the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court, used the power granted in 
section 14(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 to, in consultation with the Judge 
President, discontinue the hearing of the matters before him and refer the matters to the full 
bench of the Division.  In essence, the court held that a uniform approach must be taken by 
the judges of this Division regarding how they handle foreclosure matters.  
This thesis investigates the procedure that creditors should follow before they are 
entitled to sell consumers’ homes in execution.  In order to do this, this thesis will examine 
the Constitution, NCA, court rules, practice notes and case law. More specifically, the persons 
that are the focus of the investigation are creditors that have a security right in the form of a 
mortgage bond over the home, versus consumers who have become overindebted and are no 
longer able to meet their obligations under the loan agreement that was entered into with the 
creditors. The recent landmark Mokebe case is examined in depth to determine what the 
current law is and how it can be improved. Furthermore, the effect of the Mokebe case in 
other High Court Divisions in the country will be briefly discussed. Lastly, this thesis sets out 
what consumers can do to prevent their homes being sold on public auction especially after 
they default in their payments. 
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This thesis will show that the procedure to sell homes in execution has drastically changed 
from the pre-constitutional to the current constitutional dispensation. However, it is submitted 
that the procedures can still be improved upon. This is because the right to adequate housing 
is an important socio-economic right which has been undervalued and overlooked. The courts 
have previously allowed execution of homes without considering the circumstances of 
consumers. The court rules allowed for this as the contractual rights of creditors were held at 
a higher standard than the socio-economic rights of consumers. It is argued that in the light of 
the NCA and its aims, there must be an appropriate balancing of the rights of creditors and 
consumers to create just outcomes. If we are to truly create a society based on ‘human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms’ as 
expressed in the founding values of South Africa’s Constitution and reiterated to a large 
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1.1 Conceptualisation of Key Terms 
 
In the context of this thesis: 
 
1. Creditors: are institutions or persons who are owed money by consumers and 
their right to be repaid is secured by a mortgage bond. They may also be 
referred to as credit providers, banks or mortgagees. 
2. Consumers: are people who owe creditors money for a home loan and they 
have registered a mortgage bond over their home. They may also be referred 
to as debtors or mortgagors. 
3. Home: refers to a person’s immovable property where they primarily stay. 
This may also be referred to as their primary residence or house. 
4. Home Loan: refers to a loan that a consumer gets, usually from a bank, to buy 
a home and the loan is secured by a mortgage bond. The consumer is required 
to repay the loan over a period of time (usually 20 or 30 years) in monthly 
instalments. 
5. Sale in execution: refers to the legal process that takes place when properties 
are sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the court who has received 
instructions from an execution creditor (usually a bank). The creditor will take 
action against consumers who have failed to meet their monthly bond 
instalments. The property is sold to the highest bidder.  The sale is not subject 
to the approval of either the consumer or the bank. This will also be referred to 
as foreclosure or execution.  
 
1.2 Introduction and Background to Research Problem 
 
A home is one of the most important assets that a person can buy. However, very few people 
are in the position to pay the cash price of a home. They must borrow money, usually from a 
bank, to do so and this is referred to as a home loan.  A mortgage bond will be registered over 
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the consumer’s home, which will give the creditor security if the consumer is unable to repay 
the money borrowed.1 The mortgage bond functions as security for the debt to be paid. In 
other words, if the consumer defaults in payments and no settlement arrangement is agreed 
to, the creditor can proceed to execute against the consumer’s assets, including the home, to 
use the proceeds of the sale to pay back the debt.2 
At the time the consumer buys the home and registers the mortgage bond, the 
consumer can afford the home and repay the loan. Affordability assessments are dealt with in 
the National Credit Act (‘NCA’)3 which governs money lending transactions in South 
Africa. The Act has introduced significant consumer protection measures, but it also seeks to 
balance consumer rights against the rights of creditors.4   
The most important right that creditors have is the right to be repaid.5 Hence, when 
consumers borrow money, they must repay it.  However, for numerous reasons such as a 
weak economy or a situation arises that causes financial hardship to consumers, for example 
retrenchment or illness; consumers who were quite sure that they could afford to pay the 
money back suddenly find themselves in a position where they can no longer afford the 
repayments.6  What happens then? Creditors are entitled to their money but for consumers, a 
home represents so much more than money. In fact, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (‘Constitution’)7 protects consumers’ right to have access to adequate housing.8 
Furthermore, no one may be deprived of property or evicted from housing without a court 
issuing an order after considering all the relevant circumstances.9 These consumer rights 
conflict with creditors’ rights to property and execution. Hence there is a need for a clear 





                                            
1 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe and Related Cases 2018 (6) SA 492 (GJ) para 1.  
2 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa 3 ed (1987) 5.  
3 Act 34 of 2005. All references to the Act or to sections of the Act are to the NCA, unless otherwise stated. 
4 Section 3(d) of the NCA. Also see Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2010 (1) SA 439 (SCA) para 17; SA Taxi 
Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha 2011 (1) SA 310 (GSJ) para 32. 
5 Section 3(c)(i) of the NCA. 
6 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 3. 
7 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. All references to the Constitution or to sections of the 
Constitution are to this Constitution, unless otherwise stated. 
8  Section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
9  Sections 25(1) & 26(3) of the Constitution. 
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1.3 Purpose of Study  
 
This thesis will examine the procedure that creditors should follow before a house is sold in 
execution to satisfy the outstanding mortgage bond amount. More specifically, it will 
examine the implications if the house is the home of the consumer especially in light of the 
Constitution, NCA, court rules, and development of case law. The recent landmark judgment 
on this issue, Absa Bank v Mokebe and Related Matters,10 (‘Mokebe case’) will be examined 
in depth to determine what the current law is and to propose what should be done in future.11 
 
1.4 Rationale for Study and Desired Outcomes 
 
The issue of sales in execution of homes is an extremely topical one at present, especially 
since the right to adequate housing was entrenched in the Constitution and the introduction of 
the NCA which seeks to protect the rights of consumers. However, the courts have also been 
very clear that creditors have rights too and the courts must ensure a balancing of the rights 
between consumers and creditors.12   
Over the years creditors have been heavily criticised for the processes that they have 
followed when it comes to reclaiming the money which they have lent to consumers. It has 
been argued that South Africa has some of the most abusive sale in execution practices in the 
world.13 It has also been alleged that despite the introduction of the Constitution, over 
100 000 families have lost their homes through the sale in execution process. This has been 
possible because creditors can easily obtain and enforce court judgments.  
The NCA became operative in 2007 and it introduced new procedures which must be 
followed before creditors can proceed to claim an outstanding debt. These new procedures 
have had an impact on sales in execution. The court rules have also been amended to better 
protect the right of consumers to adequate housing. However, interpreting the law has led to 
                                            
10 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). Also see Absa Bank Limited v Njolomba and Related Cases 2018 (5) 
SA 548 (GJ) para 3-4.  
11 A consumer can also lose their home if they become insolvent and their estate is sequestrated in terms of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. However, that is not the focus of this thesis.  
12 Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd (note 4 above) para 17 & SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha (note 4 
above) para 32. 
13 Ryan C ‘SA banks sued for R60bn in home repossession case’ (2017)  available at 
https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/r60bn-home-repossession-suit-against-banks-20170816 
last accessed 8 October 2019. Also see DJ Shaw The Constitutionality of Sale in Execution for less than market 
value or where alternatives are available (Unpublished), LLD thesis, University of Witwatersrand (2019). 
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many problems and different courts have followed different procedures. This led to a Practice 
Manual14 being issued in February 2018 which included a directive on ‘foreclosure when 
property is or appears to be a defendant’s primary home.’ Thereafter, Van der Linde J, in 
consultation with the Judge President of the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court, asked 
some of the major banks and amicus curiae to address the full bench in the Mokebe case15 in 
April 2018. The matter was subsequently heard in August 2018; the purpose of the hearing 
was to establish a uniform approach that the judges in that Division must take when they 
handle execution matters where a home could potentially be sold.  
This thesis seeks to establish a procedure, which needs to be followed by creditors 
and the courts, when creditors seek to have consumers’ homes sold in execution to satisfy 
mortgage bond debt. This includes establishing factors that the courts must consider in order 
to balance the rights of creditors and consumers in this situation. Another desired outcome of 
this thesis is to set out what consumers can do to prevent their homes being sold on public 
auction especially once they default in their monthly bond payments.  
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
This thesis will commence by analysing the procedures which have traditionally been 
followed by creditors in order to have consumers’ homes sold in execution. Then it will 
examine some of the judgments where the courts have grappled with Constitutional issues 
and the procedures introduced by the NCA. Finally it will propose procedures to follow in the 
future. In order to do this the following questions will be addressed:  
 
1. What was the procedure that was followed for sales in execution of homes before 
the Constitution was adopted and what problems were encountered with the 
procedure? 
2. How did the Constitution affect the procedure and as a result, what amendments 
were made to the procedure? 
3. How did the NCA affect the procedure and as a result, what amendments were 
made to the procedure?  
                                            
14 Practice Manual of the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court of South Africa (2018), Government 
Gazette No.41257 (17 November 2017) 18. All references to the Practice Manual are to this one unless 
otherwise stated.  
15 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
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4. How has the recent judgment in the Mokebe case interpreted or altered the current 
procedure? 
5. Based on the outcomes of this research, what recommendations can this thesis 
make to improve the procedure? 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
This will be a non-empirical study. The methodology entails a desktop study of various 
primary and secondary sources of law. This thesis will consider the Constitution, specific 
legislation, court rules and practice notes to describe the rights affected, the procedures, and 
the perceived problems with the manner in which consumers lost their homes. It will also 
consider decided cases to analyse how the courts have developed the procedures and where 
problems still exist. Furthermore, textbooks, journal articles and internet sources; including 
the databases of Juta Law, Lexis Nexis and Sabinet among others, will be accessed to provide 
the opinions of experts and interested parties in the credit industry, especially the banks. In 
particular, this study will focus on the situation where creditors have a mortgage bond over 
the homes of consumers who have become overindebted and are no longer able to meet their 
obligations under their mortgage agreements. This will all be done to explore and understand 
the history of the procedure, its impact on creditors and consumers and to propose 
amendments that should be included in future to enhance the procedure.  
 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
 
The structure of this thesis flows from the research questions. Chapter two will discuss and 
analyse the procedure that was followed for sales in execution of homes before the 
Constitution was adopted. Additionally, the problems which were encountered with this 
procedure will be explained. Chapter three will unpack the constitutional right to adequate 
housing. The landmark cases which interpreted this right will be discussed. Other rights 
which affect consumers who may lose their homes will also be discussed, in particular, the 
right to dignity. Chapter four will discuss the NCA. This chapter will explore the reason for 
the NCA’s introduction, how it seeks to protect consumers, the balancing of creditor and 
consumer rights, and the procedures in the Act. Chapter five will examine the Mokebe case 
and explain why it is important. The arguments of creditors, consumers and interested parties 
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as well as the decision of the court will be analysed. Other issues with the procedure which 
were not explicitly dealt with in the case will also be discussed. Lastly, Chapter six will offer 
a way forward. That is, based on the discussions above, it will recommend how creditors, 








There are a number of reasons why consumers lose their homes.16 For example, creditors may 
lend consumers money for whatever reason and that loan is not secured by a mortgage bond. 
If consumers default in payments and cannot repay the loan, creditors could institute 
proceedings to recover the money. The courts may grant judgment against consumers whose 
movable assets would then be sold to pay the debt. If the amount realised from the movable 
assets is insufficient, creditors could proceed to have consumers’ immovable property, 
including their home, sold to pay the debt.17  
Another example is when creditors lend consumers money to buy their homes, and 
mortgage bonds are registered as security over the homes in favour of such creditors. The 
parties to a mortgage bond agreement are formally known as the mortgagor (consumer) and 
the mortgagee (creditor). The home functions as security for the debt, and creditors have the 
right to retain a hold over the home until consumers have paid their debt in full. If  consumers 
are in default, the creditors’ rights extend to having the homes sold to recover the remaining 
debt from the proceeds of the sale.18 Therefore, the value of creditors’ security rights lay in 
them being able to enforce those rights. If their rights are not enforceable, they became 
meaningless.19  
The focus of this chapter is to discuss the procedure that was followed by creditors to 
recoup outstanding debts before the introduction of the Constitution. These procedures have 
been heavily criticised because they often resulted in consumers losing their homes, the 
                                            
16 A consumer can also lose their home if they become insolvent and their estate is sequestrated using the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  That, however is not the focus of this thesis.  
17 Uniform Rule 45(1). This is what happened in the case of Jaftha v Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
& Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) which is discussed in detail chapter 3. 
18 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 5. This thesis focuses on these 
type of cases like Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson & Others 2006 (2) SA 264 (SCA) which is 
discussed in chapter 3.  
19 PJ Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property 5 ed (2006) 363. See also the discussion 
of Nedcor Bank Ltd v Kindo 2002 3 SA 185 (C) 187-188. 
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homes being sold for minimal amounts and consumers still owing a large shortfall.20 The 
Constitution was enacted in 1996 which includes the right to adequate housing and the right 
to dignity. Then the NCA was introduced in 2007. The NCA emphasises the need for 
consumer protection. Notwithstanding the introduction of these new laws, many of the 
procedures resorted to by creditors have continued into present times. Debt collection 
practices have not been completely overturned and many of the difficulties that consumers 
face when they are unable to repay their debts continue, despite the many safeguards which 
have been introduced. These practices have been challenged relying on the protections 
provided by the Constitution and the NCA. In order to understand the root cause of the 
problems, it is necessary to consider the practices that were in place before the Constitution 
was introduced. This chapter will commence by examining the contractual relationship that 
exists between creditors and consumers. Thereafter, the court procedure will be analysed by 
explaining the cause of action, locus standi, jurisdiction, summons, judgment and execution. 
In addition, the consumer’s right of redemption will be discussed. 
 
2.2 The Contractual Relationship  
 
As discussed in the introduction, creditors and consumers enter into loan agreements in terms 
of which creditors lend consumers a certain amount of money to buy a home which signifies 
a place to live, relax and raise a family. This money must be repaid by consumers in 
instalments and a mortgage bond is registered over the home.21 The purpose of the mortgage 
bond is to protect creditors in instances where consumers default in payments. In the event of 
such default, creditors are entitled to institute legal proceedings which could result in the sale 
of the home. The money received from the sale would pay creditors the full outstanding 
balance on the loan, legal costs and interest.22  
So, the terms and conditions of loan agreements secured by mortgage bonds are 
essentially governed by the law of contract which is derived from the common law. Prior to 
the introduction of the Constitution and the NCA, creditors could draft contracts that would 
include clauses solely intended to protect their own interests.23 Examples of such clauses 
                                            
20 See DJ Shaw LLD thesis (note 13 above). Also see Ryan C ‘SA banks sued for R60bn in home repossession 
case’ (2017) available at https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/r60bn-home-repossession-suit-
against-banks-20170816 last accessed 8 October 2019. 
21 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 5. 
22 Ibid.  
23 D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 396. 
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include jurisdiction clauses and acceleration clauses where the whole debt became payable on 
default.24 Consumers signed the contracts which set out the rights and duties of the parties 
and these contracts would state what creditors could do if consumers defaulted. Therefore, 
when consumers defaulted, the creditors and the courts were merely enforcing what 
consumers had agreed to.25 The fact that the homes were more than just security for loans but 
also family homes, roofs over the consumers’ heads and places of respite, was not a 
consideration. 
An important principle in the law of contract is that of pacta sunt servanda which 
recognises that since parties are free to contract, they must be bound by the terms of their 
agreements.26 In other words, contracts need to be honoured and the courts will enforce them 
because they were voluntarily entered into by the parties. It has been argued that by 
upholding the agreement, this promoted legal and commercial certainty which encouraged the 
economy to flourish.27 The courts have held that the value of a mortgage bond lies ‘in 
confidence that the law will give effect to its terms.’28 For the purposes of this thesis, this is 
described as the traditional approach to enforcing a mortgage agreement; the courts simply 
enforced the terms of the contract because the parties were themselves bound.  
The exception to the rule was when a term of the contract was against public policy 
or contra boni mores.29 Although dealing with a completely different subject and heard in the 
post-constitutional era, the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier,30 held that ‘while it 
is necessary to recognise the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, courts should be able to decline 
the enforcement of…a clause if it would result in unfairness or would be unreasonable.’31 
This principle was recognised in the leading case of Sasfin v Beukes prior to the introduction 
of the Constitution.32  
Paratie executie and pactum commissorium clauses are examples of clauses that 
                                            
24 Ibid 491. 
25 Ibid 405-406. 
26 Ibid 24. 
27 Ibid 21. 
28 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bekker & Another 2011 (6) SA 111 (WCC) para 3. 
29 FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in South African Law of Contract – the Influence of 
the Common Law and Constitution’ SALJ (2009) 71, 75. 
30 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
31 Ibid para 70. 
32 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
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were held to be invalid and unenforceable by the courts.33 In the context of foreclosure, such 
clauses allowed creditors to sell consumers’ homes privately by circumventing the court’s 
intervention. These clauses were found to be invalid because they amounted to creditors 
taking the law into their own hands which would unduly advantage creditors at the expense 
of consumers.34 For instance, the costs of the sale could be arbitrarily calculated. 
Another reason that the clauses were held to be invalid was because creditors could be 
mistaken about the consumers’ default; selling the home without notifying consumers or 
approaching the court can create various legal problems.35 From this limited discussion it can 
be seen that even prior to the introduction of the Constitution and the NCA, there were 
certain limitations imposed by the courts when it came to the procedures that creditors could 
follow before a home was sold to satisfy an outstanding debt. Nevertheless, creditors could 
have the home sold by instituting judicial proceedings for the full outstanding balance owed 
on the loan.36 Now this thesis turns to discussing the procedure to sell homes in execution. 
 
2.3 Cause of Action 
 
The cause of action refers to the elements that an applicant or plaintiff must prove in order to 
be entitled to some sort of relief. These elements are determined by substantive law and they 
must be alleged on the papers before being proved in court on a balance of probabilities.37  
If the debt is unsecured, creditors must prove that a loan agreement was entered into 
and the consumers breached this contract, which is usually that they did not repay the money 
loaned. The debt can also be secured by a mortgage bond. The mortgage bond is defined as a 
contract where immovable property is specially hypothecated and which, once registered in 
the deeds registry, creates a real right of security over the immovable property.38 If the debt is 
secured by a mortgage bond, there are four essential elements to prove; 
 
 
                                            
33 Iscor Housing Utility Co and Another v Chief Registrar of Deeds 1971 1 SA 614 (T) 616E and 623; Mardin 
Agency (Pty) Ltd v Rand Townships Registrar 1978 (3) SA 947 (W) 954, Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 
1 SA 603 (A) 611. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
36 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 203.  
37 S Pete et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2015) 3. 
38 R Sharrock Business Transaction Law 9 ed (2016) 788. 
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1. A principal obligation i.e. the loan (the mortgage is an accessory); 
2. immovable property that the mortgage attaches to; 
3. a mortgage bond agreement that the parties enter into; and 
4. registration of the mortgage bond.39 
 
For a foreclosure claim, the cause of action that creditors relied on is based on a breach or 
non-fulfilment of a term/s in the mortgage bond agreement by consumers. This is usually 
non-payment of the loan amount or any interest which was due on the loan.40 Prior to recent 
amendments which are discussed in detail later on in this thesis, there were two key clauses 
in mortgage bond agreements that entitled creditors to call up the bond and claim foreclosure. 
The first was a foreclosure clause, in combination with the second, which was the 
acceleration clause.41 What is extremely important to note is that the clauses provided that the 
full outstanding balance on the loan would be due immediately, should consumers default on 
their instalments. In addition, creditors would then have a right to claim this full outstanding 
balance by calling up the bond.42 If consumers were unable to pay the full outstanding 
balance, which was usually the case, executionary relief could be granted to sell the homes of 
consumers in execution to pay the judgment debt. This is regardless of the fact that the 
arrears were trifling or were brought up to date at the time of the sale.43 The right to 
redemption was thus the only way to prevent the home being sold through a public auction. 
This right is discussed at the end of this Chapter.  
In summary therefore, when consumers defaulted, creditors would have to prove that 
there was a valid mortgage bond agreement entered into and that they had performed in terms 
of that agreement, however, consumers had breached the agreement. In addition, creditors 
gave due notice to consumers asking for the breach to be remedied.44 Another term for such a 
notice is a demand. Demand is defined as a formal request to ask a defaulting party to 
perform their legal obligation which includes payment of an outstanding debt. It was 
necessary to send this request to try and resolve the matter without involving the courts 
because formal litigation is very expensive.45 Such notice had to be in writing and the terms 
                                            
39 Ibid & Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 .  
40 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 204. 
41  PJ Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (note 19 above) 364,367-368.  
42 See Boland Bank Ltd v Pienaar and Another 1988 (3) SA 618 (A). 
43 Ibid.  
44 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 205. 
45 S Pete et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide (note 37 above) 93.  
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of the mortgage bond agreement determined when it was given.46 A demand could be sent by 
creditors or their attorneys who needed to take reasonable measures to ensure that the demand 
was received by consumers.47 
 
2.4 Locus Standi 
 
Locus standi is about a natural or juristic person’s right to institute legal proceedings or to 
have legal proceedings instituted against them. The full term to describe this is locus standi in 
iudicio. The parties involved must have legal capacity and an interest in the matter which is 
direct and substantial.48 This must be alleged on the papers and proved by the party suing.49 
Therefore, as with any court process, including foreclosure matters, creditors had to allege 




Jurisdiction refers to the competence and power of a court to hear and determine a matter 
brought before it.50 Two aspects determine jurisdiction namely the ‘persons’ involved and 
‘causes arising.’51 Before 1994, judicial proceedings to foreclose a home could be instituted 
in the Supreme Court or the Magistrates’ Court,52 depending on the amount of the capital 
claimed or if the parties consented in writing to the Magistrates’ Court having jurisdiction.53 
The grounds that jurisdiction is based on must be set out on the papers by creditors.54 
However, creditors could still institute proceedings in the Supreme Court which always had 
concurrent jurisdiction, even if the amount involved fell within the Magistrates’ Court 
jurisdiction, and they often did.55  
                                            
46 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 205-6.  
47 S Pete et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide (note 37 above) 93.  
48 Ibid 14.  Also see DE Van Loggerenberd Jones and Buckle The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in 
South Africa Vol II: The Rules 10 ed (2011) Rule 6-17 for requirements to prove a direct and substantial interest.  
49 Mars Inc v Candy World (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 567 (A) 575.  
50 Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld’s Pass Irrigation Board 1950 (2) SA 420 (A) 424.  
51 Ewing McDonald & Co Ltd v M & M Products Co 1991 (1) SA 252 (A) 257E-G. 
52 Post 1994, the Supreme Court became the High Court. 
53 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 212. Also see section 29(1)(d) 
of the Magistrates’ Court Act.  
54 Malherbe v Britstown Municipality 1949 (1) SA 281 (C) 287. Grounds of jurisdiction may be found in section 
28(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act or section 19 of the Supreme Court Act. Also see S Pete et al Civil 
Procedure: A Practical Guide (note 2 above) 71.  
55 The reasons for foregoing Magistrates’ Court jurisdiction will be discussed further in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Coetzee DJP in the case of Standard Bank of South Africa v Shiba56 noted that when the 
Supreme Court was tasked with Magistrates’ Court work, this could lead to administrative 
justice issues.57 In particular;  
 
If [the problem is] left unchecked, it could become one of the last straws. It becomes a 
question of weighing up the desirability of keeping open the Supreme Court’s doors for all 
causes at all times, which is something that every judge strains to the utmost to maintain, 
against the danger of fouling up the cogs of this very machine which must be kept in 
reasonable running order if it is to fulfil properly its function of performing very essential 
public work.58 
 
In other words, the court rolls of the Supreme Court became very full when many matters that 
could be adjudicated in the Magistrates’ Court, were instituted in the Supreme Court. 
However, the courts have held that they should be wary of turning litigants away if the matter 
falls within their jurisdiction. If court rolls become congested and this hampers the 
functioning of the courts, other solutions should be found.59 The issue relating to jurisdiction 
of the courts has remained even in South Africa’s democratic era.  This will be discussed 




Judicial proceedings can commence in two ways. The first is by simple summons, and the 
second is by combined summons. The purpose of the summons is to inform consumers who 
became the defendants or respondents in the claim. If they dispute the claim, they must enter 
an appearance to defend.60 The general rule has always been that a mortgage bond is a 
sufficiently liquid document for judgment to be granted on, so a simple summons could be 
issued.61 This summons had to set out the cause of action that the creditor relied on and the 
courts held that copies of the home loan and the mortgage bond document had to be attached 
                                            
56 1984(1) SA 153 (W). 
57 Ibid 156G. 
58 Ibid 156G-157A. 
59 Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) 820I. 
60 See Uniform Rule 17(1)&(2)(b) and Magistrates’ Court Rule 5(1). 
61 TJ Scott & S Scott Willes’ Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 213. Also see Entabeni 
Hospital Limited v Van der Linde; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Puckriah 1994 (2) SA 422 (N) 424H-I and 
Nedbank Ltd v Mortinson 2005 (6) SA 462 (W) para 19. 
23 
 
to the summons. In addition, the originals had to be produced when judgment was 




Prior to the introduction of the NCA, legal proceedings would commence by delivering court 
documents to consumers and the court had to be satisfied that such documents were 
received.63 This was because consumers must have been aware that proceedings were being 
brought against them so the court could hear their side of the story. The Latin maxim, audi 
alteram partem, captured the need to hear the other side’s version before coming to a 
decision.64 
Sheriffs who were officials of the court had to deliver the documents that start legal 
proceedings, which are summons. The court rules stipulated various methods to effect 
service. The general rule was that personal service of documents had to be done where it was 
possible and other methods could be used where the receivers were untraceable or elusive.65 
Examples of other methods of service included leaving a copy at a person’s business or place 
of employment or at the person’s residence. Delivery could also be at the receiver’s chosen 
domicilium citandi et executandi (‘domicilium’) or to a duly authorised agent.66 
In mortgage cases, a standard term in the mortgage agreement was for consumers to 
either choose an address for delivery, or their domicilium would be chosen by default.67 If the 
sheriffs could not serve the notice personally on consumers, then they would leave a copy at 
the address by affixing it to the door or gate. Thereafter, a return of service was filed.68 If the 
court was not satisfied with the manner or effectiveness of service, then the court could order 
for other methods to be utilised.69 Consumers then had to file their notice of intention to 
defend and their cases would continue normally.  
However, in practice what usually happened was that many consumers would not file 
                                            
62 See Volkskas Bank Limited v Wilkinson and Three Similar Cases 1992 (2) SA 388 (C) 397I-398C. 
63 This is dealt with in Magistrates’ Court Rule 9 and Uniform Rule 4. See S Pete et al Civil Procedure: A 
Practical Guide (note 37 above) 101-111 for a full discussion on what service entails.  
64 S Pete et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide (note 37 above) 101. 
65 O’Donoghue v Human 1969 (4) SA 35 (E).  
66 Uniform Rule 4(1)(a).  
67 See Firstrand Bank Ltd v Powell, Firstrand Bank Ltd v Nsele & Another, Firstrand Bank Ltd v Herbst & 
Another (2011/9130, 2011/20765, 2011/31969) [2012] ZAGPJHC. 
68 Uniform Rule 4(6)(a). 
69 Uniform Rule 4(10) and MC Rule 9(20).  
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their notice of intention to defend.70 The creditor would proceed to lodge a request for default 
judgment. The relief sought would be an order for the accelerated full outstanding amount 
owed on the bond and thereafter, an order for executability. The request was lodged with the 
registrar or clerk of court.71 Thereafter, if all the documents were in order and due process 
had been followed, the order/s would then be granted by the registrar or clerk of the court 
since the mortgage bond debt was considered a liquid amount.72 When consumers finally 
became aware of the judgment against them, many of them would seek an order from the 
court to rescind the judgments, alleging that they never actually received the notices to 
institute legal proceedings.73 This was very problematic if a consumer’s family home could 
potentially be sold in execution when the proceedings came to an end.74 Such consumers 
would be left without a place to live along with their dependants. Service of court documents 
is another issue that has continued to be problematic even after the Constitution came into 
effect and the introduction of the NCA. This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 4 and 
5. 
 
2.8 Judgment and Execution 
 
Once creditors obtained judgment in their favour for the money judgment, they became the 
judgment creditors and consumers became the judgment debtors. Creditors could consider the 
arrangements made by consumers to prevent the sale in execution. If a lump sum was 
subsequently paid, the procedure could be stayed.75 It is submitted that this was a good 
practice because it accommodated consumers who could have been legitimately facing a 
temporary financial setback such as retrenchment. The consumers who could make 
arrangements with the creditors therefore benefitted because they were able to keep their 
home. 
 However, the problem was that creditors were not obligated to accept a 
rearrangement or tender of payment of the arrears. This was a principle expressed in the 
                                            
70 An example is where Standard Bank instituted foreclosure applications against nine consumers and only one 
entered an appearance to defend. See Standard Bank Ltd v Saunderson (note 18 above). 
71 Magistrates’ Court Rule 12(1)(a). 
72 See the discussion of the procedure in Jaftha (note 17 above) para 15. 
73 For example Nkata v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 257 (CC). 
74 This is discussed in depth in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
75 J Fourie ‘Sale in execution: The conveyancer and the sheriff’ (2013) De Rebus available at 
http://www.derebus.org.za/sales-execution-conveyancer-sheriff/ last accessed 8 October 2019.  
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Appellate Division case of Boland Bank v Pienaar and Another.76 The bank lent money to the 
second respondent and a mortgage bond was registered as security for the debt. The terms of 
the agreement were that the second respondent had to pay the money back in monthly 
instalments, and if he failed to do so, the full outstanding amount would be immediately due 
and payable, including interest. Furthermore, the bank could claim such an amount in court 
without notifying the second respondent.77 Thereafter, the second respondent did default in 
payments and Pienaar, who was the first respondent that was not a part of the mortgage 
agreement, tendered payment of the arrears to the bank to avoid foreclosure. The bank 
refused such payment as it did not wish to ‘jeopardise its right of foreclosure.’78 
Pienaar therefore applied to the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court to compel the bank to accept the tendered payment.79 Whilst the court a quo 
held in his favour,80 the bank appealed the matter to the Appellate Division where the appeal 
was upheld.81 Nestadt JA ultimately held that creditors are not obliged to accept late 
payments and they may instead elect to institute proceedings to foreclose the property.82 
 Although the judgment was not about a mortgaged property that was the home of 
consumers, the principle highlighted in the case says something about the approach that was 
adopted before the introduction of the Constitution. Domanksi critiqued the judgment in 
1995, stating that the implications of the case were ‘far reaching and potentially 
devastating.’83 It is submitted that under the traditional approach, creditors had extensive 
rights under the mortgage bond and could even refuse a tender to pay the arrears. The 
financial circumstances of consumers were frequently disregarded and foreclosure could be 
pursued as a first resort simply because the mortgage bond agreement allowed it and the 
courts enforced the agreement.   
On the other hand, if creditors did accept a tender of payment by consumers, it was 
argued that this practice caused severe problems if consumers continued to default in 
payments and the creditors decided to execute the property at a time in the future. This was 
because there was no mechanism in the court rules to officially record the amounts that were 
paid after judgment was granted but before the home was sold in execution. Furthermore, 
                                            
76 See note 42 above. 
77 Ibid para 1-2. 
78 Ibid para 3.  
79 Ibid.  
80 See Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another 1986(4) SA 102 (O) 109-111. 
81 Boland Bank v Pienaar (note 42 above).  
82 Ibid para 19. 
83 A Domanski ‘Mortgage Bondage’ SALJ (1995) 159.  
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sheriffs were not informed of the arrangements and the money paid in fulfilment of the 
judgment debt. Rather, sheriffs were notified that the sale was stayed and to therefore not 
proceed. If the judgment creditors did indeed decide to proceed with the sale at a later stage, 
the amount on the writ of execution did not reflect the full outstanding debt anymore.84  
If consumers did not pay the judgment debt or at least arrange to settle the debt,  
creditors could have the judgment enforced through the execution process.85 This process 
resulted in the property of consumers being sold and the proceeds being used to satisfy the 
judgment debt. Execution entailed giving effect to a judgment or carrying out a judgment in 
the way the law requires.86 
There were three steps in the process that this thesis will discuss namely; obtaining a 
valid writ (or warrant), attaching the consumer’s property and subsequently selling the 
attached property in a public auction.87 
 
 2.8.1 Obtaining a valid warrant or writ of execution 
 
This was a document requested by creditors and the clerk or registrar of the court issued it. 
The writ or warrant of execution ordered sheriffs to possess the judgment debtors’ property 
for it to be sold through a public sale, to realise the debt and costs incurred in the process.88 
Creditors could request a writ or warrant, after judgment was given, at any time.89  
Where there were outstanding debts owed to creditors, the general rule was that the 
movable assets of consumers had to first be executed against before executing against their 
immovable property. If their movable assets could not satisfy the debt, the consumers’ 
immovable asset, which in many cases was their home, could be executed against without 
obtaining a further order.90  
However, if  creditors had security for the debt in the form of a mortgage bond, they 
                                            
84 J Fourie ‘Sale in execution: The conveyancer and the sheriff’ (2013) De Rebus available at 
http://www.derebus.org.za/sales-execution-conveyancer-sheriff/ last accessed 8 October 2019. On the contrary, 
Magistrates’ Court Rule 36(4)-(5) dealt with this dilemma in the Magistrates’ Court. 
85 S Vengadajellum ‘Short notes on: The execution process and the effect that a judgment may have on a 
debtor’s movable and/or immoveable property’ (2018) available at https://www.schoemanlaw.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Website-Article-Feb-2018.pdf last accessed 8 October 2018. 
86 Maharaj Brothers v Pieterse Bros Construction (Pty) Ltd & Another 1961 (2) SA 232 (N) at 238C-D. 
87 Mattoida Constructions (SA) (Pty) Ltd v E Carbonari Construction (Pty) Ltd 1973 3 SA 327 (D) 332. 
88 Uniform Rule 45(1); Magistrates’ Court Rule 36(1) and (2). 
89 There is no obligation on the judgment creditor to wait for a reasonable time before suing out the writ. See 
Perelson v Druain 1910 TS 458 at 462. 
90 See Section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act & Uniform Rule 45(1). This will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter 3 below. 
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did not need to first execute against the movable property. Instead, creditors could execute 
against the object of the mortgage bond which was the immovable property. Creditors had to 
get an order of the court declaring that the immovable property of the consumers was 
declared specially executable.91 The courts declared the homes of the consumers specially 
executable if special circumstances existed. However, the fact that a mortgage bond existed 
was traditionally sufficient to equate to special circumstances.92 The implications were 
devastating for consumers who would be left homeless at the end of the sale in execution.  
 
 2.8.2 Attaching the judgment debtor’s movable or immovable property 
 
Sheriffs (or deputy sheriffs) were crucial in the sale in execution because various matters 
were conducted by them. This included executing the warrant or writ of execution.93 
Regarding movable property, sheriffs had to demand satisfaction of the writ by going to the 
homes of consumers or their places of employment. This could be done by demanding that 
movable property, which could be sufficient to satisfy the writ, be pointed out. If there was a 
refusal to cooperate, sheriffs could search the property. The sheriffs would then make an 
inventory and could take possession of the property. Thereafter, a return of what was done 
was filed by the sheriffs with the registrar.94 Sheriffs had to issue a nulla bona return if the 
movable property was insufficient to settle the debt. Thereafter, the clerk or registrar of the 
court had to issue a warrant or writ of execution against the immovable property as discussed 
above. 
For immovable property, including a home; the owner, the registrar of deeds and 
non-owner occupiers of the property had to be notified about the attachment by sheriffs.95 
Once the property was attached, the custody, possession and control of the property passed 
from consumers to the sheriffs.96 In reality however, consumers maintained control of the 
property until the auction. Thereafter, consumers or occupiers of the property could either 
                                            
91 See Gerber v Stolze & Others 1951 (2) SA 166 (T) 172F-G: To have property declared specially executable 
means that the creditor can immediately execute againt the immovable property. This dispenses with the 
circumlocution of having to first execute against movable and if it fails to realise the judgment debt, then to 
have recourse against the immovable property. 
92 Ibid. 
93 See Magistrates’ Court Rule 36(1) and (7) as well as Uniform Rule 45 and 46 which detail the duties of the 
sheriff when carrying out the sale in execution. 
94 Uniform Rule 45(3)&(4).  
95 Uniform Rule 46(3).  
96 Morrison NO v Rand NO 1967 2 SA 208 (D) 210. 
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abandon their possession voluntarily, or they would have to be evicted.97 It is therefore 
submitted that the law paid no consideration to where consumers and their dependants would 
go once their homes were sold in execution. Rather, the focus was on upholding the contract 
and the right of creditors to foreclose the homes of consumers once consumers defaulted in 
payments. 
 
 2.8.3 Public auction of the attached property 
 
Sheriffs were responsible for selling homes through public auctions and they had to choose 
when and where the sale in execution will take place. Creditors had to consult the sheriffs and 
prepare a notice of the sale which included a description of the property and where it was 
located. This notice had to be published. Creditors also had to prepare the conditions of sale 
which had to be submitted to the sheriff involved in the process.98 In theory, the purpose was 
to notify the public of what was being sold so that bidders were attracted to bid the highest 
possible price.99 By bidding the highest possible price, it ensured that there was justice for 
creditors, who would receive the debt they were owed in full, and consumers who should end 
up with a reasonable surplus to start over.100 The sale had to be conducted in the district that 
the attached property was situated, by a sheriff or deputy sheriff in that district.101  
Sheriffs also had to handle the money gained through the sale and could only pay the 
amount to creditors when the property was transferred to the purchaser who then became the 
new owner.102 A balance certificate detailing consumers’ bond accounts had to be obtained by 
sheriffs from the creditors. These certificates would show the arrears when the sale in 
execution occurred which helped the sheriff determine the possible surplus or shortfall from 
the sale. Thereafter, the account would be finalised by sheriffs who would pay all the relevant 
parties.103  
Consumers had to get the surplus if there was any money left over after the judgment 
                                            
97 The eviction process is not the focus of this thesis. 
98 Uniform Rule 46(7)(c) and 46(8)(a); Magistrates’ Court Rule 43(6)(b)-(d). 
99 Rossiter and Another v Rand Natal Trust Co Ltd and Others 1984 1 SA 385 (N) 389 & Pillay v Messenger 
Magistrates’ Court, Durban and Others 1951 1 SA 259 (N) 264. 
100 Ibid.  
101 Uniform Rule 46(4); Magistrates’ Court Rule 43(10) and (11). 
102 Uniform Rule 46(14)(a). Also see J Fourie ‘Sale in execution: The conveyancer and the sheriff’ (2013) De 
Rebus available at http://www.derebus.org.za/sales-execution-conveyancer-sheriff/ last accessed 8 October 
2019, which discussed the correct procedure to be followed in terms of this rule.  
103 J Fourie ‘Sale in execution: The conveyancer and the sheriff’ (2013) De Rebus available at 
http://www.derebus.org.za/sales-execution-conveyancer-sheriff/ last accessed 8 October 2019.  
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debt and the legal costs were paid. On the other hand, if there was a shortfall, consumers 
would be liable for it.104 This usually occurred when the judgment debt was quite high due to 
large arrear amounts or when the value of the house was less than the outstanding bond 
amount or if there were multiple bonds registered against the home.105  
In many cases, there was a shortfall because homes were often sold for significantly 
less than their market value. This was one of the areas that received a lot of criticism and it 
was alleged that collusion occurred to sell homes for prices way below the market value. In 
one instance it was reported that Mr Molokomme bought a home for R38 970 in 1989 with 
the assistance of a home loan from Nedbank.106 Mr Molokomme subsequently died and his 
wife was unable to keep up with the bond repayments.107 The bank instituted proceedings for 
the full outstanding balance and executed against the movables. One of the movable items 
that was attached was an asset that Mrs Molokomme used to run a small business; an 
industrial sewing machine. Mrs Molokomme’s business suffered greatly as she was only able 
to make only half of her usual income. Her home was eventually sold in execution to BOE 
Bank Limited for R10.108 After that, BOE Bank Limited resold the home for R35 000 and 
eventually, Mrs Molokomme was evicted whilst she was eight months pregnant.109 
Another case involved Mr Nkwane whose home loan amounted to R380 000.110 
Standard bank had security for the loan in the form of a mortgage bond. Mr Nkwane 
defaulted in payments shortly after receiving the loan and could not continue meeting his 
obligations as specified in the loan agreement.111 Although the home was valued at  R492 470 
when the sale occurred, it was sold in execution for R40 000.112 
Both the cases and many others like them were possible because the court rules did 
not require the setting of a reserve price when selling the home in execution. In the end, 
consumers not only lost their family home, but they also still remained overindebted. 
Therefore, it is important to address issues such as those relating to a reserve price being set 
                                            
104 Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2014) Property24 available at 
https://www.property24.com/articles/sales-in-execution-know-your-rights/17401 last accessed 10 May 2019. 
105 Ibid.  
106 See A Arde ‘Court Rules on Home Repossessions’ (2018) BusinessDay available at 





110 Nkwane v Nkwane and Others Case no. 36700/2016 [2018] ZAGPPHC 153 (22 March 2018) para 6. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. The facts showed that the bank and Nkwane actively tried to avoid a sale in execution. 
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to sell the property and ensure that consumers are not exploited if it is inevitable for the 
homes to be sold in execution. The issue of reserve prices is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Another issue with public auctions was that in practice, some sheriffs did not make 
sure that the sale in execution procedure was meticulously followed which made them 
vulnerable to damages claims launched by consumers.113 It is therefore important to ensure 
meticulous execution of the duties in facilitating a sale in execution by all role players. In 
particular, the interests of consumers need to be protected because they suffer the most 
negative consequences through the forced sale and they rely on the sheriffs to ensure that the 
sale was justly carried out.  
 
2.9 The Right of Redemption 
 
The above discussion shows the traditional approach that was followed if consumers failed to 
meet their obligations under the loan agreement. Creditors could call up the bond and claim 
the accelerated full outstanding balance on the loan by instituting proceedings to have the 
home sold in execution. The only way that consumers in this predicament could prevent their 
home from being sold in execution was to redeem their home. Under the common law, 
consumers were entitled to redeem their homes by paying creditors’ the full outstanding 
balance they are owed and thereby freeing the property from the creditors’ limited real 
right.114 In other words, the mortgage bond was cancelled, and the consumer would receive 
the property, free of the mortgage bond agreement. 
The right to redeem the property existed any time before there was a transfer of the 
property to the auction purchaser. In Liquidators Union and Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd v Brown 
& Co,115 the court held that: 
 
Although the effect of a pignus judiciale116 is that the control of the property arrested in 
execution passes from the judgment debtor… the dominium remains in the debtor, who can, 
up to the last moment before actual sale, redeem his attached property: that is to say, the 
property subject to the pignus judiciale, for while the pignus lasts he remains the owner of 
                                            
113 J Fourie ‘Sale in execution: The conveyancer and the sheriff’ (2013) De Rebus available at 
http://www.derebus.org.za/sales-execution-conveyancer-sheriff/ last accessed 8 October 2019.  
114 See PJ Badenhorst Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (note 19 above) 381. Also see TJ Scott & 
S Scott Wille’s law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (note 2 above) 191-195. 
115 1922 AD 549. 
116 This refers to an attachment by an officer of the court. 
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the pledge…117  
 
To put it differently, this means that at common law, consumers retained physical control of 
the property and had a right to redeem that property up to the time of the actual sale in 
execution. Whilst the right to redemption does protect consumers who are in danger of losing 
their homes, it is submitted that the protection under the common law was not enough. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, consumers entered into mortgage bond agreements because they 
could not afford to pay the full price of a home. If they could no longer pay their instalments 
under the mortgage agreement, it usually meant that they were facing a financial strain which 
left them overindebted. When consumers defaulted in their payments and creditors called up 
the bond, making the accelerated or entire debt due, most consumers would still be unable to 
pay that amount and were still at risk of losing their homes. Therefore, the right to 
redemption was not useful for most consumers.  
The NCA has introduced a protection which can assist consumers that are unable to 
pay the full accelerated debt but can pay the full arrear amounts to catch up on their 
instalments.118 It is submitted that this is a better way to prevent consumers’ homes being sold 
in execution. This protection is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
 
The reality is that many consumers could lose their homes by missing a few payments. In 
many instances, creditors used the sale in execution of consumers’ assets, including their 
home, as the first line of attack rather than a last resort.119 In South Africa’s pre-constitutional 
dispensation pacta sunt servanda was the overarching principle to enforce contracts which 
meant that creditors could easily sell consumers’ homes in execution if  there was a breach of 
the mortgage bond agreement. The law favoured property rights which could be vindicated 
without considering the consumers’ circumstances.120 
Creditors could even choose the court in which to institute proceedings and they 
                                            
117 Liquidators Union v Brown & Co (note 115 above) 558-9. 
118 See section 129(3)-(4) of the NCA. 
119 C Ryan ‘New Court rules make it harder for repossessed homes to be sold for a pittance’ (2017) available at 
http://www.acts.co.za/news/blog/2017/12/new-court-rules-make-it-harder-for-repossessed-homes-to-be-sold-
for-a-pittance last accessed 10 May 2019. 
120 See Boland Bank v Pienaar (note 42 above).  
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often utilised the Supreme Court even when the Magistrates’ Court had jurisdiction because it 
served their interests better.121 If legal action was taken and the consumers did not enter an 
appearance to defend, creditors could easily proceed to the clerk or registrar of the court who 
would grant default judgment if the papers were in order.122  
Thereafter, creditors would get a writ or warrant of execution and proceed to have the 
sheriff sell the home through a public auction. The procedures for the public auction have 
been very problematic because the home could be sold without a reserve price. This meant 
that potential buyers could buy property for trifling amounts.123 In the end, consumers 
continued to face financial strain because if the proceeds from the sale did not cover the loan, 
the consumers remained indebted to the creditors.124 On top of this, consumers and their 
dependants were left without a place to stay that they called home.  
In addition, the right of redemption did not assist the vast majority of consumers who 
could not pay the full outstanding balance on the loan to discharge the debt. The loan was 
initially taken out because of the fact that consumers could not afford to buy a home without 
one. Redemption would therefore be useful in limited cases where perhaps the outstanding 
balance was not a large amount.  
With these issues in mind, the next chapters will show how the procedure to sell 
homes in execution has evolved over the years and what prompted these developments. In 
particular the so-called traditional approach has been constantly challenged as 
unconstitutional and contrary to the NCA so the next two chapters will assess the impact of 
the Constitution and the NCA. It is also important to note that the majority of the procedures 
discussed above have been retained with amendments made to certain parts. 
 
                                            
121 Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) 820I. See Jurisdiction discussion 
above in Part 2.5.  
122 See the discussion of the procedure in Jaftha (note 17 above) para 15-16. 
123 See Molokomme and Nkwane examples above in Part 2.8.3. 








South Africa has a supreme Constitution which sets out the country’s fundamental laws. The 
Constitution came into effect on 4 February 1997 and its preamble highlights South Africa’s 
vision in the democratic dispensation to: 
 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights;  
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;  
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state 
in the family of nations. 
 
In addition, some of the founding values of the Constitution include human dignity, equality, 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-sexism, non-racialism, the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law.125 The Constitution contains 14 chapters which 
comprehensively deal the with the state, government and its people. It also contains a binding 
Bill of Rights that is justiciable.126 This Bill of Rights gives people certain rights and if they 
are violated, judicial proceedings may be instituted to seek a remedy. If a law or conduct 
conflicts with the Constitution it will be declared illegal or invalid by the courts.127   
In the landmark case of S v Makwanyane and Another,128 Mohamed J said the 
following regarding Constitutions in general and South Africa’s Constitution:  
  
All Constitutions seek to articulate, with differing degrees of intensity and detail, the shared 
aspirations of a nation; the values which bind its people, and which discipline its government 
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and its national institutions; the basic premises upon which judicial, legislative and executive 
power is to be wielded; the constitutional limits and the conditions upon which that power is 
to be exercised; the national ethos which defines and regulates that exercise; and the moral 
and ethical direction which that nation has identified for its future. In some countries the 
Constitution only formalises, in a legal instrument, a historical consensus of values and 
aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken past to accommodate the needs 
of the future.  The South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what 
is defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the 
past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive, and a vigorous 
identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally 
egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the Constitution.  The contrast between the past 
which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to commit the nation is stark and 
dramatic.129 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis discussed the procedures that were followed to sell a home 
when consumers defaulted on their loan instalments before the Constitution was introduced. 
There are certain constitutional rights that are affected through the sale in execution of 
consumers’ homes. In particular, the housing clause in section 26 of the Constitution is 
affected. Since the procedures discussed in Chapter 2 were developed before the right in 
section 26 was introduced, it becomes important to analyse whether such procedures pass 
constitutional muster. However, creditors have rights too which must not be overlooked and 
the courts have had to grapple with how to balance the rights of both parties.130 
This chapter will assess how the right to access adequate housing has impacted 
foreclosure proceedings by discussing the leading cases as well as amendments to the court 
rules. The chapter will also discuss other constitutional rights that may be infringed when 
homes are sold in execution. The following rights will thus be discussed under the following 
headings: 
• the right to adequate housing 
• the right to property 
• the right to human dignity 
• the rights of vulnerable people 
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3.2 The Right to Adequate Housing 
 
Section 26 of the Constitution provides that:  
  
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.  
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions. 
 
It has been argued that housing has, not only physical consequences but also psychological 
and social significance.131 It is therefore an important socio-economic right. Section 26(1) of 
the Constitution speaks of a right to access adequate housing rather than a right to housing. 
This is relative depending on the circumstances of each person.132 Adequacy therefore 
‘depends on context and may differ from province to province, from city to city and from 
rural to urban areas and from person to person.’133 
The courts have also interpreted the right to access adequate housing as having both 
positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, section 26(2) places a duty on the state to 
progressively realise the right of access to adequate housing by taking certain measures. This 
is therefore a positive obligation. On the other hand, section 26(3) prohibits private persons 
and the state from unjustifiably depriving people of the access to adequate housing they 
already have. This is therefore a negative obligation.134 
In the context of sales in execution, this right must be analysed because it can 
ultimately lead to people being deprived of their homes and such deprivation may not be 
arbitrary. However, creditors also have rights to foreclose the property and get their money 
back, as discussed in Chapter 2. These rights must be given sufficient attention. The first 
major decision to deal with the right to access adequate housing in the context of sales in 
execution of homes was Jaftha v Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz & Others135 
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(‘Jaftha case’). This was followed by Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson & 
Others,136 (‘Saunderson case’) and finally there was the case of Gundwana v Steko 
Development and Others137 (‘Gundwana case’). 
 
3.2.1 Jaftha v Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz & Others138 
 
The first Constitutional Court case to deal with the right to adequate housing and sales in 
execution was not a case which dealt with a home loan being issued and a mortgage bond 
securing the home in favour of a mortgagee. Rather, loans were advanced by creditors who 
instituted proceedings for money judgments. These orders were then used to execute against 
the consumers’ movable assets and thereafter their homes, and the warrants of execution were 
granted by clerks of the Magistrates’ Court. Nevertheless this case is still important because it 
dealt with the loss of homes through execution proceedings and it resulted in the amendment 
of the Magistrates’ Court procedure to sell homes in execution. 
 
3.2.1.1 Facts of the cases 
 
Ms Jaftha suffered from high blood pressure and heart problems which prevented her from 
working. In addition to this, she had a standard two education. In 1997 she was granted a 
housing subsidy to buy a home and she did so. She lived there with her two children where 
they lived a humble life.139 A creditor lent Ms Jaftha R250 in 1998 and monthly instalments 
were to be paid to satisfy the debt. Ms Jaftha was inconsistent in her payments which resulted 
in the creditor hiring attorneys to handle the matter. Judgment was granted for R632,45 
against Ms Jaftha in the Magistrates’ Court. Thereafter, Ms Jaftha attempted to make further 
payments but was hospitalised in 2000. When she was released, she found out that a sale in 
execution was scheduled against her home. In March 2001, the attorneys notified her that a 
sum of R5500 would stay the sale and she made payments that amounted to R500. Four 
months later, she was informed that the amount to stay the sale had increased to R7000. Ms 
Jaftha could not afford this amount, neither was she given a chance to pay it. The sale 
occurred the following month in August and Ms Jaftha was forced to leave her home. The 
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home was sold for R5000 to a third party who was the first respondent in the Jaftha case.140  
Similarly, Ms Van Rooyen was also a woman who was unemployed and 
impoverished. She had never been to school and lived in the home in question with her three 
children. Her husband received R15 000 as a state subsidy to finance the purchase of a home 
in 1997 but he passed away shortly thereafter. As the surviving spouse, Ms Van Rooyen 
inherited the home. Ms Van Rooyen then purchased vegetables on credit and could not repay 
the amount of R190. The same attorneys from the Jaftha case were employed by the creditor. 
Eventually, the case was referred to the Magistrates’ Court where judgment was granted 
against Ms Van Rooyen for R198,30.  In 2001, on the same day as the sale of Ms Jaftha’s 
home, Ms Van Rooyen’s home was sold in execution. The purchase price was R1 000.141  
Proceedings were then launched in the High Court seeking an order to set the sales in 
execution aside. Other relief sought was an interdict to stop the property being transferred to 
the buyers. A cost order was further sought against the firm that handled the two cases. 
Furthermore, Ms Van Rooyen sought orders which essentially dealt with preventing the 
eviction of previously disadvantaged people who acquired a state subsidy to buy a home in 
Prince Albert. If such eviction had already occurred, then the persons affected should be 
assisted to have such evictions set aside if their constitutionally protected rights had been 
violated.142 The non-constitutional issues were first decided but that is not the purpose or 
focus of this discussion and therefore will not be discussed.143  
 
3.2.1.2 Provisions in question 
 
In the Jaftha case, the Constitutional Court assessed section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ 
Court Act.144 That section prescribes the process that must be followed to sell homes in 
execution which starts when creditors are granted judgment to execute the property. This is 
discussed above in Part 2.8.2 but the crux is that if a sheriff does not find sufficient movables 
to satisfy the debt at the consumer’s home, then he will file a nulla bona return. The clerk of 
the court, in light of the nulla bona return, will issue a warrant of execution to have the 
consumer’s home sold to fulfil the debt. The section reads as follows:  
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(1)(a) Whenever a court gives judgment for the payment of money or makes an order for the 
payment of money in instalments, such judgment, in case of failure to pay such money 
forthwith, or such order in case of failure to pay any instalment at the time and in the manner 
ordered by the court, shall be enforceable by execution against the movable property and, if 
there is not found sufficient movable property to satisfy the judgment or order, or the court, 
on good cause shown, so orders, then against the immovable property of the party against 
whom such judgment has been given or such order has been made. 
 
Section 67 of the Magistrates’ Court Act was also challenged. The section lists several items 
which cannot be seized, attached or sold in the execution process. This includes property such 
as necessary beds, bedding and clothes, necessary furniture, a farmer’s stock and tools, food 
and drink that will last a month, tools of trade, books, documents used by the consumer in his 
profession as well as arms and ammunition that the consumer has as required by law. Some 
of the items also had to not exceed a value that was determined by the Minister in the 
Government Gazette.145 
 
3.2.1.3 Findings of the courts 
 
The High Court essentially decided that section 66(1)(a) was consititutionally permissible. 
This was because under Rule 36 of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, if the sheriff returned with a 
nulla bona return to show that the movables are insufficient to fulfil the judgment debt, the 
clerk was obliged to grant a warrant of execution.146 If the judgment debtors had an issue 
with the warrant of execution, they could approach the court to set it aside by showing good 
cause.147 In addition, the court a quo held that the right implicated is not one of ownership, 
but rather of access to adequate housing. Therefore, section 26 of the Constitution was not 
violated because the right does include the entitlement to a certain kind of house.148 
It is submitted that this judgment failed to take into consideration the plight of the 
two women in the case, as well as the consequences of the sale in execution of their homes. 
Not only were they undereducated, but also unemployed, impoverished and had dependents. 
The decision also had an impact on other people in Prince Albert and South Africa at large 
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who fell into the debt trap and only had their state subsidised home as an asset.149  
An alarming fact was that in Prince Albert at the time, there was an increase in the 
number of homes which were state subsidised and sold in execution. Some homes were also 
sold for substantially less than their market value.150 Such sales in execution not only resulted 
in the loss of a home, but for the recipients of a state subsidy, it also meant that they would 
then be disqualified from getting another state subsidy. Finding alternative accommodation 
would thus be very hard to do.151 What exacerbated the situation even more was that if there 
was a shortfall, a debt would remain. 
The matter went on appeal, and was finally heard in the Constitutional Court. Before 
considering the right to access adequate housing Mokgoro J explained that:  
 
The underlying problem raised by the facts of this case is not greed, wickedness or 
carelessness, but poverty. What is really a welfare problem gets converted into a property one. 
People at the lower end of the market are quadruply vulnerable: they lack income and savings 
to pay for the necessities of life; they have poor prospects of raising loans, since their only 
asset is a state-subsidised house; the consequences of inability to pay, under the law as it 
stands, can be drastic because they live on the threshold of being cast back into the ranks of 
the homeless in informal settlements, with little chance of escape; and they can easily find 
themselves at the mercy of conscienceless persons ready to abuse the law for purely selfish 
gain.152 
 
In other words, consumers get into debt and default on their payments because they have 
overextended themselves, faced a financial difficulty and have gotten into a bad financial 
position. Sometimes, the position they find themselves in is not their fault. The poor are the 
most vulnerable and the impact of losing a home for them is felt the most. However, creditors 
under the traditional approach, could still institute proceedings to recover the debt owed 
which would result in consumers’ homes being sold in execution.153 
  The Constitutional Court then asked the question of whether a sale in execution of 
consumers’ homes limits their right to adequate housing. If a limitation did exist, it had to 
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pass the section 36 limitation clause analysis in order for it to be rendered constitutional.154 
That is to say, the limitation would be justified. Section 36 reads as follows: 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
The respondents argued that the procedure to sell consumers’ property in execution is 
reasonable and justifiable because an important government purpose is fulfilled through debt 
recovery. Without such a process or procedure, the administration of justice would be greatly 
affected.155 Another argument advanced was that if creditors are hindered by the courts in 
their debt recovery process, there would be an indirect impact of creditors being very 
reluctant to advance loans to consumers, especially those that are poor.156 Furthermore, it is 
impossible for a judge to oversee the granting of every execution order.157  
It is submitted that debt recovery and the administration of justice are important in 
society. Not only do they foster legal certainty but they also encourage consumers to honour 
their agreements.158 However, these are some the factors that should be weighed against the 
consumers’ right to adequate housing. Common law, including the traditional approach, 
needed to be aligned to the values and rights in the Constitution which signified a need for a 
new approach to be adopted regarding selling homes in execution. 
In the Jaftha case, Mokgoro J considered that Ms Jaftha and Ms Van Rooyen already 
had access to adequate housing which was being threatened: 
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Relative to homelessness, to have a home one calls one’s own, even under the most basic 
circumstances, can be a most empowering and dignifying human experience.  The impugned 
provisions have the potential of undermining that experience. The provisions take indigent 
people who have already benefited from housing subsidies and, worse than placing them at 
the back of the queue to benefit again from such subsidies in the future, put them in a position 
where they might never again acquire such assistance, without which they may be rendered 
homeless and never able to restore the conditions for human dignity. Section 66(1)(a) is 
therefore a severe limitation of an important right.159 
 
This point was amplified in a subsequent case where the court heard multiple foreclosure 
matters. The court held that if execution is ordered, the defendants may be unable to obtain 
other adequate housing.160 This is even under circumstances where the defendants are able to 
get the residue that is left over from the difference between the purchase price minus the debt 
owed and costs incurred. In other words, the defendants would not only be rendered 
homeless, but also put ‘at the back of the queue,’161in terms of obtaining other adequate 
housing. 
For this reason, selling a home in execution may only be permitted in instances where 
it is justified. Whether it is justified will depend on the circumstances or facts of each case. 
This entails a balancing of the rights of creditors and consumers. Such a sale would not be 
justified if the advantage of the creditor by selling the home to recover the debt, is far less 
than the prejudice that the consumer will face.162 
Under this background and the circumstances of the case, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act was too broad and violated section 
26(1) of the Constitution because indigent consumers lost their security of tenure through a 
clerk allowing a sale in execution of their homes.163As a result, words had to be read into 
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Whenever a court gives judgment for the payment of money or makes an order for the 
payment of money in instalments, such judgment, in case of failure to pay such money 
forthwith, or such order in case of failure to pay any instalment at the time and in the manner 
ordered by the court, shall be enforceable by execution against the movable property and, if 
there is not found sufficient movable property to satisfy the judgment or order, or the court, on 
good cause shown, so orders, then a court, after consideration of all relevant circumstances, 
may order execution against the immovable property of the party against whom such 
judgment has been given or such order has been made. (emphasis in the original) 
 
Therefore, judicial oversight is necessary to assess the circumstances and weigh up the rights 
of both parties.165 This is so even if the home has been secured through a mortgage bond.166 
The Constitutional Court did not limit the situations where a sale in execution of consumers’ 
homes would be prohibited. Rather, it declared that the approach must be flexible enough to 
take various circumstances into consideration regarding the consumers’ plight whilst also 
being sensitive to the interest of creditors’ that are entitled to have their loans repaid.167 
 
The following guidelines can be deduced from the Constitutional Court decision:168 
1. If the procedure to sell a home in execution is not complied with as required by the 
rules, the sale must not be allowed. 
2. If another reasonable way to recover the debt exists, the sale must not be allowed. 
3. If the procedure is complied with, and no other reasonable way to recoup the debt 
exists, the sale in execution may be allowed unless there is a gross disproportion in 
the circumstances of the parties. In other words, the creditors’ interests are 
outweighed by the consumers’ interests or the harm caused to consumers’ outweighs 
the creditors’ advantage.  
4. In assessing proportionality, the amount or size of the debt must be considered. A 
trifling debt does not justify the home being sold.169  
5. However, the circumstances in which the debt arose must also be taken into 
consideration. If the consumers have been reckless and overextended themselves, 
                                            
165 Ibid para 55.  
166 See later case of Gundwana v Steko (note 37 above) below in Part 3.2.3 of this thesis. 
167 Jaftha (note 17 above) para 44&53. 
168 Ibid para 56-60. 
169 See Maleke (note 162 above)  where the court applied this principle to dismiss the applications. 
43 
 
knowing that they would not be able to pay the loan, the court may hold that a sale in 
execution is justified.170 
6. The consumers’ attempts to pay their debt. 
7. The financial position of both parties. For example, are the consumers employed or do 
they have another source of income to repay the loan? 
8. Any other relevant factor. 
 
Whilst these guidelines are useful, they are not a closed list because each case is unique. 
There are a multitude of other factors which can be considered and such factors will be 
identified in this thesis especially in Chapter 6.171  
Regarding the challenge to section 67 of the Magistrates’ Court Act, the 
Constitutional Court disagreed with the argument advanced that the section is 
unconstitutional because it does not offer the same protection to consumers’ homes as it does 
to the consumers’ movable necessities.172 The court held that the section fulfils the purpose of 
protecting the consumers’ movable property that is necessary for survival if the value of the 
movable property does not exceed a certain amount. However, a similar blanket prohibition 
in relation to a home is inappropriate.173 In essence, the court reasoned that a blanket 
prohibition would make it harder for impoverished consumers to access credit and it would 
disadvantage creditors who would be forbidden from selling the home in execution to get 
their money back.174  
Whilst the Constitutional Court’s reasoning makes sense, it would have been useful if 
this argument was further explored because prohibiting the sale of a home of a certain market 
value could serve to protect the home of indigent or vulnerable consumers. In those 
circumstances, creditors would have to pursue other means to recover the debt. This would be 
in line with the section 26 constitutional right to access adequate housing. Other countries do 
have such blanket prohibitions and this will be discussed further in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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3.2.2 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson & Others175 
 
This case was heard in the Supreme Court of Appeal and it was the first case to deal with the 
section 26 right to adequate housing in circumstances where creditors’ had mortgage bonds 
over the consumers’ property as security for a home loan.  
 
3.2.2.1 Facts of the case 
 
Following the approach in Jaftha, the Saunderson case, challenged the registrar’s powers to 
issue an order for immovable property to be sold in execution. The facts of the case were that 
Standard Bank issued summons against nine consumers whose debts were secured by 
mortgage bonds and who had subsequently defaulted in their repayments. Standard Bank 
claimed judgment against the consumers for the respective amounts owed and ancillary 
orders to declare their immovable properties executable. Eight consumers did not file notices 
of intention to defend and Standard Bank applied for default judgments with the registrar. 
Standard Bank applied for summary judgment in the one case where the consumer did enter 
an appearance to defend. The case was set down to be heard along with the default judgment 
applications.176  
The cases were first dealt with in the Cape Provincial Division where judgment was 
granted in each case for the full outstanding debt. However, the properties were not declared 
executable. Blignault J relied on the Constitutional Court case of Jaftha to conclude that the 
summonses did not contain enough allegations to permit the sales in execution. Standard 
Bank then appealed the matters to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 177 
Once again the court was tasked with determining whether the section 26 
constitutional right to adequate housing was violated.  
 
3.2.2.2 Provisions in question178 
 
Section 27A of the Supreme Court Act179 read together with Uniform Rule 31(5)(a) provide 
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that the registrar may declare immovable property specially executable. Section 27A reads as 
follows: 
 
A judgment by default may be granted and entered by the registrar in the manner and in the 
circumstances prescribed in the Rules made in terms of the Rules Board for Courts of Law 
Act, 1985 (Act No. 107 of 1985), and a judgment so entered shall be deemed to be a judgment 
of the court. 
 
Rule 31(5)(a) of the Uniform Rules states that:  
 
(a) Whenever a defendant is in default of delivery of notice of intention to defend or of a plea, 
the plaintiff, if he or she wishes to obtain judgment by default, shall where each of the claims 
is for a debt or liquidated demand, file with the registrar a written application for judgment 
against such defendant: Provided that when a defendant is in default of delivery of a plea, the 
plaintiff shall give such defendant not less than 5 days’ notice of his or her intention to apply 
for default judgment.  
(b) The registrar may –  
(i) grant judgment as requested;  
(ii) grant judgment for part of the claim only or on amended terms;  
(iii) refuse judgment wholly or in part;  
(iv) postpone the application for judgment on such terms as he may consider just;  
(v) request or receive oral or written submissions;  
(vi) require that the matter be set down for hearing in open court.  
(c) The registrar shall record any judgment granted or direction given by him.  
(d) Any party dissatisfied with a judgment granted or direction given by the registrar may, 
within 20 days after he has acquired knowledge of such judgment or direction, set the matter 
down for reconsideration by the court. 
 
Furthermore, Rule 45(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that:  
  
The party in whose favour any judgment of the court has been pronounced may, at his own 
                                                                                                                                       
179 Act 59 of 1959. 
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risk, sue out of the office of the registrar one or more writs for execution thereof as near as 
may be in accordance with Form 18 of the First Schedule: Provided that, except where 
immovable property has been specially declared executable by the court or in the case of a 
judgment granted in terms of Rule 31(5) by the registrar, no such process shall issue against 
the immovable property of any person until a return shall have been made of any process 
which may have been issued against his movable property, and the registrar perceives 
therefrom that the said person has not sufficient movable property to satisfy the writ. 
 
In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ngobeni,180 the court held that the purpose of the rules 
delegating the power to grant or refuse default judgment to registrars was to relieve the 
burden that rests on judges. However, such power only exists in uncomplicated matters where 
the registrar checks that all formalities have been adhered to. Obscure or extraordinary points 
of fact or law may not be decided by a registrar. Instead, in Uniform Rule 31(5)(b)(vi) the 
registrar is given the duty to refer the matter for a hearing if there a genuine concern about 
whether judgment should be granted.  
 
3.2.2.3 Findings of the court  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed with the arguments made by the respondents by 
distinguishing Jaftha from this case. It held that section 26(1) was not engaged in the 
Saunderson case because the section grants a right of access to adequate housing. What 
constitutes adequate housing is relative which will be determined by the facts of each case.181 
The court gave the example of a holiday home or luxury home and held that when such 
properties are sold in execution this will not trigger or affect the right to adequate housing at 
all.182  
Furthermore, the Saunderson cases were ‘radically different’ from Jaftha because 
they involved consumers who ‘willingly bonded their property to the bank to obtain 
capital.’183 The Supreme Court of Appeal therefore held that the bank is a mortgagee that has 
rights over the home which are derived from the mortgage agreement and are fused into the 
                                            
180 1995 (3) SA 234 (VSC) 235C-E. 
181 Saunderson (note 18 above) para 16. 
182 Ibid para 17. 
183 Ibid para 18. 
47 
 
title of the home.184  The Jaftha case did not address section 26(1) in the context of the kind 
of cases being dealt with in the Saunderson case. Instead, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
pointed out that the Constitutional Court in the Jaftha case expressly stated that where the 
court procedure has not been abused, a sale in execution would ordinarily be allowed.185 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal found that the defendants had not made an allegation that the court 
process had been abused and they also had not alleged that their right to access adequate 
housing would be infringed by the sales.186 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the registrar’s powers to 
grant default judgment was valid. The court reasoned that the registrar formally evaluates 
whether in the summons, a proper cause of action is disclosed; this does not involve a judicial 
function.187 Registrars only perform this function if there is no appearance to defend entered 
by consumers and there is no allegation that the order will infringe a constitutional right. 
Where consumers do defend the matter and/or raise a constitutional right, the matter will be 
heard in open court. Further, if registrars genuinely believe the order would infringe a right, 
they can refer the matter to open court.188  
Finally, the Supreme Court of Appeal issued a practice directive. This directive states 
that summons to institute legal proceedings for an order to declare immovable property 
executable must draw the consumers’ attention to the possibility of a sale in execution 
infringing their section 26(1) right to adequate housing. If consumers decide to oppose the 
matter and raise the right to adequate housing, they must place information to support such an 
allegation before the court.189 
Du Plessis and Penfold argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning is not 
easy to follow because the real question should be ‘whether the defendant is likely to be 
deprived of ‘access’ to adequate housing should he or she be deprived of the property in 
question – that is, whether he or she is likely to be left homeless as a result of the execution.’ 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not touch on the issue of security of tenure 
which was dealt with extensively in Jaftha.190  
In fact, it seems that many principles in the Jaftha case were not applied by the 
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Supreme Court of Appeal. The main principle is that there needs to be judicial oversight 
where consumers are likely to lose their home by a sale in execution. It is submitted that the 
fact that a mortgage bond was secured over the property should not be a reason to deny 
consumers’ right to adequate housing and it must be for the courts to weigh the rights and 
circumstances concerned, not the registrar. 
It is also submitted that as much as creditors have the right to be repaid the loan and 
to institute foreclosure proceedings to recover the debt owed, this cannot be the overarching 
principle that the courts consider. A multitude of factors must be assessed to balance the 
rights of creditors and consumers.191  
The effect of the Jaftha case and the Saunderson case in practice was that the 
Magistrates’ Court procedure involving the clerks’ competence to grant a warrant of 
execution was revoked, whilst the procedure in the High Court which involved registrars who 
had similar competence to grant writs of execution continued. This inconsistency created 
uncertainty in the law and courts had varied interpretations and procedures.192  
What is noteworthy is that the respondents in the Saunderson case did not take the 
matter on appeal to the Constitutional Court. Instead, the Campus Law Clinic of the 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (‘UKZN Law Clinic’) applied for leave to appeal the decision 
and in the alternative, for direct access, to the Constitutional Court on the ground of public 
interest.193 The Constitutional Court agreed that it was in the public interest to decide the 
procedure to allow applications to sell consumers’ homes in execution. However, although 
this was an important constitutional issue, the Court did not grant leave to appeal or direct 
access.194  
The Constitutional Court reasoned that UKZN Law Clinic was not a party to the 
proceedings in the lower courts and the issues it sought to be adjudicated were broader than 
those dealt with in the Saunderson case.195 The Court thus held that it is undesirable to 
determine important constitutional issues as ‘the court of first and last instance.’196 Rather, 
the case should begin at the High Court where all interested parties such as the bank, bodies 
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representing consumers, and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, can be 
joined.197 However, there was no subsequent legal action taken by the clinic. 
In essence, we do not have the benefit of seeing whether the Constitutional Court 
would have reached a different decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal. However the next 
case where registrars’ powers were once again challenged, was decided in the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
3.2.3 Gundwana v Steko Development and Others198 
 
This was the next landmark case to deal with section 26 in the context of the selling of a 
family home and it was decided by the Constitutional Court. 
  
3.2.3.1 Facts of the case 
 
Ms Gundwana bought a home in 1995 and she obtained a loan of R25000 from Nedcor Bank 
which is the second respondent in this matter. A mortgage bond was therefore registered over 
the property. In 2003, Ms Gundwana fell into arrears and the bank instituted proceedings to 
sell the property in execution. The registrar granted default judgment for an amount of 
R33 543,06 and an order declaring the property executable.199 
 For about 4 years, the bank did not pursue the matter any further and Ms Gundwana 
made irregular payments to the bank.200 In August 2007, Ms Gundwana discovered that a sale 
in execution was scheduled against her property. According to a bank official, she had 
defaulted in payments of R5 268,66 and the accelerated full outstanding balance on the loan 
was R23 779,13. In an attempt to avert the sale, Ms Gundwana paid R2000 to the bank, 
however the sale continued that same month. Steko Development bought the house, the 
transfer was registered and Steko Development launched eviction proceedings in April 2008. 
The order to evict Ms Gundwana was granted in June 2008 in the Magistrates’ Court and her 
appeal to the High Court was dismissed. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
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 Ms Gundwana then applied for the default judgment to be rescinded even though it 
was granted in 2003. That matter was pending in the High Court. She alleged that she did not 
know a default judgment had been granted against her. This is because after receiving 
summons she consulted a bank official and borrowed money to make further payments to the 
bank. She therefore assumed that the bank would not apply for default judgment and for four 
years, the bank did not take further action against her.202 
At the Constitutional Court, Ms Gundwana was granted leave to appeal the order to 
evict her. She was also granted direct access on a constitutional issue which would dispose of 
her High Court application for rescission.  
 
3.2.3.2 Provisions in question203 
 
The Gundwana case, heard five years after the Saunderson case, also challenged the 
constitutionality of the power granted to registrars to declare immovable property specially 
executable.204 An order declaring this was especially necessary since the Jaftha case had 
declared that it was for the court, not the clerk to, after considering all the relevant 
circumstances, issue a warrant of execution. Therefore, finality on this constitutional issue 
would benefit all those that are affected.205  
 
3.2.3.3 Findings of the court 
 
The prevailing argument made in various cases that deal with mortgage bond debts is that the 
consumers chose to enter into commercial transactions and they put their homes at risk by 
bonding their homes through mortgage bonds. For this reason, it has been a long-standing 
practice that if consumers fail to repay their debts, creditors are allowed to have the properties 
sold in order to recover the loan amount from the proceeds of the sales. This is why creditors 
that are armed with money judgments, are able to have the consumers’ homes declared 
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specially executable and sold in execution.206 The courts would therefore uphold the 
agreement as required by pacta sunt servanda.  
Froneman J rejected that argument and the notion that the principles of Jaftha case 
should not apply because consumers willingly bonded their homes. This is because, he 
pointed out, the rule must be objectively valid or invalid; the test for validity is not 
subjective.207 The Constitutional Court in this case held that the facts of numerous case have 
shown that there needs to be an enquiry to determine whether the right of the consumers to 
adequate housing can potentially be infringed. This cannot be determined through the 
registrar checking the summons. In fact, the Constitutional Court held, the facts of Gundwana 
show that there was nothing in the summons to indicate whether the property concerned was 
Ms Gundwana’s home or whether she was an indigent debtor.208 The Constitutional Court 
stressed that the factors mentioned in the Jaftha case must be considered in such instances. In 
other words, each case is unique and there needs to be an evaluation of all the facts to 
determine whether the order to declare the property specially executable should be granted.  
The Constitutional Court also held that willingness of the consumer to bind their 
home as security does not necessarily mean that they have waived their right to access 
adequate housing or that the mortgage agreements must be enforced without proper court 
oversight.209 Most consumers do not have the financial means to buy their homes for cash and 
therefore they must, out of necessity to have shelter and a place to call their own, obtain a 
loan from the bank.210  
The effect of the pronouncement that the registrars’ power to grant writs of execution 
was invalid was that the decision in the Saunderson case was overturned, along with the High 
Court decisions which agreed with Saunderson. In all cases where consumers’ homes are to 
be sold in execution there needs to be proper initial judicial evaluation. However, the practice 
directions issued in the cases that agreed with Saunderson for the summons to alert a debtor 
of their section 26 constitutional right, still remain because they may assist the court in their 
evaluation.211 
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3.3 The Right to not be Arbitrarily Deprived of Property 
 
The Constitutional Court intentionally did not address the section 25(1) right in the Jaftha 
case because of the conclusion the court reached in terms of section 26 of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of property can also be infringed through 
a forced sale. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance,212 the court 
held:  
 
In a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property 
rights involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in the 
property concerned. If section 25 is applied to this wide genus of interference, “deprivation” 
would encompass all species thereof…213  
 
It is therefore submitted that a deprivation of property can occur through the sale in execution 
of consumers’ homes. Such an interference must not be arbitrary and this will depend on the 
facts of each case. It is further submitted that although consumers’ property rights are 
encumbered by a mortgage bond, such rights are stronger when the consumer has built up 
equity in the home by paying a substantial amount of the loan over many years. If the 
consumer faces an unexpected financial hardship years into the agreement, they could lose 
this equity through a forced sale. This is especially because when there is a forced sale, the 
property is often sold for far less than its market value. 
The case of Firstrand Bank Ltd v Maleke and Three Similar Cases,214 (‘Maleke 
case’) dealt with this precise issue. The facts were that the defendants were historically 
disadvantaged consumers whose arrears on the bond were very low, except in one case where 
the arrear amounts were unknown. In addition, the defendants had been paying their 
instalments for periods ranging from 13 to 19 years. This meant that they had acquired equity 
in the properties, the market values of which had increased.215 The court held that the 
prejudice that would be suffered by the defendants through a sale in execution would be 
grossly disproportionate to the prejudice suffered by the banks. The banks would only be 
denied immediate payment of the loan. The arrear amounts were trifling and could therefore 
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be paid in a manner that was less invasive than execution.216 In other words, under the 
circumstances, the consumers’ right to property and to access adequate housing could not be 
limited under section 36 of the Constitution. 
However, it must be noted that for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution, a 
security right is also considered as property and foreclosure is the right that allows creditors 
to be repaid the home loan amount when consumers default. Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
when the courts refuse to grant an execution order, a delay in enforcing the agreement to be 
repaid the money owed does not amount to being deprived of property.217 Creditors will still 
be repaid albeit under different terms and conditions. It may take longer but creditors can also 
benefit from giving consumers an opportunity to remedy their default or rearrange their 
obligations. This is because forced sales do not usually realise the market value of the 
property. If the amount does not even cover the debt or legal costs, then the creditors will still 
be owed by overindebted consumers who cannot pay the remaining debt.  
It is further submitted that a sale in execution can render consumers homeless and 
they will be deprived of the equity that they built up in the home over the years. A balancing 
of factors must therefore occur to ensure that such a deprivation is not arbitrary. Nevertheless, 
the interests of creditors must also be considered because they also have a right to foreclose 
in order to be repaid the full outstanding balance on the home loan. In other words, the means 
must justify the ends when a home is sold in execution which was illustrated in the Maleke 
case discussed above.  
 
3.4 Human Dignity 
 
The right to human dignity is expressed in section 10 of the Constitution which states that 
‘everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’ 
However, the right to human dignity is also a value that is invoked to interpret other protected 
rights.218 O’Regan J, expressed the value of human dignity as follows: 
 
The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot… be doubted. The Constitution 
asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South Africans was 
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routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy 
respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity therefore informs 
constitutional adjudication an interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that informs the 
interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights… human dignity is also a constitutional value 
that is of central significance in the limitations analysis.219 (emphasis in the original) 
 
In the context of this thesis, the central right that is infringed when consumers’ homes are 
sold in execution is the fundamental right to access adequate housing. Human dignity, that is; 
a person’s intrinsic worth, is affected when those people no longer have a place to stay. 
The courts have acknowledged that this right is affected in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,220 where the court held that 
the foundational values of equality, human dignity and freedom are denied to people who 
have no shelter, food or clothing.221 The court further held that a claim for a socio-economic 
right necessarily affects the right to dignity.222 
Although Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others,223 dealt with the state evicting unlawful 
occupiers from its buildings, the court made a point which is very relevant to people’s right to 
access adequate housing. The court held that when assessing reasonableness of the way the 
state acted when making evictions, the Constitution will be rendered meaningless if the value 
of human dignity is disregarded. Human beings must be treated as such and the state’s 
conduct must be assessed against this context.224 Similarly, it is submitted that when 
consumers’ homes are sold in execution, they will be deprived of their homes therefore the 
courts must consider their human dignity as an underlying value to their right to access 
adequate housing which is affected.  
Lastly, in the Jaftha case, Mogkoro J noted that to have a home can be a dignifying 
human experience even under the most basic circumstances. That experience should not be 
undermined especially when the consumers concerned are at risk of not obtaining other 
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adequate housing and therefore unable to restore the conditions of their human dignity.225  
 
3.5 Rights of Vulnerable People  
 
The Maleke case discussed above in Part 3.3 also emphasised that people that fall into the 
category of ‘historically disadvantaged persons’ are more vulnerable in foreclosure cases. 
These persons are defined in section 2(6) of the NCA as ‘a category of natural persons who, 
before the Constitution ... came into operation, were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
on the basis of race.’ An important purpose of the Act is to promote an accessible credit 
market, especially to consumers who were historically excluded.226 The Act therefore 
imposes a duty on the National Credit Regulator ‘to promote and support the development… 
of… an accessible credit market and industry to serve the needs of historically disadvantaged 
persons.’227 Claassen J, in the Maleke case held that the courts must pursue and reflect the 
same ideal and noted that the NCA is: 
 
Designed to render assistance and protection to the previously disadvantaged section of our 
population who may wish to enter the property market. The Act levels the playing field 
between a relatively indigent and unsophisticated consumer and a moneyed and well-advised 
credit provider, and to limit the financial harm that the consumer may suffer if he/she is 
unable to perform in terms of the credit agreement228 
 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly refer to a right of vulnerable people, it does 
express certain values and aspirations which were discussed in the introduction of this 
chapter. South Africa has a repressive past that was categorised by inequality, indignity and 
violence. The Constitution aims to create a new era which heals the divisions of the country’s 
past, there is equal protection of every citizen by the law and the quality of life of South 
Africans is improved.229 It is therefore submitted that vulnerable, historically disadvantaged 
persons have to be especially protected by the courts to help them keep the existing access 
they have to housing.230 The courts can do this by considering the circumstances of 
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consumers before coming to a decision to order a sale of their homes in execution. This also 
needs to be done to fulfil the provisions of the Act. 
Additionally, Du Plessis and Penfold also argue that the creditors’ interests to execute 
should be weighed against the prejudice or hardship of the consumers’ dependants who may 
lose their home as a result of the foreclosure. Such dependants, which include children and 
the elderly, are innocent victims under the circumstances.231 In particular, the Constitution 
grants children the right to shelter232 and also states that in every matter concerning children, 
their best interests are of paramount importance.233 The courts have held that housing and 
shelter are interrelated concepts.234 If there are other means to recover the debt without 
rendering a family homeless, then the courts must refuse an order for executability. 
 
3.6 Amendments to the Procedure 
 
As a result of the court decisions which have been discussed above, Uniform Rule 46(1)(a) 
was amended and the amendment came into effect on 24 December 2010. The rule now 
reads:  
 
(a) No writ of execution against the immovable property of any judgment debtor 
shall issue until– 
 (i) a return shall have been made of any process which may have been issued 
against the movable property of the judgment debtor from which it 
appears that the said person has not sufficient movable property to satisfy 
the writ; or 
(ii) such immovable property shall have been declared to be specially 
executable by the court or, in the case of a judgment granted in terms of 
rule 31(5), by the registrar;  
Provided that, where the property sought to be attached is the primary residence 
of the judgment debtor, no writ shall issue unless the court, having considered 
all the relevant circumstances, orders execution against such property. 
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This amendment ensured that the High Court rule mirrored that of the Magistrates’ Court 
when a creditor seeks a sale in execution of consumers’ homes. It is now a settled rule that 
judges will consider the relevant circumstances in open court before coming to a decision.  
This rule was interpreted in the case of Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Bekker & Another 
and Four similar cases.235 The full bench of the Western Cape High Court Division first 
considered the Jaftha and Gundwana decisions and held that the phrase ‘all the relevant 
circumstances’ which was used in both cases, comes directly from section 26(3) of the 
Constitution.236 This section provides that there can be no demolition or eviction of a person’s 
home without an order issued by the courts after considering ‘all the relevant circumstances’. 
The full bench then noted that in both cases, the Constitutional Court declined to give 
a list of the facts which would be considered relevant. Therefore, it would be ‘undesirable’ 
and ‘futile’ for them to give such direction. This is because the circumstances which could be 
considered are endless and the facts of each case will shed light on what should be 
considered. The court is also restricted to making a decision based on the material placed 
before it.237 As mentioned above, the Jaftha case did give some guidelines in terms of the 
factors to consider which is useful for the courts when they have to decide whether a home 
should be sold in execution. 
In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v Folscher,238 although the court agreed with 
the notion that is impossible to offer a complete list of factors because every potential 
circumstance cannot be anticipated, the court did provide a comprehensive list of factors to 
consider.  These are as follows: 
• Whether the mortgaged property is the debtor's primary residence;  
• The circumstances under which the debt was incurred;  
• The arrears outstanding under the bond when the latter was called up;  
• The arrears on the date default judgment is sought;  
• The total amount owing in respect of which execution is sought;  
• The debtor's payment history;  
• The relative financial strength of the creditor and the debtor;  
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• Whether any possibilities exist that the debtor's liabilities to the creditor may be 
liquidated within a reasonable period without having to execute against the 
debtor's residence; 
• The proportionality of prejudice the creditor might suffer if execution were to be 
refused compared to the prejudice the debtor would suffer if execution went 
ahead and he lost his home;  
• Whether any notice in terms of section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
was sent to the debtor prior to the institution of action;  
• The debtor's reaction to such notice, if any;  
• The period of time that elapsed between delivery of such notice and the 
institution of action;  
• Whether the property sought to have declared executable was acquired by means 
of or with the aid of, a State subsidy;  
• Whether the property is occupied or not;  
• Whether the property Is in fact occupied by the debtor;  
• Whether the immovable property was acquired with monies advanced by the 
creditor or not;  
• Whether the debtor will lose access to housing as a result of execution being 
levied against his home;  
• Whether there is any indication that the creditor has instituted action with an 
ulterior motive or not;  
• The position of the debtor's dependants and other occupants of the house, 
although in each case these facts will have to be established as being legally 
relevant.239 
 
This list will be very useful in assisting the courts to reach a decision. It is submitted that this 
enhances the court’s ability to assess all the relevant circumstances in foreclosure cases to 
safeguard the very important right to access adequate housing. Not all the factors must be 
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present but rather, the particular circumstances and facts of each case will determine what to 
scrutinise. The courts are required to decide on a case by case basis by balancing the rights of 
the creditor and consumer to determine whether the sale of consumers’ homes would be 
justified. 
On 17 November 2017, the Rules Board for South Africa’s Courts of law substantially 
amended the Uniform Rules of Court and the Magistrates’ Court Rules.240 Both amendments 
deal with selling the primary residence of consumers in execution. Major amendments were 
made to Uniform Rule 46 and a new Uniform Rule 46A was added which is titled ‘Execution 
against residential immovable property’. Similarly, Magistrates’ Court Rule 43A deals with 
the same process in the Magistrates’ Court. The rules therefore do not apply to property 
which is not the primary home of defaulting consumers. 
In particular both Uniform Rule 46A(2) and Magistrates’ Court Rule 43A(2) provides 
that a court has to consider an application to foreclose a primary home and must: 
 
(a)(i) establish whether the immovable property which the execution creditor intends to 
execute against is the primary residence of the judgment debtor; and  
    (ii) consider alternative means by the judgment debtor of satisfying the judgment debt, 
other than execution against the judgment debtor’s primary residence. 
(b) A court shall not authorise execution against immovable property which is the primary 
residence of a judgment debtor unless the court, having considered all relevant factors, 
considers that execution against such property is warranted.   
(c) The registrar shall not issue a writ of execution against the residential immovable property 
of any judgment debtor unless a court has ordered execution against such property. 
 
It is submitted that the amendments are aligned to the abovementioned judgments which have 
served to safeguard consumers’ right to access adequate housing. The fact that the courts 
must consider alternative means to get the creditors’ money back reinforces the idea that a 
home can only be sold in execution as a last resort. Each case will have its own merits, and 
the rules retain the principle that the court will consider all the relevant factors to decide the 
matter, not the registrar. However, the amendmenrs do impose extensive requirements on 
creditors and the courts are no longer quick to impose their right to foreclose to recover the 
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debt. However, the courts have said that South Africa cannot be a ‘debtor’s paradise’ so 
creditors still need to be repaid the loan owed.241 In Chapter 5, this thesis discusses the 
amendments in more depth, along with the practice directives issued to adhere to the rules. 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The courts have interpreted the right to access adequate housing as a fundamental socio-
economic right. As much as the value of registering a mortgage bond lies in being able to sell 
the home in execution to obtain the full outstanding balance on the loan, this must be 
balanced against consumers’ right to access adequate housing. The fact that the decision 
whether consumers’ would lose their primary home was left to the registrars or clerks of the 
courts, without any judicial oversight, meant that consumers were left in very vulnerable 
positions. The abovementioned cases highlighted that factor.  
The Jaftha case significantly improved the position of consumers because the 
Constitutional Court held that the court (judges) had to ‘consider all the relevant 
circumstances’ before ordering a sale in execution in the Magistrates’ Court. However, the 
Jaftha case was interpreted differently in various courts.242 In particular, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal distinguished the Jaftha case from the Saunderson case and said that the registrar’s 
power to decide whether to execute was valid. The unintended result, as predicted by Du 
Plessis and Penfold was that creditors who could proceed using the Magistrates’ Court chose 
instead to use the High Court.243 The argument that consumers could approach the court to set 
the order aside, was rejected in the Gundwana case. In most cases, consumers are unaware of 
the protection and if consumers were aware, they did not have the wherewithal to use the 
mechanism. Instead, the Constitutional Court in the Gundwana case agreed with the Jaftha 
case and held that it is for the courts, and not the registrars, to decide whether a home should 
be sold in execution. 
Amendments were made to the rules and this was an improvement which reconciled 
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court procedure with the obligation of the courts under section 7 and 8 of the Constitution.244 
That is, to ‘respect, protect, promote…’ and ‘give effect’ to the right to access adequate 
housing which is enshrined in section 26 of the Constitution. 
Now the law is clear. In both the Magistrates’ Courts and High Courts, the court 
must, after all the relevant circumstances are considered, decide whether a writ or warrant of 
execution should be granted to sell a home in execution. However, judicial oversight does not 
guarantee that the home will not be sold in execution. The courts have to look at the specific 
circumstances of each case.245 What is certain is that if there are other measures to settle the 
matter, for instance, the payment of the arrears and reasonable costs incurred; the courts are 
very hesitant to grant the order for executability where the loss of a home is a possibility. The 
Constitution therefore restricts what a creditor could simply do under the common law and 
because of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Nevertheless, creditors’ are not stripped of 
their security rights. The courts have held that consumers’ financial obligations remain and 
they must take responsibility by paying their debts.246 
The next chapters will continue to discuss the progression of the court procedure 
over the years. In particular, the next chapter will assess the NCA and its impact on the 
procedure. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, the constitutional provisions which led to the amendment of certain 
procedures that needed to be followed before a family home could be sold to satisfy a debt 
were discussed. Now this thesis turns to analyse how the introduction of the NCA has 
impacted the procedures. The NCA was enacted in 2005 and came into full effect on 1 June 
2007. It was enacted to regulate South Africa’s credit industry thereby replacing various Acts,  
which did this before.247 The previous legislation and the economy they operated under was 
 
…characterised by discrimination, a lack of transparency, limited competition, high costs of 
credit, and limited consumer protection. The mechanisms to prevent over-indebtedness that 
were in place at the time, could also not adequately promote the rehabilitation of consumers, 
and the available debt relief could also not assist already over-indebted consumers to deal 
with their debt.248 
 
Therefore, there was a need for new legislation to be enacted which was targeted at not only 
creating an efficient credit market, but also with a focus on consumer protection issues such 
as relieving the over-indebtedness of consumers and preventing reckless credit lending.249 
The NCA was thus enacted ‘to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, 
effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers.’250 The Act 
does all of this by promoting an accessible credit market especially for consumers who were 
previously disadvantaged,251 promoting responsibility and equity in the credit market,252 
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correcting negotiating power imbalances between creditors and consumers,253 as well as 
preventing and alleviating the over-indebtedness of consumers.254  
Moreover, in interpreting the provisions of the NCA, the courts have pronounced that 
the main purpose of the Act is to balance the rights of creditors and consumers so that there is 
an effective credit market.255 The Act attempts to even out the playing field between ‘a 
relatively indigent and unsophisticated consumer and a moneyed and well-advised credit 
provider, and to limit the financial harm that the consumer may suffer if he/she is unable to 
perform in terms of the credit agreement.’256 
The NCA therefore restrains creditors’ powers to enforce the credit agreement,257 and 
gives the consumer certain rights.258 It also prohibits reckless credit lending and assists over-
indebted consumers by providing a number of debt relief measures. These include debt 
review, debt counselling and debt restructuring.259 All of this is done to ensure that creditors 
are repaid what they are owed whilst still protecting the rights of consumers and ensuring that 
they are not taken advantage of. 
However, Otto and Otto argue that the NCA introduced cumbersome procedures 
which curtail the creditors’ right to seek relief for the amount they lent the consumer.260 The 
Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation with over 173 sections.261 It represents a complete 
shift from its predecessors and signifies a clean break from South Africa’s past.262 The rules 
regulating the enforcement of credit agreements have become stricter ever since the NCA 
came into full effect.263 Mortgage bonds are also regulated under the NCA because they are 
included in the definition of credit agreements.264 The NCA defines a mortgage agreement as 
                                            
253 Section 3(e) of the NCA. 
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‘a credit agreement that is secured by a pledge of immovable property, the registration of a 
mortgage bond by the registrar of deeds over immovable property.’265 Therefore, there are 
certain procedures that creditors must follow in terms of the NCA before enforcing a credit 
agreement which in this thesis is a mortgage bond. 
The Act has been amended on a number of occasions to correct numerous 
ambiguities and inconsistencies which has resulted in a flood of litigation and commentaries 
by academics.266 This chapter will discuss these additional procedures, the amendments and 
leading case law to the extent that this is relevant to this research. In addition, although not a 
main focus of this research, debt relief measures will be briefly discussed because they tackle 
the root cause of a sale in execution which is over-indebtedness. 
 
4.2 Debt Collection Process 
 
When consumers borrow money, they must repay that money. One of the most important 
rights that creditors have is the right to be repaid.267 Nevertheless, creditors must follow the 
procedure to recover debt which is now set out in the NCA. First of all, creditors must send  
notices (commonly referred to as section 129 notices) to consumers to notify them that they 
have defaulted and to ask for that default to be remedied. If the default is not remedied, or 
consumers fail to respond to the notice; creditors may institute proceedings to claim the 
money they are owed and certain procedures must be followed in court. It is also important to 
note that even if the consumers are in default, they are entitled to reinstate the credit 
agreement under certain circumstances. So for the purposes of this research the following 
sections are important –  
• Section 129(1)&(2) which deals with the notice; 
• Section 129(3)&(4)  which deals with reinstatement of the loan agreement; and  
• Section 130 which deals with the procedures to be followed in court. 
 
 
                                            
265 Section 1(a) of the NCA as amended by the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 (‘the Amendment 
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266 See R Brits ‘The “reinstatement” of credit agreements: Remarks in response to the 2014 amendment of 
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4.2.1 The section 129 notice 
 
4.2.1.1 Meaning of the provisions  
 
This section sets out the procedures that must be followed before legal proceedings are 
instituted to recover the debt. In particular, section 129(1)&(2) provide that:   
  
(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider—  
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and propose that the 
consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative dispute 
resolution agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the 
parties resolve any dispute under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to 
bring the payments under the agreement up to date; and  
(b) subject to section 130(2), may not commence any legal proceedings to enforce the 
agreement before—  
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as contemplated in paragraph (a), or 
in section 86(10),51 as the case may be; and  
(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in section 130. 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to a credit agreement that is subject to a debt restructuring 
order, or to proceedings in a court that could result in such an order. 
 
Although sub-section (1)(a) states that if consumers fail to meet their obligations under a 
credit agreement and are in default, creditors may give the consumers written notice of the 
default. The courts have interpreted this to mean that creditors are obliged or must give 
written notice of the default to consumers.268 This is because sub-section (1)(b) provides that 
creditors may not commence legal proceedings under section 130(2) until such notice has 
been given to defaulting consumers. 
Creditors must also propose that consumers refer their matters to a number of third 
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parties so the problems can be resolved before further legal action is taken.269 This includes a 
debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud with 
jurisdiction. A plan can therefore be formulated for consumers to pay the arrears, thereby 
getting the payments up to date. As stated above, creditors are forbidden from instituting legal 
proceedings without having first given notice and following the procedures that are in section 
130 of the NCA. This is briefly dealt with in part 4.2.3 of this chapter. 
In the context of a mortgage bond agreement, creditors (normally the banks) are 
required to give consumers a section 129 notice and make an attempt to make further 
arrangements with the them to get their payments up to date. Without having first done so, 
creditors cannot institute legal proceedings for the full outstanding balance on the mortgage 
bonds or sell the consumers’ homes in execution.  
Furthermore, in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher,270 the court issued a practice 
directive in the North Gauteng High Court. The directive requires that a section 129(1)(a) 
notice must also notify the consumer that if the court grants an order in favour of the creditor, 
the next step would be a sale in execution and thereafter eviction from the home.271 
Considering the fact that there are consumers who are under educated or inexperienced in 
dealing with such transactions and do not realise the grave consequences of  defaulting, or not 
responding to legal notices; it is submitted that the practice directive is a good initiative. 
 
4.2.1.2 Delivery of the section 129 notice  
 
Before certain amendments regarding delivery were made to the NCA, the courts 
encountered numerous problems in interpreting section 129(1).272 The main question was 
whether it was sufficient for creditors to show that the notice was delivered, or did the NCA 
require that consumers receive actual notice? Numerous cases attempted to answer this 
question. 
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In Rossouw and Another v First Rand Bank Ltd,273 (‘Rossouw case’) Mr and Mrs Rossouw 
were a married couple who concluded a mortgage bond agreement with First Rand Bank and 
the NCA applied to the agreement. The material terms of the agreement regarding notice 
stated that service would be at the Rossouws’ domicilium or by registered post. Such notice 
would be deemed as received by them three days after posting. Also, a signed certificate 
stating that notice was delivered on behalf of the bank, would be sufficient proof to discharge 
the section 129(1) requirement of notice and the signature’s validity did not need to be 
proved.274 After two years, the Rossouws defaulted in payments and the bank sent them a 
section 129 notice. One of the arguments the Rossouws made was that they did not receive 
proper notice in terms of section 129(1) and section 130(1) of the NCA.275 The matter was 
eventually dealt with by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 The court identified the issue as: in section 129(1) of the NCA, what manner of 
delivery is intended?276 The Supreme Court of Appeal examined a number of sections in the 
NCA to hold that the consumer is granted a right to choose the method of delivery. This 
shows the legislature’s intention was to also place the risk of not receiving the notice on the 
consumer.277 In other words, if the creditor can show that there was delivery of the notice; 
that was sufficient to discharge the section 129 notice requirement before litigating, even if 
the consumer did not actually receive such notice.  
Another case which dealt with the manner of delivery of the section 129(1) notice was 
Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (‘Sebola case’).278 The Sebola case was decided 
by the Constitutional Court and the facts were similar to the Rossouw case. Mr and Mrs 
Sebola were a married couple that entered into a mortgage bond agreement with Standard 
Bank. The Sebolas chose the property that was mortgaged as the address to serve documents 
and notices. If the bank sent documents and notices by registered post to this address, the 
clause provided that the Sebolas would be regarded as having received notice within 14 days 
after posting.279  
Thereafter, the Sebolas defaulted on their payments and the bank sent notice as 
required by section 129 and 130 of the NCA via registered mail. The Sebolas argued that the 
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notice was diverted to the wrong post office therefore, they never received it. A tracking and 
tracing record in the Sebolas’ papers proved this.280 Approximately two months later after 
sending notice in terms of the NCA, Standard Bank issued summons where it claimed the full 
outstanding amount under the mortgage bond, interest and costs. Furthermore, the Bank 
sought an order to declare home specially executable. The summons was served by affixing a 
copy at the Sebolas’ chosen domicilium door. In the next months, default judgment was 
granted as well as a writ of execution. Once the Sebolas found out about the proceedings, 
they sought rescission of the writ of execution and default judgment. They argued that they 
did not receive the summons either. The matter ultimately ended up at the Constitutional 
Court. Cameron J, in a unanimous judgment held that: 
 
The requirement that a credit provider provide notice in terms of section 129(1)(a) to the 
consumer must be understood in conjunction with section 130, which requires delivery of the 
notice. The statute, though giving no clear meaning to “deliver”, requires that the credit 
provider seeking to enforce a credit agreement aver and prove that the notice was delivered to 
the consumer.  Where the credit provider posts the notice, proof of registered despatch to the 
address of the consumer, together with proof that the notice reached the appropriate post 
office for delivery to the consumer, will in the absence of contrary indication constitute 
sufficient proof of delivery. If in contested proceedings the consumer avers that the notice did 
not reach her, the court must establish the truth of the claim.  If it finds that the credit provider 
has not complied with section 129(1), it must in terms of section 130(4)(b) adjourn the matter 
and set out the steps the credit provider must take before the matter may be resumed.281 
 
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the requirements for delivery 
to be effected strikes a balance between creditors and consumers. Since the consumers agreed 
to a certain manner of deliver, all the creditors had to prove is that they delivered the notice 
which is not a burdensome requirement. If consumers argue that they did not receive the 
notice, like the Rossouws, then they must prove this.  
The cases discussed above are just two of the many cases where the issue of delivery 
was dealt with by the courts, leading to conflicting decisions. Even the Sebola judgment was 
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interpreted differently in various jurisdictions.282 Although the facts of the case of Kubyana v 
Standard Bank of South Africa283 did not deal with mortgage agreement, the Constitutional 
Court once again had the task of determining what constituted proper service of a notice. In 
particular, the Constitutional Court asked what steps did creditors have to take to discharge 
the onus that they served the notice.284  
In essence, Mr Kubyana had defaulted in payments of a motor vehicle loan, the bank 
notified him of his default and further sent a section 129 notice to Mr Kubyana’s nominated 
registered post. The notice reached the correct post office and a notification was sent to Mr 
Kubyana’s address. However, Mr Kubyana did not collect the notice and did not provide an 
explanation as to why he did not do so.285 The Constitutional Court held that the NCA does 
not require that creditors personally serve notice to consumers or ensure that the notice is 
brought to the subjective attention of consumers.286 Instead, the duty to send a notice is 
discharged when creditors make the document available to the consumer, as provided in 
section 65(2) of the NCA.287 This is what the bank had done in this case. A track and trace 
record proved this and the onus shifted to Mr Kubyana to explain why he had not fetched the 
notice.288 The Constitutional Court also revisited the Sebola judgment and distinguished it 
from the Kubyana case because notice was sent to the incorrect post office in the Sebola case, 
whilst it had reached the correct post office in the Kubyana case.289 
The NCA has now been amended in order to provide much needed clarity. The NCA 
now provides that the notice must be delivered either to an adult at a place the consumer 
chose in the original contract that the consumer signed with the creditor or, the notice must be 
sent by registered mail to an address that the consumer chose.290 The preferred manner of 
delivery must be indicated in writing by the consumer and once the notice is delivered there 
are two ways to indicate proof of delivery. The first is the postal service or its agent giving 
written confirmation. The second is a signature of the recipient, that is, the consumer or the 
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adult at the place the consumer chose.291 
In practice most consumers choose to receive notices by registered mail or at their 
domicilium and they provide an address in their original contract. This has serious 
implications for the debt collection process because consumers often do not collect their 
registered letters from the Post Office. Notices delivered at a domicilium may also not come 
to the actual attention of consumers who may have been at work when the delivery 
occurred.292  
This is particularly problematic when it seems that consumers are deliberately 
avoiding collecting their registered post or not responding.293 The court has noted that some 
consumers do not understand or sufficiently appreciate the danger of receiving such letters of 
demand.294 Many consumers who fall under the category of historically disadvantaged 
persons also do not have the funds to seek legal advice and are unaware of the free legal 
advice that is offered by institutions such as the Legal Resources Centre, Legal Aid Board or 
law clinics at universities.295 It is therefore submitted that a greater effort must be made by all 
stakeholders to ensure that consumers are educated about the consequences of defaulting as 
well as their rights and options under the NCA. However, if consumers deliberately avoid 
notices, then the creditors have done enough to discharge their duty to send the notice. 
It seems that the amendments by the NCAA are aligned to what case law decided so 
the principles in the abovementioned cases are still good law. However, an amendment was 
made to Uniform Rule 46A and Magistrates’ Court Rule 43A which makes personal service 
mandatory to serve summons unless it cannot be effected in which case the court has a 
discretion to order another form of delivery. This places a higher burden on creditors who 
wish to institute proceedings after the section 129 notice is sent which means that subjective 
knowledge is required. Only time will tell if such a requirement of personal service can be 
extended to the section 129 notice which serves as a letter of demand. 
 
4.2.2 Reinstatement of the credit agreement 
 
The NCA creates a further right for consumers which provides them with extra protection 
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because they are, in terms of the Act and not just based on creditor discretion, permitted to 
reinstate their credit agreements.296 Mortgage bond agreements can therefore be reinstated 
under the section 129(3) and (4).  These sections initially provided as follows:  
 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a consumer may 
(a) at any time before the credit provider has cancelled the agreement, reinstate a 
credit agreement that is in default by paying to the credit provider all amounts that are 
overdue, together with the credit provider’s prescribed default administration charges 
and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up to the time of reinstatement, and 
(b) after complying with paragraph (a) may resume possession of any property that 
had been repossessed by the credit provider pursuant to an attachment order.  
(4)  A consumer may not re-instate or revive a credit agreement after— 
(a) the sale of any property pursuant to—  
(i) an attachment order; or  
(ii) surrender of property in terms of section 127;  
(b) the execution of any other court order enforcing that agreement; or  
(c) the termination thereof in accordance with section 123. (my emphasis) 
 
Regarding the above provisions, the general rule was that a defaulting consumer could, 
before the agreement was cancelled, pay the arrears, the default charges and ‘reasonable costs 
of enforcing the agreement,’297 to reinstate the credit agreement. The exceptions to the rule 
was in the case where the property has been sold, the execution of a court order to enforce the 
agreement or a termination of the agreement. Under those circumstances, reinstatement could 
not occur. 
The effect of reinstatement was that the credit agreement would continue to operate 
as if the consumer had never been in default. Both parties would thus be restored to the 
position they were in before the default with the same duties and rights under the credit 
agreement. Therefore, foreclosure proceedings would come to an end and the consumer 
would be entitled to maintain or resume possession of their home. In principle, this 
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mechanism is very beneficial to consumers who are faced with losing their home because 
reinstatement can not only prevent but also reverse debt enforcement up to a certain stage.298 
However, the provisions in the Act contained certain terminological and conceptual 
contradictions which made it difficult for them to be interpreted. This is evidenced by the 
various judgments where the courts, including the Constitutional Court, have had conflicting 
views. In addition, academics have written journal articles and tried to provide clarity as to 
how to interpret the provisions.299 For instance the fact that reinstatement had to occur before 
the cancellation of the agreement was a contradiction. If the agreement had not been 
cancelled, there would be no agreement to reinstate. Furthermore, the prohibitions mentioned 
in section 129(4) of the NCA  could only occur if there had been a cancellation of the 
agreement.300 
The landmark case of Nkata v Firstrand Bank Limited and Others,301 attempted to 
clear up the principles of reinstatement by interpreting sections 129(3) and (4) in the NCA. 
The Constitutional Court asked the question whether the reinstatement of the mortgage 
agreement had occurred? The facts were that Ms Nkata was a single mother of two and 
business woman who bought a house in 2005. In order to finance the purchase, Ms Nkata 
registered two mortgage bonds with Firstrand Bank of R630 000 and R850 000. In 2007, the 
property became the family home.302 Thereafter, Ms Nkata repeatedly fell into arrears which 
resulted in numerous letters and calls from the bank. This included two section 129(1) notices 
however, she denied ever receiving the notices. She raised an issue regarding the addresses to 
which the notices were delivered.303  
The bank subsequently issued summons which were served by the Sheriff who 
affixed a copy on the door. Ms Nkata further denied receiving the summons which is why an 
appearance to defend was not entered into.304 The bank then applied for and was granted 
default judgment for the accelerated full outstanding balance of R1 472 506.89 on the loan 
and interest. The Sheriff was authorised to carry out the execution process after the Registrar 
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issued a writ of execution.305 In November 2010, Ms Nkata instituted an urgent application to 
rescind the default judgment. Before the matter was heard, a settlement agreement was 
entered into by Ms Nkata and the bank.306 The terms were that the sale in execution would be 
cancelled, Ms Nkata would pay an instalment of R10 000 to the bank every month and if she 
defaulted again, the bank could proceed to sell the property in execution.307  
Ms Nkata thereby settled her bond arrears of R87 500 in full, in March 2011. 
However, over the next two years, she still struggled to meet her monthly payments. 
Eventually, in February 2013, the bank sent her a notice of the pending sale to her registered 
mail address which she did not collect. The property was then sold in April 2013.308 Ms 
Nkata brought another High Court application to cancel the sale of her home and she also 
sought a rescission of the default judgment. Transfer and registration to the new owner was 
temporarily cancelled pending litigation.309 The High Court dismissed the rescission 
application. However, the High Court found that the credit agreement was reinstated in terms 
of section 129(3) of the NCA. As a result, the default judgment could not be enforced, and the 
sale was set aside.310 
The Supreme Court of Appeal then heard the matter and upheld the appeal in favour 
of the bank stating that since the property had already been sold, it amounted to the execution 
of a court order to enforce the agreement. This therefore barred Ms Nkata from reinstating the 
agreement as stated in section 129(4)(b) of the NCA. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that reinstatement meant that the credit the agreement has been amended. This 
would demand a formality of the amendment being reduced to writing and signed.311 
The matter was then heard by the Constitutional Court which set aside the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal and found that the sale was invalid since it occurred two years 
after the mortgage agreement was lawfully reinstated.312 Moseneke DCJ, who wrote the 
majority judgment first captured the essence of the purpose of the NCA. He pointed out that 
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when the courts decide the case the rights of the creditor must be balanced with those of the 
consumer. He stated that: 
 
The Act seeks to infuse values of fairness, good faith, reasonableness and equality in the 
manner actors in the credit market relate. Unlike in the past, the sheer raw financial power 
difference between the credit giver and its much needed but weaker counterpart, the credit 
consumer, will not always rule the roost. Courts are urged to strike a balance between their 
respective rights and responsibilities. Yes, debtors must diligently and honestly meet their 
undertakings towards their creditors. If they do not, the credit market will not be sustainable.  
But the human condition suggests that it is not always possible – particularly in credit 
arrangements that run over many years or decades, as mortgage bonds over homes do. Credit 
givers serve a beneficial and indispensable role in advancing the economy and sometimes 
social good. They too have not only rights but also responsibilities. They must act within the 
constraints of the statutory arrangements. That is particularly so when a credit consumer 
honestly runs into financial distress that precipitates repayment defaults.  The resolution of the 
resultant dispute must bear the hallmarks of equity, good faith, reasonableness and equality.  
No doubt, credit givers ought to be astute to recognise the imbalance in negotiating power 
between themselves and consumers. They ought to realise that at play in the dispute is not 
only the profit motive, but also the civilised values of our Constitution.313 
 
In interpreting section 129(3) of the Act, the Constitutional Court decided that reinstatement 
is something that happens by operation of law. This is unless reinstatement is prohibited by 
section 129(4) of the NCA. The majority reasoned that the wording of the sections show that 
the consumer is the ‘protagonist’ who is not required to seek the co-operation of the creditor 
or notify the creditor of their intention to reinstate the agreement. Such reinstatement may 
occur by paying the arrears, costs and permissible default charges to the creditor. A 
precondition of giving notice before reinstating the agreement would thus unduly limit the 
remedy.314 The Constitutional Court further held that the full accelerated outstanding balance 
on the loan need not be paid for reinstatement to occur. What is required if for the arrears to 
be paid.315  
The main (dissenting) judgment and majority judgment differed on whether in this 
case, the appellant had paid the respondent’s ‘permitted default charges and reasonable costs 
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of enforcing the agreement.’316 The facts show that the respondent debited legal fees to Ms 
Nkata’s bond account in October 2010 and February 2011. The bank did not give a separate 
notice of legal costs that it demanded for payment, nor did it regard Ms Nkata as being in 
arrears because of the costs.317  
On the one hand, Cameron J, in the main dissenting judgment argued that the duty to 
determine the costs that must be paid as required by section 129(3) of the NCA, rests on the 
consumer. Therefore, if the consumer does not attempt to determine these costs and tender 
payment, then paying only the arrears will not reinstate the mortgage agreement.318 
In addition, Nugent AJ also agreed with Cameron J but reasoned that nothing in the 
express words used in section 129(3) placed a duty on the creditor to claim costs in order for 
them to be due and payable. Furthermore, the provision did not mention that there would be a 
circumstance where such costs would not be required for reinstatement to occur.319 
On the other hand Moseneke DCJ, in the majority judgment, held that when the 
appellant settled her bond arrears in full, the costs were not ‘due and payable’. He reasoned 
that the respondent unilaterally debited the costs without giving notice to the appellant of 
their nature and extent.320 The Constitutional Court therefore placed the duty on creditors to 
quantify the amounts that are payable to recover the legal costs from consumers. If this is not 
done, and consumers pays the arrears in full, the agreement is reinstated. 
Moseneke DCJ also noted that if creditors are not required to give consumers due 
notice of the amount of the legal costs to be paid, the reinstatement mechanism will be 
frustrated. Creditors would argue that reinstatement cannot occur because the unilaterally 
debited legal costs to the mortgage account, had not been paid. This would be unfair not only 
because those legal costs would be relatively small, but also because they were never 
assessed or disclosed properly to the consumer.321 In light of the abovementioned principles, 
the appeal was upheld in these terms:  
 
Ms Nkata is entitled to an order declaring that: the credit agreement was lawfully reinstated; 
from 8 March 2011, the default judgment entered against Ms Nkata and the subsequent 
                                            
316 Ibid see Cameron J and Moseneke DCJ judgments.  
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320 Ibid para 121. 
321 Ibid para 125.  
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warrant of execution against her home had no legal force; the public auction of Ms Nkata’s 
home on 24 April 2013 to the third respondent is set aside and the property may not be 
transferred to or registered in the name of the third respondent.322 
 
The Nkata judgment was applauded for offering a lifeline to consumers who meet the 
requirements of section 129(3)&(4). For credit providers, it meant that reliance on the 
acceleration clause is insufficient to assist them when it comes to enforcing their right to 
foreclose.323 
However, it has been argued that the dissenting judgments of Cameron J and Nugent 
AJ seem closer to the intention of the legislature in drafting the reinstatement mechanism as 
well as with practical reality.324 It has also been argued that such an interpretation does not go 
against consumers who wish to use the reinstate the agreement. Any future amendments to 
the NCA should address the issue of who has the onus of determining the reasonable costs to 
pay, especially because the Constitutional Court  judges were in such disagreement.325 
 It is submitted that the majority tried to interpret the provisions in a manner that 
would allow reinstatement even when consumers did not necessarily have reinstatement in 
mind but paid the arrears in full. This is also evidenced by court deciding that reinstatement 
happens ex lege without a need to inform the creditor, or even having an intention to reinstate 
the agreement.326 Steyn argues that this creates uncertainty and the NCA should be amended 
so that clear procedural and substantive requirements which need to be met for reinstatement 
to occur, are created.327 This argument is supported by Brits, Coetzee and van Heerden.328 
Although the court stated that reinstatement was something that occurs unilaterally 
and ex lege which provides a lifeline for consumers who are not even aware of the 
mechanism, there is still a need to ensure that there is clear process for reinstatement to 
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occur.329 Having a clear process to allow reinstatement would prevent cases like that of Jaftha 
where both the creditor and consumer were unaware that reinstatement had actually occurred.  
In 2014, section 129(3) and (4) were amended by the National Credit Amendment Act 
19 of 2014. It now reads as follows:  
 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a consumer may at any time before the credit provider has 
cancelled the agreement, remedy a default in such credit agreement by paying to the credit 
provider all amounts that are overdue, together with the credit provider’s prescribed default 
administration charges and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up to the time the 
default was remedied.  
(4) A credit provider may not re-instate or revive a credit agreement after –  
(a) the sale of any property pursuant to –  
(i) an attachment order; or  
(ii) surrender of property in terms of section 127;  
(b) the execution of any other court order enforcing that agreement; or  
(c) the termination thereof in accordance with section 123. 
 
The legislature therefore made material changes to the reinstatement mechanism.  
Unfortunately it has been argued that such amendments have exacerbated the problem of 
interpretation.330 Before the amendment, under section 129(3), it was the consumer who had 
the power to reinstate the credit agreement by paying their arrears and other costs. However, 
the effect of the amendment is that when consumers pay all their arrears, they simply remedy 
a default. This therefore removes the issue of reinstating the agreement before cancellation 
which existed in the initial provision.331 However, it has been argued that the fact that the 
words ‘before the credit provider has cancelled the agreement’ have remained, is still 
problematic because it is still not clear what cancellation entails or means in relation to 
reinstating a credit agreement.332  
Another problematic amendment is that the power to reinstate the agreement has now 
shifted to the credit provider unless any one of instances in subsection (4) occur. The purpose 
of this amendment is not clear and it has been suggested that the legislature made an error 
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and should have maintained the word ‘consumer’ in that provision. The words ‘revive’ have 
also been inserted and the meaning of this word is not explained.333 Lastly, section 129(3)(b) 
has been completely repealed so the consumer no longer has the right to possess the property 
which is held pursuant to an attachment order. The reason for this amendment is also unclear. 
Evidently, the Nkata judgment is not that useful when it comes to interpreting these 
new provisions. Academics suggest that instead of trying to reach a satisfactory interpretation 
of the current provisions on reinstatement, there is a need to ‘go back to the drawing board’ to 
reformulate and redraft sections 129(3) and (4) of the NCA.334   
 
4.2.3  Procedures in court 
 
Creditors may institute legal proceedings and claim relief only if consumers have defaulted 
under the agreement for a minimum of 20 business days. Moreover, a minimum of 10 
business days must have passed since proper notice was delivered the consumers in terms of 
section 129(1) of the NCA. This would mean that they did not respond to the notice or they 
rejected the proposals of the creditors.335 
In addition to the above, because creditors have security in the form of a mortgage 
bond, creditors may approach the court to enforce the consumers’ remaining duties under the 
mortgage bond agreement at any time. This can be done only if the property was sold in 
accordance with an attachment order or it has been surrendered under section 127 of the 
NCA. The amount gained must have been insufficient to pay the full outstanding balance on 
the loan thereby discharging the consumers’ obligations.336 
The court can decide the matter only if the relevant procedures have been followed 
and if there is no pending case before the Tribunal which could affect the outcome of the 
current proceedings. In addition, the case must not be before a debt counsellor, consumer 
court or an agent for alternative dispute resolution or the ombud that has jurisdiction. 
Creditors also cannot approach the court if the consumers surrendered the home to the them 
before it is sold, agreed to the proposal and acted in good faith to fulfil it, complied with an 
agreed plan or brought the payments up to date.337  
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4.3 Over-indebtedness and Debt Review 
 
Brits argues that over-indebtedness can be linked to consumers defaulting on their loan 
agreements.338 Therefore, in instances where consumers go through financial difficulties 
which is beyond their control, the law should assist them and prevent a sale of their homes.339 
One of the purposes of the NCA is to prevent and relieve the over-indebtedness of consumers 
and in this context, the effect would be that less consumers would face a forced sale of their 
home.  
The NCA deals with over-indebtedness in section 79. In particular, a consumer is 
regarded as overindebted if  
 
(1) the preponderance of available information at the time a determination is made indicates 
that the particular consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the 
obligations under all the credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, having regard to 
that consumer’s –  
 (a) financial means, prospects and obligations; 
(b) probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the 
credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, as indicated by the consumer’s 
history of debt repayment. 
 
In order to be declared over-indebted, consumers can apply to a debt counsellor, who, if the 
application succeeds, can propose that the Magistrates’ Court make an order to rearrange their 
obligations. The rearrangement measures include extending the duration that the agreement 
runs for, reducing the instalments to pay or postponing the period that payments are due.340 If 
the decision reached by the debt counsellor is that the consumer is not over-indebted but is 
nevertheless going through a financial hardship, the debt counsellor may recommend that the 
creditor and consumer voluntarily enter into a rearrangement agreement.341  
Another way that consumers can be declared over-indebted is through the courts. If 
the application to the debt counsellor fails, consumers may proceed to the Magistrates’ Court  
to seek an order to be declared over-indebted.342 Furthermore, where proceedings are 
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launched against consumers, they can allege to the court that they are over-indebted. The 
court may then either refer the consumers to a debt counsellor or declare the consumers over-
indebted. A debt relief order may be made as contemplated in section 87 of the Act.343  
A very recent amendment to section 85 of NCA states that even if the consumer does 
not allege they are over-indebted, but it appears to the court that the consumer is over-
indebted, the court can still refer the matter or make an appropriate order.344 This amendment 
is welcomed because there are consumers who do not know their rights or options under the 
Act. The court mus be able to protect such consumers in an effort to prevent their homes 
being sold in execution. 
In the Maleke case, which was decided almost a decade before the amendment, the 
court held that based on the circumstances of the case, the creditor could be repaid the loan 
amount through debt review which would be more desirable than having the properties sold 
in execution. Therefore, the court has a duty to apply the principles of fairness and justice 
even when they were not prompted by the parties.345 
What is noteworthy is the fact that an allegation of over-indebtedness does not 
invalidate creditors’ claims to the money lent. Rather, it is used to refer the matter to a debt 
counsellor for a rearrangement of the obligations of consumers.346 Debt review therefore 
restricts the creditors’ ability to enforce the mortgage agreements.347 In terms of section 88(3) 
of the NCA, creditors who receive notice of consumers being under debt review and debt 
rearrangement, are prohibited from enforcing any right or security that exists in the 
agreement. The prohibition exists until the consumers are in default under the credit or 
rearrangement agreement or incurred further charges or entered into another credit 
agreement.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, consumers have a right to access adequate housing and 
foreclosure must be pursued as a last resort. It is submitted that if consumers are over-
indebted and debt review can help prevent the sale of their family homes, then it is desirable 
to first pursue debt review before foreclosure is allowed by the courts. Brits supports this 
view and argues that ‘debt restructuring is… the most significant and far reaching creative 
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alternative to full-blown mortgage foreclosure.’348 So although creditors will be restricted in 
their debt enforcement process, such restriction is justified if it means that consumers can 
meet their obligations through debt review and debt rearrangement.  
However, the Act does not allow debt review to occur for an open-ended period of 
time if consumers still struggle to meet their obligations under the mortgage agreements. 
Where consumers continue to default whilst under debt review, creditors may, 60 business 
days after the application for debt review, give notice to terminate it.349 I submit that this is a 
reasonable provision because consumers must not abuse the process. The purpose of the Act 
in general ‘was not to shift the balance of power so much that all power in the credit 
relationship would amass into the hands of the consumer.’350 Therefore, if consumers 
continue to not meet their obligations under the loan, creditors are entitled to recover the loan 
amount immediately.  
Similarly, the creditor must also not abuse the process. In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) 
Ltd v Ndobela,351 although not dealing with a mortgage bond agreement, the court held that a 
creditor had to engage in good faith with the consumer. If a debt counsellor sends a proposal 
on how the consumer’s debts should be rearranged, the creditor cannot simply ignore the 
proposal and wait 60 business days to terminate the debt review and the loan agreement. Such 
termination is invalid because the creditor acted in bad faith and frustrated the process.352  
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The NCA has granted consumers extensive rights to prevent them from being exploited by 
creditors. Additionally, the NCA provides consumers with mechanisms to manage their debt 
and prevent or alleviate their over-indebtedness.  
Debt enforcement is justifiable if creditors have legitimate interests which outweigh 
the social and economic impact that consumers will face as a result. However, if debt 
enforcement can be prevented so the agreement can follow its normal course, it is 
preferable.353 This is why the Act contains the section 129(1) notice provision which requires 
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creditors to notify consumers of their default and suggest dispute resolution to get consumers 
back on track with their payments. Additionally, section 130 of the NCA provides that the 
creditor does not have locus standi to sue nor does the court have jurisdiction, before a 
section 129 notice has been sent. 
Although there was confusion regarding what constitutes delivery of the section 129 
notice, various cases and the amendments to the NCA have made that clearer. However, the 
amendments to the Uniform Rules of Court and Magistrates’ Court Rules on personal service 
being the requirement to effect delivery of summons, could possibly affect the section 129 
notice.354  
In terms of section 86 of the Act, consumers may be declared over-indebted which 
has the consequence of rearranging their obligations under their loan agreements. Although 
this limits the ability of creditors to enforce the agreement by having a forced sale of the 
home; it is desirable to pursue other means to repay the loan. Debt review is therefore a good 
measure that can be utilised by distressed consumers whose section 26 constitutional rights 
will be protected.   
Additionally, the NCA introduced a reinstatement mechanism in section 129(3) and 
(4) which is similar to the right of redemption under the common law. However, there are 
major differences.355 The common law right requires the full outstanding balance to be paid 
whereas, the NCA’s section 129(3) only requires that the consumer to pays the arrears, 
charges and reasonable costs, thereby catching up on payments. This means that 
reinstatement under the Act is broader and provides a life line for consumers who can pay the 
arrears but cannot pay the full outstanding balance which is usually the case.356 Another 
difference is that redemption ends the obligations between the parties so the mortgage bond 
agreement comes to an end whilst reinstatement continues the agreement as if there had never 
been any default.  
Reinstatement is therefore an important mechanism since selling the family home in 
execution has detrimental consequences and it provides a way to reverse or even prevent 
execution up to a certain point.357 Furthermore, reinstatement also enhances the constitutional 
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right to housing because it provides a further remedy for consumers in financial distress to 
keep their home. In fact, Brits argues that to insist on selling a family home in execution in 
circumstances where consumers could purge their default by paying their arrears, would not 
pass constitutional scrutiny.358 A creditor’s right to foreclose in those circumstances would 
not outweigh the consumer’s right to adequate housing.  
The major issue regarding reinstatement is that the provisions in the NCA have 
ambiguities which resulted in the courts having to interpret the sections. The Act was then 
amended which has caused even more confusion because there have been major changes to 
the principles of reinstatement. These amendments to the reinstatement provisions in the Act 
have made it harder for consumers to be viewed as the protagonists in reinstatement, as the 
Constitutional Court had found in the Nkata case. Instead, it is up to the credit provider to 
facilitate the credit agreement being reinstated.359 To conclude, the reinstatement mechanism 
in the NCA is an important one, but the provisions need to be clearer in communicating what 
reinstatement means for creditors and consumers.
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The previous chapters have critically discussed the procedure to sell homes in execution and 
the impact of the Constitution as well as the NCA on such procedure. It is evident that the 
procedure had many flaws which led to various amendments, with the most recent 
amendment being Uniform Rule 46A which came into operation on 22 December 2017.360 In 
particular, this rule aimed to deal with how courts should resolve divergent issues in relation 
to selling the homes of consumers in execution.361 It is also important to note that a Practice 
Manual to regulate foreclosure matters had also been issued in the Gauteng Local Division of 
the High Court.362 Nevertheless, problems still remaine and different courts followed 
different procedures regarding foreclosure and the granting of money judgments.363 
In April 2018, numerous applications for foreclosure were heard by Van der Linde J 
in motion court in the Gauteng Local Division.364 Van der Linde J used the power granted in 
section 14(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act which allows a single judge of any Division to, in 
consultation with the Judge President, discontinue the hearing of a civil matter before him or 
her and to refer such matter to the full bench of that Division. Van der Linde J observed that 
the judges in the Division were not following a harmonious approach regarding foreclosure 
matters.365 The full bench had to hear submissions of various parties including the banks, 
consumers and various amicus curaie. 
This chapter will therefore discuss the Mokebe case in depth because it is a recent 
case on foreclosure laws which has had a significant impact on how courts must deal with the 
sale in execution of homes. This chapter will briefly discuss the facts of the case, the 
provisions in question, the issues identified, the arguments of the parties and the findings of 
                                            
360 The Magistrates’ Court Rules were also amended with a similar Rule 43A to deal with forclosure of homes in 
that court.  
361 See the brief discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
362 Chapter 10.17 of the Practice Manual of the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court of South Africa.  
363 Absa Bank Ltd v Lekuku [2014] ZAGPJHC 244 (14 October 2014); FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a First National 
Bank v Zwane; FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a First National Bank v Hyslop and Another, Nedbank v Nkuna and 
Another 2016 (6) SA 400 (GJ); ABSA Bank Ltd v Njolomba, RC and Another Case no. 20321/2017 (5 March 
2018). 
364 See Absa Bank Limited v Mokebe; Absa Bank Ltd v Kobe; Absa Bank v Vokwani; Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd v Colombick and Another (GJ) (unreported case no 2018/00612; 2017/48091; 2018/1459; 
2017/35579, 13-4-18). 
365 Ibid para 15. 
85 
 
the court. This chapter will also discuss other important issues regarding the procedure to sell 
homes in execution which were not explicitly asked in the case namely the service of court 
notices and jurisdiction.  
 
5.2 Facts of the Case 
 
Four applications were brought by Absa Bank and Standard Bank in unopposed motion court 
in the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court. The banks sought to foreclose on properties 
that were possibly the homes of the consumers. It is important to note that the banks did not 
seek orders to declare the property immediately executable. Rather, at that time, they applied 
for money judgments of the accelerated full outstanding balance on the home loans. This was 
because these consumers had defaulted on their monthly bond instalments.366 
For the first application, the respondent (Kobe) was just over 11 months in arrears on 
a home loan for R237 256 repayable at R2450 over 20 years. The arrear amount was R35 042 
and the accelerated outstanding balance was R267 527. The bank could not confirm whether 
the property was Kobe’s home, but suspected that it was not.367 In the summons it also said 
that although the Kobe was employed, she would not be in a position to satisfy the judgment 
debt. The summons was served by affixing a copy at the door or gate of the chosen 
domicilium.368  
Similarly, in the second application, the respondent (Mokebe) had a home loan of 
R275 000 for 20 years at monthly instalments of R3018. Mokebe was 6 months in arrears and 
the accelerated full outstanding balance was R295 697. The bank suspected that the house 
was Mokebe’s home.369 The summons and application for default judgment were served by 
affixing at the door or gate of the chosen domicilium. The relief sought in the application was 
only judgment for R295 697, interest and costs.370 
Furthermore, in the next application, the respondent (Vokwana), had a home loan of 
R115 000 which was repayable in monthly instalments of R1 479 for a period of 20 years.371 
Vokwana was in arrears of 10 months and the bank suspected that the property was 
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Vokwana’s home. Relief sought was a money judgment for the accelerated full outstanding 
balance, interest, executability, a writ and costs.372 The summons was served on an occupant 
at the Vokwana’s residence, and the application for default judgment was served on 
Vokwana’s son’s girlfriend at the domicilium.373  
In the last application, the respondents (Colombrick and Kimberg) had two home 
loans of R836 000. The amount was repayable in 20 years and the respondents fell into 
arrears for 4 months. The full outstanding balance that was triggered amounted to R771 
494.374 Relief sought was judgment for the accelerated full outstanding balance, interest, 
executability, a writ, costs and confirmation that the bank was entitled to retain all amounts 
paid to it under the home loan.375  
 Van der Linde J noted that the facts of each case will always differ even though they 
may be certain similarities. One such fact that varies is the extent of the arrears because 
periods as short as two months can be involved or the loan amount could be small which also 
makes the monthly instalment small.376 
 
5.3 Provisions in Question  
 
The relevant laws to be interpreted were the courts function under section 26(3) of the 
Constitution; the meaning of section 129(3) and (4) of the NCA; the meaning and effect of, 
and the courts function under the new Uniform Rule 46A; and the provisions of the latest 
Practice Manual regarding applications of this nature.377 
 
5.4 Questions to Answer 
 
The banks involved in the matters, namely Absa Bank and Standard Bank, along with a 
number of amicus curiae,378 were called to assist the court in how to interpret the 
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abovementioned laws. Van der Linde J asked for the following questions to be answered:379  
 
1. Where a bank requests an immediate order for the accelerated full outstanding 
balance on the loan, does a court have a discretion when postponing an 
application, to decline that request and give the debtor an opportunity to remedy a 
default by paying the overdue amounts?  In other words, can the courts postpone 
the request too so that it is ultimately dealt with at the same time and in the same 
enquiry when the executability application is dealt with?  
2. If the court does, should the practice manual request uniformity of treatment by 
the judges in the Gauteng Local Division?  
3. If so, what should that uniformity of treatment be? In particular, is the suggested 
manner to deal with the issue as stated in the practice manual objectionable or 
desirable? 
4. Does an immediate money judgment (and its subsequent execution by the sale of 
an attached movable) for the accelerated full outstanding balance qualify as ‘any 
other court order enforcing that agreement’ for purposes of s129(4)(b) of the 
NCA? 
5. If it does, does it prohibit the reinstatement or revival of the credit agreement - 
despite the arrears having been paid up - once the applicant bank, on the strength 
of such a judgment, will have attached and sold in execution the movable property 
of the debtor? 
6. If such a judgment could be given on the basis that it would be capable of being 
set aside or declared null and void later if the debtor ‘remedy a default in such 
credit agreement by paying to the credit provider all amounts that are overdue …’, 
is it desirable that the court make such an order given its potential for movables to 
be attached and sold (potentially to purge the arrears) in the meantime or that it 
may be undesirable to make an order, which is not final in that it may potentially 
be set aside/declared null and void later?  
 
The parties deposed to affidavits detailing their position, and this, along with the judgment 
will be discussed in this chapter to establish what the new approach to foreclosure is. 
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5.5 Foreclosure is Pursued as a Last Resort 
 
Before dealing with the questions set out by the court, this thesis will first discuss how the 
banks argue that foreclosure is pursued as a last resort. For instance, in the Mokebe case, 
Standard bank explained the steps it takes as follows: ‘a possibility to rehabilitate the 
borrower; payment holidays; rescheduling of instalment; debt review; debt consolidation; 
surrender of collateral and private sales prior to the legal process being commenced.’380 
Similarly, Absa Bank first explained its debt recovery process to show that a sale in 
execution is the last step that is pursued by the bank. In fact, a great deal of time and money 
is spent to ensure that the process is fair and that other reasonable means are used to get 
consumers up to date with their payments.381 From the time consumers sign the home loan 
agreement, Absa stated that a conveyancer will advise them on their rights, duties, the NCA 
and their section 26 rights in the Constitution.  
Furthermore, consumers are encouraged to speak to the bank when facing financial 
difficulties so that a solution can be devised.382 However, if the bank detects that consumers 
are at risk of defaulting or when they do default, the bank will engage with them to find a 
solution. The solutions include reducing payments, extending the loan agreement, creating a 
catch-up plan, referring the consumer to debt counselling or the bank facilitating debt 
management itself.383 
If consumers are not able to get back on track, there are six stages of engagement before 
foreclosure is pursued.384 
 
1. If consumers are in arrears of an amount worth 6 months of instalments, their file goes 
to the bank’s legal department. The file can remain here for years if sporadic 
payments are made. 
2. If consumers devise a solution to catch up on payments and they do, their file will 
return to the legal department if they default again and the arrear amounts to 3 
months’ worth of instalments.  
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3. Consumers will be advised to sell their homes privately if they continue to default on 
their obligations under the home loan agreement.  
4. Absa also has a ‘Help U Sell’ programme to assist consumers in selling their homes 
where an estate agent is used to market the property. 
5. If all the above does not work, the consumers’ files are referred to the Release Price 
Forum. 385 
6. If the default continues, a Risk Mitigation Officer will go to the consumers’ property 
to engage with them and determine their circumstances. This occurs before or after 
judgment is granted in favour of the bank.  
 
Absa Bank further stated that the whole process takes them an average of 33 months and 
consumers are allowed to settle their arrears  right up until the sale in execution has 
occurred.386 This is in line with section 129(3) of the NCA which enables the agreement to be 
reinstated.  
Several factors are considered before foreclosure is pursued by the Release Price 
Forum. This includes; whether a life changing event occurred which affected the ability of 
consumers to pay the instalments, engagements with the bank and solutions explored to 
remedy the default, social justice factors, history of defaults and not honouring the 
subsequent agreements to pay. The forum also considers the age of consumers, whether there 
is a short term left of the loan and whether there is a low outstanding balance on the loan. 
Another important factor is whether consumers rejected a good private offer to purchase.387  
From this discussion it appears that, the process followed by the bank is very 
comprehensive and it sounds good on paper. It gives consumers numerous opportunities to 
remedy their default and get back on track with payments to keep their homes. The process is 
consumer centric and the fact that foreclosure is pursued as a last resort ensures that 
consumers do not lose their homes for frivolous reasons. In addition, the factors that the 
banks consider are very relevant and the courts should also analyse such factors to decide 
whether it is necessary to have the sale in execution. 
If such an approach was followed, it is submitted, there would be far less sales in 
execution of primary homes. However, a consideration of the previous matters shows that in 
                                            
385 This is a committee that assesses the consumers’ portfolios to determine whether Absa Bank would proceed 
with foreclosure proceedings. 
386 Absa’s supplementary affidavit para 30 in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
387 Ibid para 21. 
90 
 
fact this is not the case.388 Homes have been sold regardless of the fact that there was a low 
outstanding balance owed on the loan, vulnerable consumers were involved or the financial 
position of consumers had changed. This is why it is so important to reassess and strengthen 
South Africa’s foreclosure laws to ensure that such injustices do not occur in the future. 
Although there were amendments to the court procedure to sell the homes of 
consumers in execution, Shaw argues that the principle which comes from the Jaftha case 
should have been included. This principle is that a sale in execution must be pursued a last 
resort for creditors to recover the debt owed.389 By including this principle in the rules it 
would reduce the rate of sales in execution especially when there are other options available.  
However, case law is also binding and this principle has appeared in other cases. For 
instance in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales,390 the court held that ‘(e)very effort 
should be made to find creative alternatives which allow for debt recovery but which use 
execution only as a last resort.’391 This is regardless of the fact that the consumer willingly 
bonded the property. 
There are various alternative means to have the debt repaid and Shaw argues that 
South Africa can include the mechanisms that exists in other countries to better protect the 
right to access adequate housing. In England for example, if consumers temporarily lose their 
jobs but are able to get long term employment thereafter; the courts will require the arrears to 
be added to the capital and consumers will be entitled to continue paying the bond but pay 
higher premiums.392 This is a much more desirable situation than in South Africa where a sale 
in execution is allowed. It is submitted that redemption or reinstatement under those 
circumstances would not be useful for the consumer. In other words, the only way to prevent 
the home from being sold in execution under the common law is to pay the full outstanding 
balance to redeem the home, and the contract comes to an end. This does not assist 
consumers who temporarily lose their jobs and find other jobs to get back on track with their 
obligations under the home loan agreement. Similarly, reinstating the agreement by paying 
                                            
388 See Absa Bank v Ntsane and Another (note 192 above) where the arrears amounted to only R18.46 on the 
day application for default judgment was made.  
389 DJ Shaw ‘Too quick to execute – how does SA’s new rules on sale in execution compare internationally?’ 
(2016) De Rebus, available at http://www.derebus.org.za/quick-execute-sas-new-rules-sale-execution-compare-
internationally/ last accessed 8 October 2019.  
390 See note 346. 
391 Ibid para 59. 
392 DJ Shaw ‘Too quick to execute – how does SA’s new rules on sale in execution compare internationally?’ 
(2016) De Rebus, available at http://www.derebus.org.za/quick-execute-sas-new-rules-sale-execution-compare-
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the overdue amounts and costs under the NCA is also not a useful mechanism for consumers 
who find new employment. Therefore, the situation in England is much more desirable in 
preventing homes being sold in execution.  
Another suggestion made by Shaw is that the home should not be sold in execution if 
the loan amounts to less than 80% of the value of the home. This is because the risk that 
creditors carry is quite low and at the end, they will get their interest when the property is 
sold, hopefully at market value.393 It is submitted that under those circumstances, consumers 
who have spent years paying for their home and have therefore built its equity over the years, 
stand to lose all of that equity as a result of a sale in execution. This is especially 
reprehensible because in the past, homes could be sold for substantially less than their market 
value. So, consumers would lose their home along with the equity they built up in their home 
whilst still remaining indebted to creditors because of a shortfall in the proceeds. Foreclosure 
therefore did not benefit creditors and consumers.  
 
5.6 Findings of the Court 
 
5.6.1 Granting of monetary judgment separately from application for execution 
 
Regarding the first issue, the banks argued that a monetary judgment cannot be postponed so 
that it is heard with the application to execute against immovable property because the courts 
do not have the discretion to do that. However, the banks submitted that it would be 
preferable for both applications to be heard and decided together because they form part of 
the same process.394 All of this is done to ensure that consumers get back on track when their 
circumstances improve.  
Without first obtaining the monetary judgment, creditors cannot get an order which 
declares the immovable property specially executable. The Law Society supported the 
applications being heard together to reduce collusion which occurs in the auction process to 
sell houses for amounts significantly lower than the market value. The NCR and Legal Aid 
further submitted that since both applications are part of the same process, they are 
inextricably linked.395 
The court noted that it is important for creditors to disclose the nature of security 
                                            
393 Ibid. 
394 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 9.  
395 Ibid para 10.  
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they hold in matters pursuant to a home loan where they intend to foreclose the property so 
that a court can exercise proper judicial oversight. A failure to do so results in a risk of the 
executionary relief being denied if it is sought separately from the money judgment.396  
Furthermore, Uniform Rule 46A requires that creditors fully disclose, to the court 
when applying for a money judgment, all the facts which would affect the court’s discretion 
when execution is sought.397 Therefore, to grant the money judgment but postpone the order 
for executability gives rise to a piecemeal handling of the case and undue protraction of the 
proceedings. This should be discouraged.398 Applications should only be dealt with in a 
piecemeal manner as an exception to the rule.399  
The court thus decided that the ‘money judgment is an intrinsic part of the cause of 
action and inextricably linked to the in rem claim for an order of execution, the latter which is 
non-existent without the money judgment’400 (emphasis in the original). This makes the 
execution claim accessory in nature and it is dependent on the main obligation that it secures, 
to exist. The real right cannot be divorced from the debt it secures.401 
The court further held that it is obligatory for creditors to allege and prove that their 
cause of action is based on execution which shows their claim to the money judgment. This is 
a necessary averment to obtain an order for execution.402 This is because when creditors 
institute legal action to foreclose, in reality, both actions to recover the debt and to use the 
property to pay the debt back, are instituted. The Practice Manual of the High Court, Gauteng 
Local Division also supported both applications being heard together.  
The issue which arises when a money judgment is sought on its own and is granted 
by the court is that creditors will use the order to attach and sell the movable assets of 
consumers. This is done in partial satisfaction of the judgment debt.403 Another prospect is a 
garnishee order being granted against the income of consumers. This would adversely affect 
their situation in that it would be difficult to arrange to pay the judgment debt and to prevent 
                                            
396 Ibid para 11. Also see Nedbank Ltd v Mortinson (note 61 above) para 33.1.5. 
397 FirstRand Bank t/a First National Bank v Zwane (note 363 above) para 20.  
398 Dawood v Mohamed 1979 (2) SA 361 (D) at 365H. 
399 Atterbury Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager: City of Tshwane 2017 JDR 1844 (GP) para 17.  
400 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 14. 
401 See Klerck N.O. v Van Zyl and Maritz 1989 (4) SA 263 (SE) 275. 
402 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 17. 
403 Absa Bank Limited v Mokebe; Absa Bank Ltd v Kobe; Absa Bank v Vokwani; Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Colombick and Another (GJ) (unreported case no 2018/00612; 2017/48091; 2018/1459; 2017/35579, 13-4-
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the looming sale in execution of their homes.404 Consumers would also struggle to find 
further financial assistance from another source since they would have a judgment recorded 
against them.405 Furthermore, there is a possibility that if consumers can catch up on the 
arrears, the money judgment can end up being rendered nugatory. 
It is submitted that it is not only desirable, but also necessary for both claims to be 
heard simultaneously. The courts can therefore postpone the money judgment so that it is 
dealt with when the order for executability is sought. Section 173 of the Constitution states 
that courts must take the interests of justice into account when they regulate their own 
process. This further justifies the postponement.406 
The court also noted that all the banks alleged that foreclosure is sought as a last 
resort. This means that they should be able to place all the relevant facts before the court at 
one time so that  the court is able to consider both matters properly. Therefore, there would be 
no need for a postponement. Additionally, there is no prejudice that creditors would face if 
the money judgment is postponed because they are still secured by the mortgage bond.407 
Their right to be repaid the debt does not fall away.  
It is submitted that by having both orders decided in one hearing, there would be 
added benefits of reduced costs and time saved. However, the court distinguished the issue of 
postponement in relation to unsecured creditors. It held that unsecured creditors can have 
both matters heard separately. Nevertheless, the court noted that such creditors are still bound 
by Uniform Rule 46A in the way they seek executability and they have a more onerous 
procedure to follow.408 
In conclusion, creditors have a duty to institute proceedings for the money judgment 
and order for executability simultaneously. If the matter requires postponement, the entire 
matter must be postponed avoiding piecemeal adjudication. 
 
5.6.2 Section 129(3) and (4) of the NCA 
 
Reinstatement was extensively dealt with in Chapter 4; the essence of the mechanism is that 
                                            
404 See FirstRand Bank t/a First National Bank v Zwane (note 363 above) para 17.  
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it will be allowed when the consumer pays the arrears, reasonable costs and default charges. 
However, reinstatement will not be allowed under certain circumstances mentioned in section 
129(4) of the NCA.  
More specifically, the Mokebe case asked the question of whether granting an order 
for the accelerated full outstanding balance and the order to declare the home specially 
executable, amounted to a court order which prevents the reinstatement of the bond 
agreement which is a specified ground in section 129(4) of the NCA?409 In other words, if a 
creditor has instituted foreclosure proceedings and is granted a money judgment as well as 
the order for executability, does this bar the consumer from having the mortgage bond 
agreement reinstated? 
In the Nkata case, the court decided that reinstatement amounts to a ‘statutory 
remedy for rendering a default judgment and attachment order ineffectual.’410 Ms Nkata paid 
her arrears after judgment was granted but before the sale in execution occurred. The majority 
therefore decided that she was entitled to revive the mortgage bond agreement at that time. 
Therefore, it is accepted in law that reinstatement will be prevented under section 129(4)(b) 
of the NCA when the proceeds of the sale are realised after the public auction of the home.411 
This is because at that point, if the court procedures were duly followed, the agreement would 
have come to an end and there would thus be nothing to reinstate. 
In addition, the court in the Mokebe case relied on section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
The section requires the courts to, when interpreting legislation, ‘promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ Under the circumstances, the NCA must be interpreted to 
promote the section 26(1) right to access adequate housing. By doing so, the granting of a 
money judgment and execution order should not be a bar to the reinstatement of a mortgage 
agreement because the mechanism can help consumers keep their home.412 In other words, 
the right to access adequate housing of consumers outweighs the right of creditors to have the 
order enfocred so the debt repaid timeously. However, once the home has been publicly 
auctioned and the money from the sale realised, the agreement ends and the consequence is 
that it cannot be reinstated or revived. 
Therefore, to answer the initial question, the full bench in the Mokebe case held that 
the granting of a money judgment and the order to declare property specially executable is 
                                            
409 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 40. 
410 Nkata (note 73 above) para 131. 
411 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 43.  
412 Ibid para 46.  
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not a bar to reinstating the mortgage agreement. The court also stated that to ensure that 
consumers understand their rights, a statement needs to be included in a document which 
initiates foreclosure proceedings, in the following way: 
 
The defendant’s (or respondent’s) attention is drawn to section 129(3) of the National Credit 
Act No. 34 of 2005 that he / she may pay to the credit grantor all amounts that are overdue 
together with the credit provider’s permitted default charges and reasonable agreed or taxed 
costs of enforcing the agreement prior to the sale and transfer of the property and so revive 
the credit agreement. 
 
5.6.3 Reserve price 
 
As mentioned previously in this thesis, the court rules allowed a public auction of properties 
without setting a reserve price.413 This practice led to collusion in the system whereby 
syndicates would engage in bid rigging to buy houses for a pittance at public auctions and 
then sell them for a huge profit.414  
In Nkwane v Nkwane and Others,415 a case considered just before the amendments 
were made to the procedure, Mr Nkwane, who was the applicant in the matter, argued that the 
original Uniform Rule 46(12) was inconsistent with the constitutional rights to access 
adequate housing and to not be arbitrarily deprived of property.416 The bank argued that the 
low prices that immovable properties are purchased for, reflects the fact that a sale in 
execution amounts to a forced sale. The sale continues regardless of the financial 
circumstances of consumers or the property market. Furthermore, there is uncertainty because 
forced sales can be cancelled at the last minute and if they do go through, buyers would have 
to institute eviction proceedings of the occupiers. Eviction proceedings can be very drawn out 
and expensive.417 The bank also argued that: 
 
                                            
413 The original rule 46(12) of the Uniform Rules explicitly stated that the sale shall be ‘without reserve’ and the 
immovable property will be sold to the highest bidder. 
414 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 53. Also see C Ryan ‘New Court rules make it harder for 
repossessed homes to be sold for a pittance’ (2017) available at http://www.acts.co.za/news/blog/2017/12/new-
court-rules-make-it-harder-for-repossessed-homes-to-be-sold-for-a-pittance last accessed 10 May 2019. 
415 See note 110 above, para 6 for facts.  
416 Nkwane v Nkwane (note 110 above) para 5.  
417 Ibid para 13. 
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Where sales of property at an auction are subject to a reserve price …, the effect of this is to 
diminish interest in the sale and reduce the likelihood of the property being sold at the 
auction at all. Where the property is sought to be sold in execution but no sale results, this 
causes prejudice to both the execution creditor and the execution debtor… An additional 
challenge is that the property often deteriorates further because the sale date is often months 
apart. This will reduce the price that the buyers are willing to pay at subsequent sales. 
 
It is submitted that there is an even bigger prejudice caused to creditors and consumers when 
a home is sold for a price that is significantly lower than the market value. The Nkwane case 
is a good example where the home was sold for an amount that was less than 10 per cent of 
its market value. It is further submitted that this is highly irrational because the purpose of the 
sale in execution, that is; to sell the property to realise the debt owed by the consumer, is not 
fulfilled. Instead, the opposite effect occurs where creditors are still owed a large sum of 
money and consumers are not only rendered homeless, but are still distressed and 
overindebted. Another submission is that the person who buys the property is unjustifiably 
enriched by the misfortune of consumers. However, such enrichment was allowed by the 
rules where the highest bidder could buy the home without a minimum price being set. It has 
been argued that this situation where the buyer buys and then on-sells property for a huge 
profit should be prohibited.418 
A further argument was made by Brits who stated that it is necessary for the best 
possible price to be obtained in a sale in execution of a home so that consumers can leave the 
situation with as much dignity as possible.419 Moreover, where the legal system allows 
consumers to lose their home at a value that is unconscionably less than the market value, it is 
contrary to South Africa’s constitutional order, which attempts to create a society based the 
values such as human dignity, equality and the advancement to human rights.420 It is also 
contrary to section 9(1) of the of the Constitution which guarantees that ‘everyone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.’ It is submitted 
that the practice of selling consumers’ homes way below the market value left them 
unprotected and this was unjust. 
The amendment to the rules in relation to reserve prices was therefore very necessary 
and only time will tell if it will be enough to fix the issue of homes being sold for an amount 
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significantly below than their market value. In Uniform Rule 46(12), the prohibition on 
setting a reserve price is removed. Instead, the new rules enable the courts to set a reserve 
price.421 In addition, the rules set out the factors that the courts can consider when deciding 
whether a reserve price should be set and what that reserve price should be. Uniform Rule 
46A(9)(b) sets out the factors which include: 
 
(i)  the market value of the immovable property;  
(ii) the amounts owing as rates or levies;  
(iii) the amounts owing on registered mortgage bonds;  
(iv) any equity which may be realised between the reserve price and the market value of the 
property;  
(v) reduction of the judgment debtor’s indebtedness on the judgment debt and as 
contemplated in subrule (5)(a) to (e), whether or not equity may be found in the immovable 
property, as referred to in subparagraph (iv);  
(vi) whether the immovable property is occupied, the persons occupying the property and the 
circumstances of such occupation; 
(vii) the likelihood of the reserve price not being realised and the likelihood of the immovable 
property not being sold;  
(viii)  any prejudice which any party may suffer if the reserve price is not achieved; and  
(ix) any other factor which in the opinion of the court is necessary for the protection of the 
interests of the execution creditor and the judgment debtor. 
 
As much as these amended rules provide a major shift from the previous procedure which 
required no reserve price to be set, it has been argued that they do not go far enough.422 In 
particular, although Uniform Rule 46A(9)(a) states that a court must consider whether a 
reserve price should be set, the Rule merely provides that the courts may set a reserve price as 
empowered by Uniform Rule 46A(8)(e). 
The courts must therefore exercise their discretion and a reading of these provisions 
shows that setting a reserve price has not been made something that is compulsory. Thus 
                                            
421 Uniform Rule 46A(8)(e) & 46A(9). 
422 DJ Shaw ‘Too quick to execute – how does SA’s new rules on sale in execution compare internationally?’ 
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there is still a possibility for consumers’ homes to be sold with no reserve price.423 This is 
problematic because in practice, the amendment to the rules could be ignored, and homes 
would continue to be sold way below their actual value. However, in the Mokebe case, the 
full bench stated that: 
 
It would, in our view, be expedient and appropriate to generally order a reserve price in all 
matters depending on the facts of each case. That will serve to curb the inequities of the matters 
such as those in Jaftha,424 Ntsane,425 Maleke,426 Gundwana,427 Nxazonke428 and Nkwane429. The 
facts of a particular case may, however, convince a court to depart from the general practice of 
setting reserve prices. It may well be that the debtor’s obligations regarding the property can be 
so great that the equity in the property is close to zero or even has a negative value. This fact 
too, should be taken into account in order to decide whether to impose the reserve price in a 
particular matter. It will always be   
‘. . . in the interests of both the Banks and the judgment debtor to realise as much value 
in the property as reasonably possible.’430 
 
It is submitted that it will be in rare circumstances that the market value of the property is 
below zero. If the amendments do not require every sale in execution of a home to have a 
reserve price, the amendments should have at least expressly outlawed properties being sold 
for a pittance due to collusion in public auctions.431 Such sales are illegitimate as they defeat 
not only the purpose of a sale in execution, but also go against the constitutional rights of 
consumers. 
When the homes of consumers are sold, the sale will disadvantage them if it is sold at 
a pittance. Consumers lose their homes and still owe creditors for the shortfall which can be a 
substantial amount.432 Another reason which makes a reserve price necessary is that many 
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(2016) De Rebus, available at http://www.derebus.org.za/quick-execute-sas-new-rules-sale-execution-compare-
internationally/ last accessed 8 October 2019. 
432 Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above) para 53. 
99 
 
consumers spend years, sometimes decades, paying their instalments and over those years, 
the market value of their homes increase.433 An unforeseen financial difficulty can result in 
those consumers defaulting in payments. If the courts decide that a sale in execution is 
justified, and the property is sold for significantly less than the market value, then those 
consumers will lose the equity they contributed towards for years and are left without a home.  
What the amended rules do mention is that the sale in execution as well as the 
conditions of the sale must comply with any law that regulates auctions, especially the 
Consumer Protection Act,434 and its regulations.435 Furthermore, the amendments also require 
that creditors include the property’s market value and local authority valuation, in the 
application for execution among other things.436 Since properties have been sold for 
ridiculous amounts that are way below market price, this is an improvement in the procedure 
because it makes the amount that the property should be sold for very clear.437 In addition, the 
courts play an imperative role in foreclosure proceedings and they have a duty under the 
Constitution to prevent unjust outcomes.438 This has been reiterated in many cases, including 
the Mokebe case.  
The Mokebe case boldly addressed the issue of reserve prices. Although the banks 
argued that setting a reserve price would reduce the number of potential buyers of the 
immovable property, the court disagreed. It held that there is no foundation for such an 
allegation.439 Even if it is true, the court is empowered by the rules to decide whether to set a 
reserve price and what that price should be. The court in the Mokebe case also held that the 
court’s power to set such a price stems from section 26(3) of the Constitution.440 Such a 
power exists so the court can make a decision that is just and equitable. This decision will be 
based on certain facts that need to be deposed to in an affidavit by the banks. Since the banks 
argue that a sale in execution is pursued as a last resort, they should be able to put forward all 
the information that will assist the court. In addition, the court in the Mokebe case also placed 
a duty on consumers to also give their input in the matter. If consumers choose not to do so, 
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the court will be bound by whatever information is placed before it by creditors.441 
The court in the Mokebe case further held that if there is difficulty in finding a buyer 
because the reserve price is too high, creditors can seek a variation of the existing order from 
the court.442 Although the courts cannot ensure that consumers will be left with a shortfall to 
pay after the property is sold, the courts can ‘ensure the sale is at a just and equitable price by 
taking the factors of each specific matter into account.’443 The court therefore oversees the 
sale in execution and their role is to balance the rights of both creditors and consumers.  
Shaw argues that the rules should allow potential buyers to view the property which 
could also result in a higher purchase price. Another amendment to the rules could be 
reducing the required deposit which is currently 10%. Not many buyers are able to provide 
this without first securing a bond.444 It has also been proposed that the minimum price to 
begin bidding should be 85% of the market value of the property.445 Additionally, an 
amendment could be made to give consumers three to six months to privately sell their homes 
through an estate agent which could also influence the property being sold at the highest 
possible price.446 
A look at the laws of other countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Malaysia, 
Korea and Ghana, among others, shows that foreclosure laws in relation to the sale of homes 
can be quite stringent.447 These countries take into consideration that mortgage bonds last for 
an average of 20 to 30 years and there is a high possibility that in that time, a debtor will face 
financial strain. Instead of selling the home, UK laws require creditors to rearrange the debt 
to allow the consumer to get back on track with their payments. Other countries require the 
homes to be sold at fair market value.448 
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As discussed above in Chapter 2 of this thesis, since the High Court has concurrent 
jurisdiction to hear matters that fall under the Magistrates’ Court jurisdiction, an issue arose 
in foreclosure matters. Creditors would forego the Magistrates’ Court jurisdiction which led 
to various problems for consumers and the courts. This is an issue that the court did not 
address in the Mokebe case although the facts show that the Magistrates’ Court had 
jurisdiction in three of the matters that were before Van Der Linde J. It is however important 
to address these problems and the new approach that courts must take will be discussed 
below.  
In particular, the recent cases of Nedbank Limited v Thobejane and Related 
Matters449 (‘Thobejane case’) and Nedbank Limited v Gqirana NO and Related Matters450 
(‘Gqirana case’) will be briefly analysed to find out what the law currently says regarding 
jurisdiction of the courts. 
 
5.7.1.1 Nedbank Limited v Thobejane and Related Matters451 
 
The case was decided in the Gauteng Division of the High Court in Pretoria. The main issue 
was that creditors had a tendency to institute proceedings which had amounts within the 
Magistrates’ Court jurisdiction, in the High Court.452 In this case, all of the matters concerned 
claimed the accelerated full outstanding balance on home loans that were below R400 000 
and therefore within the Magistrates’ Court jurisdiction.453  
A longstanding principle in law exists that courts must not refuse to hear a matter 
where they have jurisdiction if the matter is properly brought before them because the 
plaintiff or applicant has a right to choose a court when there is concurrent jurisdiction.454 
                                            
449 Nedbank Limited v Thobejane and Related Matters (unreported case no 84041/15; 93088/15; 99562/15; 
36/16; 736/16; 1114/16; 1429/16; 3429/16; 6996/16; 16228/16; 29736/1; 30302/16, 26-9-2018) (GP). 
450 2019 (6) SA 139 (EGC). 
451Nedbank Limited v Thobejane (note 449 above). 
452 Ibid para 1.  
453 Ibid para 7. 
454 Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) 820I; Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd and 
Another v Commissioner of the Competition Commission and Others 2013 (5) SA 484 (SCA) 493E-F; Moosa 
NO v Moosa (A146/13) [2014] ZAGPPHC 796 (18 September 2014) para 19. 
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However, the full bench in the Thobejane case noted that the tendency of foregoing 
Magistrates’ Courts when they have jurisdiction to hear certain matters posed two threats. 
The first is to the right of access to justice455 and the second is the sustainability of burdening 
the High Courts with matters that could have been instituted in the other courts.456 
The full bench also noted that the courts have to regulate their processes in a manner 
that promotes the interests of justice457 and access to justice.458 This is why the court called 
for a new approach to determine the jurisdiction of High Courts where matters fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ Courts.459 The full bench held that where the appropriate court 
is avoided simply because another court has concurrent jurisdiction, this amounts to an abuse 
of process:460 
 
Access to justice as envisaged by the Constitution is not served, where alternative Courts are 
created and equipped to deal with matters and litigants bypass those institutions, because 
they claim that they have a right to do so. What section 34 envisages is a meaningful 
opportunity to institute and defend legal action in a Court of law and places an obligation on 
the State to take steps to remove any regulatory, social or economic obstacles, which may 
prevent or hinder the possibility of access to justice. The position that a plaintiff is dominus 
litus and can choose any forum that suits him/her is at best outdated. It loses sight of the deep 
seated inequalities in our society and the constitutional imperative of access to justice.461 
 
The full bench further held that matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ 
Court should be instituted there.462 The exception is if the matter concerns difficult principles 
of law or fact which would be better considered by the High Court.463 Under those 
circumstances, an application must be made setting out the reasons why the matter must be 
heard in the High Court.464 In addition, the Courts have a mero motu discretion to transfer a 
matter to another court if they do so in the interests of justice.465 This judgment only 
                                            
455 Section 34 of the Constitution states that ‘Everyone has the right t have any dispute that can be resolved by 
the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.’ 
456 Nedbank Limited v Thobejane (note 449 above) para 29. 
457 Section 173 of the Constitution.  
458 Section 34 of the Constitution. Also see Nedbank Limited v Thobejane (note 449 above) para 45. 
459 Ibid para 46-47. 
460 Nedbank Limited v Thobejane (note 449 above) para 76. 
461 Ibid para 79. 
462 Ibid para 91. 
463 Ibid para 75. 
464 Ibid para 91. 
465 Ibid para 96. Also see Veto v Ibhayi City Council 1990 (4) SA 93 (SE). 
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impacted litigants in Gauteng, however, it represents a shift in the law. In the past, creditors 
could choose to institute matters in the High Court even if the Magistrates’ Court had 
jurisdiction because it was in their interests to do so. Now the Courts take into consideration 
the impact that this has on consumers, which is brought about by the right to access justice. 
The next case delves deeper into this impact and the rights that consumers have.  
 
5.7.1.2 Nedbank Limited v Gqirana NO and Related Matters466 
 
This case was heard in the Eastern Cape and it dealt with the same issue of  the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the High Court.467 There were initially seven matters in the Gqirana case 
which sought money judgments for amounts within the Magistrates’ Court jurisdiction.468 In 
essence, Lowe J with Hartle J concurring, used the NCA to come to the a similar conclusion 
as the Thobejane case.  
Lowe J first set out the context under which creditors and consumers interact. Many 
consumers fall under the category of historically disadvantaged individuals and low income 
persons.469 The debt they owe is often an insignificant amount to creditors, but not to 
consumers who would face substantial prejudice if they defaulted in their payments.470 The 
NCA therefore exists to protect consumers and to balance the bargaining power between 
creditors and consumers.471 One such way that the NCA does this is by stating that 
Magistrates’ Court have jurisdiction over all matters where the NCA applies, whatever the 
amount.472 What is also noteworthy is that the NCA states that if a credit agreement contains 
a  provision that the consumer consents to the High Court’s jurisdiction, such a provision is 
unlawful if the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ Court.473 The NCA 
therefore supports the contention that matters need to be heard in the Magistrates’ Court when 
                                            
466 See note 450 above. 
467 Ibid para 2&3. 
468 Ibid para 9 
469 Ibid para 37.1 & 37.4.  
470 Ibid para 37.3. 
471 See para 4.1 of this thesis which discusses the why the NCA was enacted and its purpose. 
472 Section 29(1)(e( of the Magistrates’ Court Act read with Section 172(2) of the NCA: 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act 34 of 2005), a court, in respect 
of causes of action, shall have jurisdiction in ─ ... (e)  actions on or arising out of any credit agreement, as 
defined in section 1 of the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act 34 of 2005); ... (g)  actions other than those already 
mentioned in this section where the claim or the value of  the matter in dispute does not exceed the amount 
determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette.    
In respect of matters falling under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, magistrates’ courts have unlimited 
monetary jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of this subsection and s 172 (2) of the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005.’ 
473 Section 90(2)(vi) of the NCA. 
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it has jurisdiction. It is submitted that this is in line with the right to access justice.  
In dealing with this right, Lowe J in the Gqirana case, agreed with decision in the 
Thobejane case,474 and linked access to justice with the right to equality under section 9 of 
the Constitution.475 However, Lowe J also argued that the Thobejane case ‘was too widely 
cast’ in the relief it gave.  
Whilst the banks argued that High Courts are quicker and more efficient, and that 
defendants or respondents usually do not defend the matter, Lowe J stated that the right to 
access justice still applies.476 It is not fair for defendants or respondents to have their matters 
heard in the High Courts as they are usually difficult to access geographically and financially. 
There are greater costs involved in the High Courts and it is more difficult to represent 
oneself. 477 
A proper reading of the NCA and Magistrates’ Courts Act recognised these 
difficulties, and the Acts therefore attempted to provide consumers with better access to 
justice, by allowing the Magistrates’ Court to have jurisdiction no matter the amounts 
involved. However, if exceptional circumstances exist such as the court having to decide 
complex legal or factual issues, then the High Courts may be utilised.478  
It is submitted that the prejudice that is caused to consumers who have to defend 
their matters in the High Court, is greater than the prejudice suffered by creditors, usually the 
banks, who seek to sell the homes of consumers in execution. As much as creditors argue that 
the High Court is quicker, this must be balanced against the right to access justice of 
consumers.479 The right to access justice of creditors will still be fulfilled in the Magistrates’ 
Court and the prejudice that creditors suffer as a result, is less than that of consumers. Whilst 
debt enforcement fulfils an important function in society, there must be no abuse of process. 
 
5.7.2 Personal service of notices 
 
As explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 of this thesis, consumers usually choose the address 
where notices should be sent in all kinds of cases, including applications to sell a home in 
                                            
474 Nedbank Limited v Thobejane (note 449 above) para 51. 
475 Ibid para 53. 
476 Ibid para 59.  
477 Ibid para 64. 
478 Ibid para 74. 
479 Ibid para 68. Also see para 75 for a summary of the case principles. 
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execution. Many standard form contracts have the domiciluim of consumers listed as the 
address to send notices to. Whilst sitting in on various foreclosure cases Meyer J observed the 
following: 
 
[Motion Court] deals with hundreds of this type of applications on a weekly basis in which 
the sales in execution of people’s homes are sought.  Service in most instances was effected at 
the chosen domicilium citandi et executandi by affixing a copy to the ‘outer’ door, the 
‘principal’ door, the gate, the ‘main’ gate, and the like, or by leaving a copy somewhere on the 
premises, such as under a stone.  Instances of service on a human being, qualified to receive 
service, are rare.  The ineluctable inference, in my view, is that debtors are invariably at work 
during weekdays when service of process and of documents are mostly effected by sheriffs, 
unless they have moved away from, or vacated, the premises where service was effected.480 
 
Bearing in mind the constitutional right to adequate housing, Meyer J was not satisfied that 
proper service was effected in the process to sell the homes of consumers in execution. 
Therefore, Meyer J ordered that the defendant furnish reasons as to why the application 
should not be granted. A copy of the order and the application was to be served where the 
defendant is employed or at the defendant’s residential address on a Saturday.  
Considering many cases like the Powell case,481 the Rules Board amended the 
Uniform Rules to require that notices should be served personally on the debtor where the 
creditor seeks to execute a primary residence. However, the court can order service in another 
manner. Uniform Rule 46A states that: 
 
Every notice of application to declare residential immovable property executable shall be—  
(a) substantially in accordance with Form 2A of Schedule 1;  
(b) on notice to the judgment debtor and to any other party who may be affected by the sale in 
execution, including the entities referred to in rule 46(5)(a): Provided that the court may order 
service on any other party it considers necessary;  
(c) supported by affidavit which shall set out the reasons for the application and the grounds 
on which it is based; and  
(d) served by the sheriff on the judgment debtor personally: Provided that the court may order 
service in any other manner. 
 
                                            
480 See Powell (note 67 abve) para 5. 
481 Also Maleke (note 160 above). 
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As a result of the amendment, the Practice Manual of the Gauteng Local Division of the High 
Court of South Africa created a directive which reads as follows:482 
 
An order declaring property specially executable shall only be granted by the Court if the 
application has been served on the respondent PERSONALLY, alternatively in a manner as 
authorised by the Court. If efforts to serve personally proves impossible, the Court may 
authorise service at the place of employment of the respondent, or on a Saturday, or on a 
person over the age of 16 at the domicilium citandi, or in any other way which may bring the 
matter to the attention of the respondent;  Furthermore, all email and/or other correspondence 
which may be relevant to the respondent being aware of the date of hearing should also be 
attached. If the property is not the primary residence (for example of served on a tenant, and 
the respondent no longer resides there) personal service is not required. (Emphasis in the 
original) 
 
The amendments were thereafter interpreted in various cases.483 In Standard Bank of South 
Africa Limited v Hendricks and Related Matters,484 Savage J heard seven foreclosure matters 
where executionary relief was sought in the Western Cape High Court Division. Savage J 
invoked the provisions of section 14(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act485 and the matters were 
postponed to be heard by the full bench as directed by the Judge President of the division, as 
was done in the Mokebe case. The abovementioned issues regarding the granting of the 
money judgment and execution order at the same time, as well as uniformity of treatment by 
the division was discussed. The full bench essentially agreed with the Mokebe judgment.486 
The issue of personal service was also dealt with in depth in the Hendricks case. 
In many cases, default judgment is granted to creditors when consumers fail to enter 
their appearance to defend the case. The prevailing argument made by consumers is that they 
did not receive service of the summons.487 This is why personal service is essential. The 
courts have agreed that a ‘party’s recourse on getting to know of a default judgment – once 
                                            
482 Practice Manual of the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court of South Africa (2018) Chapter 10.17 item 
1.  
483 This was not an identified issue in Mokebe case (note 1 above), although personal service was mentioned in 
para 52. 
484 2019 (2) SA 620 (WCC). 
485 Act 10 of 2013. 
486 Standard Bank of South Africa v Hendricks (note 484 above) para 40 & 48.  
487 See De Paul Albert and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited  Case no. 21841/14 [2015] 
ZAGPPHC 727 (11 September 2015). 
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the horse has bolted – is a poor substitute for the initial judicial evaluation.’488 
In fact, in certain serious matters the courts have used their discretionary power to 
require, as a rule, that personal service be mandatory. An example is divorce matters which 
has numerous consequences for the spouses, their families and third parties.489 Similarly, it is 
submitted that since the right to access adequate housing is an important socio-economic 
right, the courts must require the higher standard of personal service where it is possible.  
Both the creditors and consumers will benefit from personal service because if 
consumers have actual knowledge of the pending proceedings, they can contact the creditors 
to resolve the matter.490 For instance, Absa Bank argued in the Mokebe case that most 
foreclosure matters do not result in the home being sold because after legal proceedings are 
instituted, consumers do make an active attempt to find a solution with the bank that results 
in them keeping their home.491 Simply affixing a copy at the door of the homes of consumers 
cannot be acceptable service especially because they are at risk of losing their home. They 
therefore need to be personally served the documents.  
It has been suggested that personal service could be effected on the weekend when 
consumers are at home, or even at their workplace.492 The principle of audi alteram partem 
also supports personal service on consumers who will be given a chance to defend the matter 
and be heard in court. It is inadequate for the courts to only hear the side of creditors which 
has been the prevailing practice in applications to sell the homes of consumers in execution. 
It is submitted that this new practice of making personal service a mandatory step in 
foreclosure is a good practice because it acts to safeguard the constitutional rights of the 
consumers who may potentially lose their homes.493 However, the amendment is not rigid and 
does provides that ‘the court may order service in any other manner.’ This too is a welcomed 
rule because there will be cases where personal service is impossible or difficult. A simple 
example is allowing service via email when consumers are out of town or the country. The 
Practice Manual above also suggests various ways to effect service if authorised by the court.  
 
 
                                            
488 Gundwana (note 137 above) para 50 and Jaftha (note 17 above) para 49. 
489 Canale v Canale 1995 (4) SA 426 (E).  
490 Standard Bank of South Africa v Hendricks (note 484 above)  para 31. 
491 Absa’s supplementary affidavit in the Mokebe case (note 1 above). 
492 Standard Bank of South Africa v Hendricks (note 484 above) para 32. 
493 Absa Bank Limited v Lekuku Case no. 32700/2013 [2014] ZAGPJHC 244 (14 October 2014).    
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5.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
The order in the Mokebe case stated that: 
 
1. In all matters where execution is sought against a primary residence, the entire claim, including the 
monetary judgment, must be adjudicated at the same time. 
2. Execution against moveable and immovable property is not a bar to the revival of the agreement until 
the proceeds of the execution have been realised.  
3. Any document initiating proceedings where a mortgaged property may be declared executable must 
contain the following statement in a reasonably prominent manner: 
‘The defendant’s (or respondent’s) ‘attention is drawn to section 129(3) of the National Credit Act No. 
34 of 2005 that he / she may pay to the credit grantor all amounts that are overdue together with the 
credit provider’s permitted default charges and reasonable taxed or agreed costs of enforcing the 
agreement prior to the sale and transfer of the property and so revive the credit agreement.’ 
4. Save in exceptional circumstances, a reserve price should be set by a court in all matters where 
execution is granted against immovable property, which is the primary residence of a debtor, where the 
facts disclosed justify such an order. 
 
The order therefore articulates the major findings of the case. Now, in the High Court 
Division of the Gauteng Provincial Division, the money judgment and execution order must 
be heard simultaneously. Furthermore, the mortgage agreement may be reinstated under 
section 129(3) of the NCA right up until the home is sold in execution. This is a similar 
provision to  the common law right to redemption which can also be utilised till the home is 
sold. Since consumers are usually unaware of their rights, the court also held that a notice 
must be added to summons to notify consumers of their right to redemption. Finally, the court 
held that reserve prices should be set by a court in all matters where creditors seek to sell the 
homes of consumers in execution. A reserve price will be disallowed only under certain 
circumstances.  
 This judgment has been welcomed by academics and the courts in other jurisdictions  
who have adopted the same uniform approach.494 It is submitted that the Mokebe case 
adequately addressed most of the issues that still existed despite the court rules being 
amended and the issuing of the Practice Manual in the Gauteng Local Division of the High 
Court.  
                                            
494 Standard Bank of South Africa v Hendricks (note 484 above) in the Western Cape adopted the Mokebe 
principles. However, in the jurisdictions like the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal, such changes have not been 
effected through their Practice Manuals or case law. See C Singh ‘To foreclose or not to foreclsoe: Revealing 
the ‘cracks’ within the residential foreclosure process in South Africa’ (2019) SA Merc LJ 145, 155. 
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Nevertheless, other important issues were tackled in depth by other cases where the full 
bench dealt with foreclsure cases. In terms of jurisdiction, creditors must institute 
proceedings in the relevant Magistrates’ Court which has jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Regarding notices, personal service of notices must be effected unless the court decides 
another manner to effect service. 
In conclusion, the amendments and the court’s interpretation of them have attempted 
to enhance the procedure to sell the homes of consumers in execution. The courts have 
therefore moved from the traditional approach where creditors could easily have the homes 
sold in execution. The procedure has been strengthened so that any loss of access to adequate 
hosuing through the execution process is not arbitrary. However, creditors still retain their 
mortgage security interest and they have a higher burden to prove that a sale in execution 








The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse the procedures which must be followed before 
homes are sold in execution as a result of consumers defaulting in their home loan 
instalments. Initially, the law held property rights at a high standard which made it easier for 
creditors to foreclose properties. The Magistrates’ Court Rules and Uniform Rules of Court 
contained many loopholes which made a sale in execution an easy process.495  
However, whilst a sale in execution is a normal occurrence which is not in itself 
reprehensible,496 the Constitution enshrined the right to access adequate housing which also 
includes the right to not be arbitrarily evicted. These rights made it necessary for the court 
procedures to be developed when allowing consumers’ homes to be sold in execution. Such 
changes were also brought about by numerous landmark cases which interpreted the rights 
affected through the forced sale of a home.497 
Furthermore, this thesis discussed the NCA and how the Act has also impacted 
foreclosure procedures. In particular, the Act restrains creditors from enforcing mortgage 
bond agreements by providing for reinstatement and debt review. The Act also sets 
preconditions as well as further steps to follow when creditors do institute legal action to 
foreclose property and recover the amount owed from the proceeds.498 
Finally, the Mokebe case was discussed which dealt with various issues that have 
arisen as a result of different judges interpreting the amendments to the court rules and 
practice notes differently. This includes issues related to whether the applications for the 
money judgment and execution order should be heard together, reinstatement under the NCA, 
the jurisdiction of the courts, service of notices and reserve price.499   
The purpose of this final chapter is to propose the way forward. It will outline what 
consumers can do to prevent foreclosure when they are unable to meet their financial 
                                            
495 See Chapter 2 above. 
496 Gundwana (note 137 above) para 53-54. 
497 See Chapter 3 above. 
498 See Chapter 4 above. 
499 See Chapter 5 above.  
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obligations in terms of a mortgage agreement. It also consolidates the factors that the courts 
must consider to balance the rights of creditors and consumers in foreclosure matters. Finally, 
recommendations are proposed on how the court procedures can be further amended so that 
they better protect consumers’ rights whilst also taking creditors’ rights into consideration. 
  
6.2 The Role of Consumers 
 
What has been consistently stressed in this thesis is that when consumers borrow money, they 
need to pay it back.  The most important right which creditors have, is their right to be repaid.  
Even in landmark cases where the right to housing was discussed, the Constitutional Court 
pointed out that the interests of creditors must not be disregarded.500 Those courts that 
interpreted the NCA were consistent in their view that the intention of the NCA was not to 
create a debtor’s paradise in South Africa.501  This is an indication that there is a need to focus 
on consumers to make them aware not only of their rights, but also of their responsibilities. In 
this regard consumers should take the following steps: 
• Be educated about their finances and mortgage laws 
• Be proactive when facing financial strain 




In 2008, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) initiated a Public Hearing 
where various stakeholders including community members, the banks, the Banking 
Association of South Africa and the South African Board of Sheriffs made submissions 
regarding the content of the right to access adequate housing and the process to evict and 
repossess homes. A report was then written to synthesise the findings as well as make 
recommendations to assist role players in the process.502 
One of the key findings was that people regularly enter into mortgage agreements 
without fully understanding the fine print. The documents are also written in a language that 
                                            
500 Jaftha (note 17 above) para 42. 
501 Seyfrett (note 241 above) para 10. 
502 Report on Public Hearing on Housing, Evictions and Repossessions (2008) 4.  
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consumers do not understand. Additionally, there is a lack of documentation which serves as 
proof when disagreements emerge. If consumers have insurance, they do not always 
understand the terms of this insurance. This is especially in cases where the homeowner dies. 
The homeowner’s dependants may simply assume that the property will be paid off and later 
discover that it has not been paid off. 503 
Consumers also lack an understanding of the legal processes involved which are 
often complicated. Furthermore, they do not know their rights or what alternatives are 
available. There is also a tendency on the part of consumers to ignore court processes.504 This 
is evidenced by the fact that in so many cases, consumers fail to file a notice of intention to 
defend the matter.505 Moreover, consumers are frequently unaware of the consequences of not 
paying their mortgage bond instalments and they do not seek proper advice when they face 
financial hardship. The reasons for this lack of knowledge is inexperience, limited or no 
education and inadequate information provided by creditors.506 
It is submitted that there must be a responsibility on all stakeholders to ensure that 
consumers are adequately informed about mortgage laws and the consequences of non-
payment. The banks have argued that before the mortgage agreement is entered into, a 
conveyancer will explain the consumer’s rights and obligations under section 26 of the 
Constitution and the NCA.507 This practice should continue and it is also important for 
consumers to be informed in a language that they understand. In fact, the NCA provides that 
the consumer has a right to receive information in plain and understandable language.508  
In addition, one of the purposes of the NCA is ‘addressing and correcting imbalances 
in negotiating power between consumers and credit providers by providing consumers with 
education about consumer rights.’ This is done through the National Credit Regulator which 
is tasked with disseminating and promoting information about the NCA to the public.509 It is  
submitted that knowledge is power and if a consumer knows about certain rights that have 
been introduced by the NCA to protect them, this would reduce sales in execution of homes. 
In particular, the reinstatement mechanism and the debt review process are significant 
                                            
503 Ibid 29.  
504 Ibid 30. Also see L Marais et al ‘The non-payment of mortgage bonds in South Africa: the voice of 
defaulters’ Acta Structilia (2005) 11 & Maleke (note 160 above) para 5.  
505 See facts of Mokebe (note 1 above). 
506 L Marais et al ‘The non-payment of mortgage bonds in South Africa: the voice of defaulters’ Acta Structilia 
(2005) 11. 
507 See Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit para 12 in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
508 Section 63& 64 of the Act. 
509 Section 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
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lifelines that are granted to consumers who struggle to fulfil their financial obligations.510 
Another suggestion is for consumers, before even getting the home loan, to research 
and get as much information as they can before binding themselves to a 20-30 year loan. 
They should shop around to try and get the best possible deal.511 After the affordibility 
assessments are done and the bank makes the loan offer, consumers should not take the 
maximum home loan amount they can afford.512 Instead, they should buy a home that costs 
less so that they can pay an instalment that is higher than the one required by the bank. 
Paying more than the required instalment results in paying up the loan earlier than expected 
which also means that less interest will be paid overall.513 Furthermore, if consumers face a 
financial hardship and subsequently default in payments, they will already be ahead in their 
payments. For example, if the bank offers a home loan of R1 000 000, the consumer can take 
up a home loan of R800 000 and buy a home for this amount. If the monthly imstalments are 
R8000, the consumer can pay R10000 which is in excess of R2000 every month and would 
drastically reduce the loan period and interest paid on the loan.  
Lastly, consumers should live within their means because overindetedness is a major 
reason for homes being foreclosed. The debts that consumers have should be as low as 
possible especially when they are also owing under a home loan.514 There are numerous 
books on budgeting and finances in general which will enlighten them on how to spend 
responsibly.515 In essence, prevention is key when it comes to foreclosure. When consumers 
are knowledgeable about their finances, options and rights; they make better decisions.  
 
6.2.2 Be proactive  
 
Numerous cases, especially those dealt with in the Mokebe case have also shown that 
consumers will avoid the banks when they face financial difficulties.516 This happens even if 
the banks make substantial attempts to make arrangements to help consumers catch up on 
                                            
510 See Chapter 4 above.  
511 Banks such as FNB, Absa, Standard Bank and Nedbank have bond repayment calculators which are useful in 
determining if consumers can afford the loan.  
512 P Ndumo From Debt to Riches: Steps to Financial Success (2011) 155. 
513 Ibid 142.   
514 Ibid 154.  
515 The classics are GS Clason The Richest Man in Babylon (1926), R Kiyosaki & S Lechter Rich Dad Poor Dad 
1997. Also see a South African book on finances – P Ndumo From Debt to Riches: Steps to Financial Success 
(2011). 
516 Also see Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2013) Property24 available at 
https://www.property24.com/articles/sales-in-execution-know-your-rights/17401 last accessed 10 May 2019. 
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their arrears. When this happens, banks usually institute proceedings to have a consumer’s 
home sold in execution as a last resort.517 It is submitted that consumers need to be proactive 
when they face a financial strain. In many cases, they seek assistance when creditors have 
already obtained a court order. Instead, they should contact the creditor when they experience 
financial difficulties and they should not ignore any notices that may be sent by the 
creditor.518 A sale in execution can therefore be prevented. This is especially because it is not 
beneficial for either party. 
 The banks have argued that they pursue foreclosure as a last resort. It is therefore 
submitted that consumers have multiple opportunities to rearrange their obligations with the 
bank. However, they must not make unrealistic commitments or act under pressure when they 
decide on the correct course to take.519  
Some suggestions that have been made are that consumers should consult an expert 
such as a debt counsellor to assist with drawing up a budget which will help them catch up on 
the arrears. This can be used to negotiate with creditors.520 Consumers can get such assistance 
by applying for debt review when they cannot keep up with their financial obligations so they 
can be declared overindebted.521 
Consumers can also contact an alternative dispute resolution agent such as the 
National Debt Mediation Association to assist them to reach a resolution with creditors, that 
benefits both parties.522 The section 129(1) notice includes a provision that consumers take 
such action to reach an agreement with the creditors so that debt enforcement proceedings are 
not institutted. Consumers must thus respond immediately to a section 129(1) notice because 
ignoring it could have dire consequences.523 Similarly, when consumers receive summons, 
they must file a notice of intention to defend the matter if they have a good defence. They 
must place facts that the courts must consider in the foreclosure application so that the court 
can hear their side and make a decision based on all the relevant circumstances. In the end, 
                                            
517 See Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit 21-30 in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
518Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2013) Property24 available at 
https://www.property24.com/articles/sales-in-execution-know-your-rights/17401 last accessed 10 May 2019. 
Also see the banks’ affidavits in Mokebe (note 1 above). 
519Ibid. 
520 Ibid. 
521 See Chapter 4 for debt review proceedings.  
522 Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2013) Property24 available at 




consumers who are proactive can take control of the situation and they will be better off for 
doing so.524 
 
6.2.3 Minimise loss 
 
If the sale of the home is inevitable, consumers should try and sell the home through an estate 
agent or privately find a buyer who will approach the bank with an offer. In this way, the 
property will yield the best possible price.525 It is submitted that this will prevent the home 
from being sold for significantly less than the market value through a public auction or 
reduce a shortfall. In addition, banks have programmes specifically created to help consumers 
who are struggling to pay their mortgage bond.526 For instance, Absa Bank’s Help U Sell 
programme utilises estate agents who market the property in the relevant area and who are 
experts in selling distressed property.527 If the market value is still not realised or the home is 
sold in execution, consumers are entilted to have the shortfall explained as well the charges 
and fees associated with the sale.528 
 
6.3 The Role of Creditors 
 
Creditors, especially the banks, play a vital role in society. As stated in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis, most consumers do not have the financial capacity to pay the full price of a home and 
they borrow money from the bank in order to do so. Home loans are therefore a major 
mechanism that allows consumers to gain access to adequate housing, which is an important 
socio-economic right.529 The mortgage bond grants creditors the right to sell homes in 
execution where consumers default in their payments. However, as discussed in Chapters 3 to 
5, such right is restricted by the Constitution, NCA, court rules and practice notes.  
                                            
524 Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2013) Property24 available at  
https://www.property24.com/articles/sales-in-execution-know-your-rights/17401 last accessed 10 May 2019. 
Absa stated in an affidavit that in a private sale, the home could be sold for about 80% of its market value whilst 
in a public auction, it is usually 50-55% of the market value. See Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit para 23 in 
Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
525 Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2013) Property24 available at  
https://www.property24.com/articles/sales-in-execution-know-your-rights/17401 last accessed 10 May 2019. 
526 See P Ndumo From Debt to Riches: Steps to Financial Success (2011) 159-161. Absa Bank has a ‘Help U 
Sell’ programme whislt Standard Bank has an ‘EasySell’ Programme. First National Bank has a ‘Quick Sell’ 
programme and Nedbank has assisted sales. 
527 See Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit para 19 in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
528 Author unknown ‘Sale in execution: Know your rights’ (2013) Property24 available at 
https://www.property24.com/articles/sales-in-execution-know-your-rights/17401 last accessed 10 May 2019. 
529 Also see Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit para 52&53 in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
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In particular, a reading of the legislative authority shows that a higher burden has been placed 
on creditors who seek to foreclose consumers homes. The role of creditors who provide home 
loans will be discussed under the following headings:  
• Be transparent 
• Be flexible 
• Pursue the sale in execution as a last resort 
• Do not abuse court procedure 
 
6.3.1 Be transparent 
 
From the outset, banks must be transparent with consumers. They must do this by 
communicating to the consumer their various rights, duties and options under the mortgage 
bond agreement.530 For example, creditors must explain that consumers must let them know 
if they face financial strain so that the terms of the agreement can be altered to help the 
consumers keep up with payments.531 This creates a relationship of trust and when consumers 
are knowlegeable about the transaction, both parties benefit.  
 Another suggestion is for creditors to offer life insurance and retrenchment cover that 
is affordable for consumers who are more vulnerable to their financial situation changing 
drastically in a manner that would deem them unable to pay the instalment.532 
Furthermore, creditors must engage with consumers throughout the loan period. The 
consumers’ bond accounts should be sent to them and must be communicated in such a way 
that consumers understand what it says. When consumers default, banks must react promptly 
to find out why.533 In essence, a hands-on approach is necssary because when both parties are 
aware of the loan repayments, it is easier to identify when there is a struggle to repay and 
arrangements can be made to alter the agreement.  
 
6.3.2 Be flexible 
 
Home loans can last for up to 30 years and in that time consumers can face financial strain. 
                                            
530 Ibid, para 12. 
531 Report on Public Hearing on Housing, Evictions and Repossessions (2008) 46.  
532 Ibid 44. 
533 See L Marais et al ‘The non-payment of mortgage bonds in South Africa: the voice of defaulters’ Acta 
Structilia (2005) 17 for a discussion of the results of consumers who participated in a survey about their 
mortgage bonds and their suggestions.  
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Research has shown that the reasons for defaulting in payments are linked to a direct change 
in the financial situation of consumers and their families, such as unemployment or an 
illness.534 Some of these things cannot be prevented which is why creditors need to be 
flexible and accommodating in allowing the agreement to be restructured to fit the needs of 
consumers. Banks have said that a sale in execution is not in their interest and that they are in 
the business of financing homes, not foreclosure.535 By giving consumers an opportunity to 
catch up on payments or reduce the instalments, amoung other things, this can ensure that 
consumers keep their homes and creditors are eventually paid the outstanding balance on the 
loan.  
 
6.3.3 Use the sale in execution as a last resort 
 
Creditors must have sufficient reason for the sale in execution. The facts and circumstances 
of each case will vary and the courts will be tasked with determining whether the sale in 
execution was pursued as a last resort. Brits argues that there must be a sufficient link 
between the reason for the sale in execution versus the effect that this will have on 
consumers.536 In particular, if the arrear amounts are trifling, a sale in execution should not be 
permitted because the debt could be fulfilled by other means and the prejudice cause to 
consumers who will lose their home is much higher that the prejudice that would be caused to 
creditors.537 
 
6.3.4 Do not abuse court procedure 
 
The Constitutional Court in the Jaftha case held that where there has not been an abuse of 
court procedure, a sale in execution should ordinarily be granted by the courts.538 It is 
therefore submitted that this is an important requirement when instituting legal proceedings to 
foreclose consumers’ homes. Creditors must follow the correct procedures in their entirety 
                                            
534 See L Marais et al ‘The non-payment of mortgage bonds in South Africa: the voice of defaulters’ (2005) Acta 
Structilia 14. 
535 See C Ryan ‘SA banks sued for R60bn in home repossession case’ (2017) GroundUp available at 
https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/r60bn-home-repossession-suit-against-banks-20170816 
last accessed 10 May 2019. Also see G Salter ‘Repossession of homes: Nedbank responds to criticism’ (2017) 
available at https://www.groundup.org.za/article/repossession-homes-nedbank-responds-criticism/ last accessed 
10 May 2019.  
536 R Brits ‘Sale in Execution of mortgaged property of homes may not result in arbitrary deprivation of 
property’ (2013) SAJHR 536 at 543. 
537 Jaftha (note 17 above) find para & Maleke (note 160 above) para 5.4. 
538 Jaftha (note 17 above) para 58. 
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especially because the sale could result in consumers losing their homes and this should not 
be taken lightly. For instance, if the mortgage agreement is not attached to the summons or 
the matter has been instituted in the High Court when the Magistrates’ Court has 
jurisdiction,539 or personal service of summons has not occurred;540 a sale in execution of a 
home should not be permitted. As much as these new procedures have placed a higher burden 
on creditors who wish to institute proceedings for debt recovery, they are necessary to protect 
consumers’ constitutional right to access adequate housing.  
Generally, banks have argued that they already practice the abovementioned 
suggestions.541 Therefore, it is submitted that they continue or improve upon engaging with 
consumers, accommodating consumers’ needs and selling homes in execution as a last resort 
by following the correct court procedures.  
 
6.4 The Role of the Courts 
 
The main function of South African courts is to adjudicate disputes impartially ‘without fear, 
favour or prejudice.’542 In addition to that function, the NCA implores the courts to balance 
the rights of creditors and consumers.543 A sale in execution is an important mechanism to 
uphold a mortgage bond agreement especially because this type of security allows so many 
people to buy a home. Therefore, foreclosure must not be undermined by consumers as a debt 
enforcement mechanism. Similarly, the foreclosure process must not be abused by creditors at 
the expense of the consumers.544 
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property and arbitrary eviction.545 
The Constitution also gives people the right to access adequate housing.546 The courts must 
therefore be careful and engage in a balancing of the rights of creditors, that is, to be repaid 
the home loan, versus the property rights of consumers in sections 25(1) and section 26 of the 
                                            
539 See Part 5.7.1 of this thesis.  
540 See Part 5.7.2 of this thesis. 
541 See G Salter ‘Repossession of homes: Nedbank responds to criticism’ (2017) available at  
https://www.groundup.org.za/article/repossession-homes-nedbank-responds-criticism/ last accessed 10 May 
2019. Also see Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe and Related Cases 2018 (6) SA 492 
(GJ). 
542 Section 165(1) & (2) of the Constitution. 
543 See section 3 of the NCA discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis; Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd (note 4 above) 
para 17 & SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha (note 4 above) para 35. 
544 Also see R Brits ‘Sale in Execution of mortgaged property of homes may not result in arbitrary deprivation 
of property’ (2013) SAJHR 536 at 544-545. 
545 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. 




Each case is unique and there is a potential for abuse by both creditors and 
consumers.547 The courts have however developed guidelines on the factors to consider, 
although they do not amount to an extensive list of factors. This thesis has consolidated the 
factors mentioned in numerous cases:548 
 
The home: 
• Is the property the primary residence of the consumer and will the consumer be 
rendered homeless if it is sold in execution? If it not, then the rights in section 26 of 
the Constitution are not engaged. The creditor would be justified in selling such 
property because the defendant will not suffer undue hardship or prejudice of losing a 
home. 
• Was a state subsidy used to buy the home?549  
• What is the market value of the home?   
 
The loan agreement:550  
• Is the loan secured by a mortgage bond? 
• What was the amount loaned? 
• What is the amount of arrears and the oustanding balance on the loan? How does this 
compare to the market value of the home?551 
 
The consumer:  
• What circumstances was the debt incurred under?552  
• How old is the consumer?  
• Is the consumer a historically disadvantaged and vulnerable or indignant person?553 
                                            
547 See Brits Supporting Affidavit para 11 in record of Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
548 See Mokebe (note 1 above), Jaftha (note 17 above), Maleke (note 160 above), Nstane (note 192 above) 
Hendricks (note 484 above) & Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Panayiotts 2009 (3) SA 363 (W) para 78-80. 
549 Mortinson (note 61 above) para 33.1-33.2.    
550 See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 60.  
551 If the amount of the arrears is trifling, other alternatives can be used to recover the debt such as 
reinstatement. See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 40 & Maleke (note 160 above) para 5.2-5.3. 
552 See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 60 & Ntsane (note 192 above) para 58.   
553 Maleke (note 160 above) para 3. 
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• What does the payment history of the consumer look like? 
• What was the financial position of the consumer which led to the arrears? Has there 
been an unexpected change which has affected his ability to pay the instalments? 
• What is the current financial position of the consumer? Are there other sources of 
income available to pay the arrears?554  
• Has the consumer made attempts to engage with the creditor to make other 
arrangements to pay the debt?555 
• Does the consumer have dependants such as minor children or elderly parents who 
live in the home and would therefore be impacted by a sale in execution?  
• Does the family have access to alternative adequate housing? 
• Has the consumer refused to privately sell the home or rejected favourable offers to 
purchase by private persons? 
 
The creditor: 
• Did the creditor comply with all the procedures or has there been an abuse of court 
process?556 This includes procedures set out in the NCA, the court rules and practice 
directions.  
• Did the creditor inform the consumer of the section 26(1) right to access adequate 
housing and the need for the consumer to set out their circumstances before the 
court?557  
• Is the creditor pursing foreclosure as a last resort?558 
• What attempts has the creditor made to make arrangements with the consumer? 
• Would the creditor be prejudiced by a delay of the repayment of the loan?  
 
Alternative measures to repay the loan 
• Are there any other less invasive measures to repay the loan that can be explored?559  
                                            
554 For instance the consumer can sell some movable property or get a loan from friends and family.  
555 See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 60.  
556 Jaftha (note 17 above) para 58. 
557 Saunderson (note 18 above)  para 27. 
558 See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 59. 
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o Can the term of the loan increase so as to allow lower instalments?  
o Is the consumer over-indebted and has gone through debt review?560  
o Can the agreement be reinstated under section 129(3) of the NCA? 
o Is redemption under the common law a viable option?  
o Should the matter be postponed to allow a private sale?561  
 
Other factors may be taken into consideration depending on the facts of each case.562 It is 
submitted that the courts must analyse the factors to determine who would suffer the most 
prejudice. In other words, does the interest of creditors to receive payment outweigh the 
interest of consumers to keep the current access they have to adequate housing?563 That is the 
overarching question that the courts must consider to make a just and equitable decision for 
both parties.  
For example, it may be just to allow execution where the consumer lives alone, the 
outstanding balance on the loan is high, the arrears are also high, the consumer defaulted for 
years and ignored all attempts by the creditor to rearrange the obligations under the home 
loan. On the contrary, if the consumer is a historically disadvantaged person who consistently 
paid their instalments for many years, has dependants and was retrenched which lead to 
arrears; this is a different situation. The consumer has built up considerable equity in the 
home so a less invasive way to pay the outstanding loan can be ordered by the courts.  
The courts should also consider the economic interests of the community in general 
and the impact on the economy in relation to access to credit.564 If the procedures to foreclose 





                                                                                                                                       
559 Ibid.  
560 Maleke (note 160 above) para 17. 
561 Gundwana (note 137 above) para 53.    
562 In numerous cases, the courts have explained that this is not an extensive list and the unique set of facts for 
each case will determine the factos to take into considerations. See See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 53 & 
 Standard Bank v Bekker (note 28 above) para 30.  
563 Ntsane (note 192 above) para 42. 
564 L Steyn Statutory Regulation of Forced Sale of a Home in South Africa (LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 
2012) 328.  
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6.5 Recommendations to Improve Foreclosure Proceedings  
 
The amendments to the rules are welcomed and they have changed drastically over the years, 
but they can be improved. South African laws should further protect the constitutionally 
protected right of consumers to access adequate housing. 
Firstly, it is submitted that the rules should make mediation or arbitration compulsory 
for creditors and consumers. A tribunal should be created to specifically deal with sales in 
exeution of homes.565 This is especially because the right to adequate housing is an important 
socio-economic right and execution has to be pursued as a last resort. Moreover, such a 
manner of resolving the issues between parties would be a quick and inexpensive remedy. 
Mediation or arbitration should be compulsory especially if the amounts are trifling, the 
default is for a short period of time and the consumer’s financial situation has changed.  
Additionally, although the rules have given the courts a discretion to set the reserve 
prices of homes and the Mokebe case further held that setting a reserve price is the general 
rule; it is submitted that the rules should have made the setting of a reserve price compulsory. 
If not, then they should have at least expressly prohibited bid rigging. The main argument 
raised against the setting of reserve prices is that it reduces the amount of people interested in 
the property and it is submitted that this argument cannot be given much weight.566 This is 
because the purpose of the sale in execution is to fulfil the full outstanding balance on the 
loan. If the home is sold for a price that is significantly less than its market value, this 
purpose is not fulfilled. Instead consumers are left homeless and still overindebted whilst 
creditors are still owed the shortfall. On the other hand, the buyer becomes enriched and the 
law previously allowed this.567 
In order to combat the issue of not having enough interested buyers, it is submitted 
that the rules should provide for better advertising of the sale in execution. For instance, the 
rules should provide for an auctioneer who has a wide range of advertising methods, network 
of buyers, and expertise in handling auctions, to be hired to handle the sales. Similarly, 
sheriffs could be trained on how to better advertise and conduct the auctions.  
Another submission is that the mortgage shortfall should not be claimed if it is the 
result of an abuse of the sale in execution procedure by the creditor. This is because the 
                                            
565 See Ntsane (note para 192) 97&98. 
566 See Part 5.6.3 of this thesis. Also see Hendricks (note 484 above) para 58.  




overindebted consumers who have already lost their homes are put in a worse off position by 
still being indebted to creditors. If an abuse of the procedure occurred, holding consumers 
liable for the shortfall is unjust.  
Furthermore, although the Constitutional Court decided that a blanket prohibition of 
the sale of homes that are under a certain amount was not appropriate,568 the legislature could 
explore that option for low income housing. This is especially if the housing was acquired 
with a state subsidy.569 It is also submitted that a prohibition of sales in execution of homes 
where the consumers have paid a certain percentage of the loan should also be introduced. 
Shaw suggested 80% of the market value. This is because the home owner has built up equity 
in the home and it would be undesirable to sell it and lose all that equity. 
Lastly, the NCA should be amended to clarify what reinstatement entails because the 
latest amendment has caused even further confusion.570 Although the majority in Nkata 
interpreted the provisions of the Act to offer a lifeline to consumers; the amendments seem to 
contradict those findings. It is therefore imperative for the legislature to refine and rework the 
reinstatement mechanism especially because it is a viable remedy for consumers to keep their 
homes.  
 
6.6  Conclusion 
 
The abovementioned discussion shows that the issue of foreclosure of primary homes is a 
very sensitive topic. On the one hand, creditors must be repaid the money they lent to 
consumers and the strength of a mortgage bond lies in being able to enforce it.571 On the other 
hand, consumers have the right to access adequate housing as well as to not be arbitrarily 
deprived of property.  
Over the years, the procedure to sell homes in execution has changed drastically from 
the traditional approach of enforcing contracts because the parties bound themselves; to the 
approach of balancing the right of creditors and consumers. This balancing act has not been 
an easy task and the courts play an important role in attempting to create just outcomes for 
both creditors and consumers.  
                                            
568 See Jaftha (note 17 above) para 51. 
569 L Steyn LLD thesis (note 564 above) 335. 
570 Ibid 322. Also see Part 4.2.2 of this thesis.  
571 Saunderson (note 18 above) para 3. 
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Whilst the amendments to the rules have made it difficult to foreclose primary homes, the 
courts have also said that they are not trying to create a debtor’s paradise.572 There will be 
very little incentive for consumers to pay their mortgage debt if there is no legal consequence 
to defaulting.573 In fact, if the value of a mortgage bond diminishes, there will be an adverse 
impact on the home loan system as a whole because there will be a much greater risk of 
banks not being able to recover the debt. This would lead to stricter requirements to access a 
mortgage loan such as a greater deposit.574 Reduced access to credit impacts the most on 
poorer consumers who will not be able to afford to buy a home which is one of the most 
essential assets consumers can have. This not only goes against the constitutional right to 
adequate housing, but also an important purpose of the NCA which is to create an accessible 
credit market.  
However, the amendments were necessary because homes were being sold in 
execution under circumstances where the arrear amounts were too small, proper service of 
summons was not effected or for prices way below the market value, among other things. 
Such practices were unjust especially because the Constitution and the NCA aim to create a 
society based on human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights. Foreclosure 
laws must also reflect that vision and only time will tell if the amendments will make a great 
impact to better protect the rights of consumers whilst balancing them with the rights of 
creditors. Whilst there is uncertainty regarding the practices in various jurisdictions, it is 
hoped that over time, clarity can be further provided by the rules board and the courts.  
                                            
572 Seyfrett (note 241 above) para 10. 
573 See Absa’s Supplementary Affidavit 20, para 51-52 in Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe (note 1 above). 
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